Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BC Kashmir/6–949: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

New Delhi, June 9, 1949—10 p. m.

648. Comkas 48.

1. Re Kascom 82,¹ June 3, present thinking USDel is that UNCIP action should be:

(1) Fixing cease fire line separable and urgent. Since GOP agrees give authority MA decide disputed points, Commission should seek immediately same agreement GOI without prejudice claims northern area.

(2) Invite both governments send representatives Srinagar or Simla meet together under auspices Commission to seek agreement truce. Without confining discussion Commission would suggest agreement possible on following basis:

(a) On northern area positions so diametrically opposed attempt compromise formula useless and both governments agree let Nimitz decide.

(b) Both governments agree that there be large scale reduction Azad forces and JK forces, that discussions this end be started immediately, and decisions taken and implemented soon as possible. Whether implementation could occur during truce would depend decisions reached.

(c) GOI agree schedule withdrawal bulk its forces and in any event agreed or proposed schedule be disclosed GOP.

(d) Both governments accept rest of truce terms.

(3) In event above step fails either by rejection proposal by either government or by lack early results Commission would propose to both governments name arbitrator, who as envisaged reftel, would seek work out truce with authority decide any point governments unable agree. He would use August 13 resolution as basis and his interpretation would be final. He would not be bound by Commission’s truce proposals.

(4) If one or both governments reject arbitrator Commission would immediately place case again before SC with report containing its recommendations.

2. Although Commission would propose only steps one and two, it would at same time inform both governments intention take steps three and four in event rejection or failure. Its invitation to joint meeting would be given to press and subsequent exchange of correspondence would be published.

3. USDel believes proposal re joint meeting GOI–GOP essential before it can consider Commissions’ mediating obligations discharged, and is more in nature attempt get parties together rather than continuance negotiations. Aware acceptance proposal may give both governments, particularly GOI, opportunity procrastinate, USDel would endeavor have UNCIP call halt at first signs bogging down.

4. In view necessity arbitrator having sound knowledge history of dispute, USDel considers that only Nimitz, Colban, personal representatives SyG, would have necessary qualifications. While Nimitz harder to refuse, he would run grave risk his prestige as PA adversely affected should such refusal be forthcoming, which USDel deems strong probability. Should Colban be refused SC could then name Nimitz.

5. UNCIP to consider USDel’s plan June 7.

6. Nehru’s Srinagar speech and recent action Indian Assembly have given rise within UNCIP further doubts bona fides GOI protestations her desire follow through her commitments re plebiscite. All members Commission, however, are convinced further effort should be made and Commission now engaged discussion nature that effort.

7. Czech member UNCIP, Chyle, has had private talks with Sheikh Abdullah² and other members Kashmir Government during past ten days. UNCIP members have no legitimate reason deal with Kashmir Government and he volunteers no information re nature of talks. Curious onlookers within UNCIP speculate that he may be discussing possibility independence Kashmir with backing Soviet bloc. Significant however, most his proposals seem directed toward procrastination and delaying arrival Nimitz. His conduct at meeting Commission in general correct and cooperative, but there are signs that under his veneer he is conceited, aggressive, imperious, impatient of opposition. Professes his determination, however, UNCIP should exercise patience both governments continue efforts mediation truce.

Sent Department 648, pouched Karachi, Rangoon, London.

Henderson

1. Telegram 399, p. 1715.
2. Sheikh Mohamad Abdullah, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.