Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

501.BB Palestine/1–449: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, January 4, 1949—1 p. m.

20. Embassy having earlier asked regarding nature counsel being given Abdullah by UK (Dept’s repeat of Amman’s unnumbered, December 29, 4 p. m.¹) Burrows² January 3 stated that some time ago when Abdullah asked for advice UK made 3 points:

(a) If possible Abdullah should not finalize any agreement reached with PGI before Conciliation Commission³ arrives (Burrows said accent is on finalize);

(b) There are great advantages in Abdullah and Egypt reconciling their differences and working together;

(c) UK made clear what it considers reasonable settlement with PGI along lines discussed earlier with Dept., i.e. GazA–Beersheba road as southern boundary Negev; Haifa and Lydda free ports, etc.

2. Upon learning of interview in which PGI representatives threatened Transjordan (paragraph 5, Dept’s 4819, December 30⁴) Foreign Office telegraphed Kirkbride⁵ to tell Abdullah that it still considered its advice (paragraph 1 above) sound. In view HMG, Abdullah would be courting difficulties if he should continue to negotiate with PGI while Israeli forces still in Egypt. However, HMG aware serious responsibility involved for UK if it should advise Abdullah to refrain from any negotiations which Abdullah wished to undertake. Consequently, although HMG still hoped King would be able to “spin out” negotiations until CC arrives, Kirkbride “should not try to re strain Abdullah from any course of action upon which Abdullah decides in full knowledge facts.”

3. In same instruction Kirkbride was told to make clear that if Abdullah, acting upon Jericho resolution accepts formal union between Palestine and Transjordan without limiting this to Arab areas Palestine, UK would have to make clear that it does not recognize and cannot support any claims by Abdullah to areas which may be incorporated into Jewish state.

4. Burrows said that foregoing means Abdullah is free to act as he thinks best regarding negotiations and that he is not under any UK restraint.

5. Burrows said Foreign Office has just received report of January 1 meeting Jerusalem between Abdullah Tel for Abdullah and PGI representatives. Meeting “went rather well.” Israelis insisted confining “armistice” talks to Arab Legion area only and listed as points of interest to PGI access northern potash works and suggested re starting southern plant for which water would have to come from Transjordan.

Israelis suggested that boundaries should be defined between Arab Legion and Israeli forces, that prisoners should be exchanged and organization set up to handle claims. Israelis favored dividing Jerusalem and Tel replied this might be acceptable if Arab part Jerusalem included Arab quarters outside old city. Tel mentioned among Arab points of interest return Arabs of Lydda, Ramallah and Jaffa, and suggested he would like to discuss future of Galilee. Israelis made no comment.

6. Burrows asked classification should be observed regarding paragraph 5 above “since Abdullah is negotiating without knowledge Transjordan government” and should be protected from leaks.

7. Burrows commented that UK is pleased talks are continuing and that there have been “no more ultimata.” He thought it obvious that while talks are technically concerned with armistice, they have already gone well beyond this limit into field peace settlement. Burrows opined limiting talks to Arab Legion area “might be sinister,” since there is school of Arab thought (including Samir Pasha) which believes that as soon as some progress is made with Transjordan, Israeli forces will drive south from Baisan along Jordan valley thus cutting off Iraqis who at present show no signs of either negotiating or going home. Arab Legion is aleady spread thin and could not take over Iraqi front unless assured it would not have to meet Israeli attacks.

8. Asked regarding British ideas for road ahead, Burrows said Foreign Office still believes, and apparently Ambassador Griffis agrees, next move should be US and UK reaching understanding regarding territorial objectives (Embassy’s top secret despatch 2497 December 21⁶ and A–2377⁷ December 22). He said British Embassy Washington was instructed January 3 to suggest to Dept. that these talks should begin at once. Foreign Office was encouraged by British Embassy report December 28 that Department willing discuss with UK policy regarding Conciliation Commission which according Foreign Office logically should embrace territorial thinking.

9. Please keep Embassy fully informed.

Holmes

1. Presumably telegram 176, December 29, 1948, 5 p. m., not printed.
2. Bernard A. B. Burrows, Head of the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office.
3. The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, hereinafter an notated as the Palestine Conciliation Commission.
4. This was a repeat of telegram 281 to Tel Aviv, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1704.
5. Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan.
6. Not printed (867N.01/12–2148); it transmitted a memorandum of December 17, 1948, prepared by the British War Office, which dealt “with the strategic significance of Palestine and in particular with the importance which the British War Office attaches to the location of Israel’s southern frontier.” This memorandum was a followup to the Douglas–Bevin meeting of December 14, as described in telegram 5244 from London of the same day, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1670.
7. Ibid., p. 1680.