501.BB Palestine/1–2349: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State
niact
152. Palun 7. Under Bundle’s instructions, John Reedman, senior political adviser [Acting] Mediator’s staff, arrived Athens from Rhodes afternoon January 22 for purpose confidentially acquainting USDel progress Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.
Egyptians and Israelis have agreed on preamble to armistice agreement and separately on Faluja pocket (Unpal 7).1
Differences on other points are as follows:
Israeli position: (1) Eytan informally proposed re coastal strip effective withdrawal Egyptian forces leaving such defense units as are agreed upon for administration and maintenance police control; (2) Israelis will accept principle withdrawal Israeli mobile and striking forces from area in northwest Negev as yet undefined which both sides would consider as threat to other. Bunche believes area might approximate that south of October 14 line; (3) Israelis will not agree to any armistice line which would result in advance Egyptian forces from present positions; (4) Israelis will not agree to return Egyptians in any form to Bir Asluj; (5) Israelis will not negotiate on basis of Egyptian civil governor in Beersheba; (6) Israelis hold firm position to retain El Auja but might not prevent agreement on this point alone. Israelis very probably would not permit Egyptians to return.
[Page 690]Egyptian position: (1) Egyptians expect adherence November 13 line under November 4 resolution; (2) Egyptians will accept present lines in coastal strip which coincide approximately with November 13 line; (3) Egyptians prepared withdraw (Israeli point 2) on basis agreement but are likely to press for Israeli withdrawal to November 13 line; (4) Egyptians will press for November 13 provisions re Bir Asluj and Beersheba except willing to modify claim to defense forces in Bir Asluj for civil administration and police; (5) El Auja must be held as defense outpost; (6) status quo requested for Egyptian forces in Hebron-Bethlehem area but will work out arrangements definitely to include [t]his group in armistice. Israelis accept this position.
Bunche believes agreement can be worked out for coastal strip and for principle of withdrawal in greater part northwest Negev but fears armistice may fail because no compromise can be reached on apparently (approximately five characters garbled) points of Bir Asluj and Beersheba and El Auja. Bunche feels it would be regrettable if armistice agreement should fail for these reasons and hopes US Government will consider what diplomatic action it could take at Tel Aviv and Cairo; had suggestion closeness agreement on major points should not be prevented by less important considerations. Bunche considers time factor important because negotiations have already lasted ten days, Israelis may modify views after January 25 election, Egyptians may modify views after January 26 meeting Arab League PolComm and present agreement re Faluja pocket might collapse if no armistice agreement.
It seems apparent Israeli military may be willing risk [the loss of?] political credit of agreement before election and possibility Bunche will report Israeli non-compliance SC November 4 resolution to UN in order to keep Egyptians out of Negev. It also seems apparent Egyptians hope to retain token positions in Bir Asluj and Beersheba and thus to score political victory in spite of military defeats. Egyptians undoubtedly consider such positions would be advantageous to Egypt at time of political and geographic settlement.
Reedman informed information re Israeli and Egyptian positions plus Bunche’s views would confidentially be reported Department for consideration as to what action, if any, could be taken. It was added that it might not be appropriate for US alone to approach Tel Aviv and Cairo in view US membership Conciliation Commission.
As Bunche has not yet reported to Lake Success re present stage negotiations Reedman requests substance not be repeated elsewhere for moment.
Sent Department 152, Jerusalem 2.