Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper to Mr. Mark F. Ethridge

secret

[Washington,] January 27, 1949.

I. General—The attitude of the Arab states individually and collectively during United Nations consideration of the Palestine question has been marked by the following features:

(a) At the outset of the General Assembly consideration of the question in April 1947 there was unanimous agreement among the Arab states who were members of the UN as well as the Arab Higher Committee that Palestine should become a unitary Arab state. On the surface this position has been officially maintained up to the present. Their opposition to the Partition of Palestine was based on historical, legal, ethnic and other grounds. That many of their contentions had merit cannot be denied.

(b) Arab governmental leaders have for the most part been prodded by the populace, particularly in the cities of the Arab states to liberate Palestine from the Jewish hold. With very few exceptions these Arab leaders have not only done little publicly to try and cool the ardor of the populace, but have more often taken positions which tended to fan the flames even though the governments possessed little or no power to back up their public position with effective action.

(c) Strong resentment existed among Arab leaders and peoples towards the U.S. particularly during the 1947 General Assembly and immediately there afterwards, and on May 14th when the US gave de facto recognition to the Government of the State of Israel. During the past six months there is evidence that this anti-American sentiment has subsided slightly. There is increasing evidence that a number of the Arab leaders would like to get out of the Palestine situation as gracefully as possible. Nevertheless, there still exists considerable unrest and agitation inspired by more extreme elements which makes the situation in several of the Arab states somewhat unsettled.

(d) The policy of the Arab Governments regarding a Palestine settlement was frequently characterized by a stubborn unwillingness to yield on points which might have created a more suitable solution from the Arab point of view that the situation which developed after their unwillingness to yield. Many of the points upon which they have failed to concede, have frequently seemed relatively insignificant in light of subsequent developments.

(e) In UN negotiations one is frequently confronted with a situation where Arab leaders are saying one thing publicly for home consumption yet at the same time privately are trying to find ways and means of settling the situation in a more moderate way.

(f) The unity of the Arab states in the Palestine situation was fairly well preserved until they undertook military action in Palestine. The failure of the governments to take effective action or no action at all has led to mutual recrimination and has all but shattered cooperation in the Arab League on the Palestine question. The position of Transjordan throughout the UN discussions was never exactly the same as the position taken by the other Arab states. There is increasing evidence that the Arab Governments would like to have the Palestine question settled so that they can get along with economic and social developments in their own individual countries.

(g) The problem of the 500,000 Arab refugees from Palestine created by the Jewish influx and Israeli military activity has placed a very heavy burden upon all of the Arab states excepting Saudi Arabia and Yemen. An adequate settlement of this potentially dangerous and electric situation is essential.

II. The attitudes of the individual Arab states may be summarized as follows:

[Here follow the attitudes of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen.]

III. Conclusion—Most of the Arab leaders seem to realize that their cause against the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine is now hopeless. They are not, however, as yet able to take a position in public recognizing the state of Israel. Only time will permit them to take such a position. In spite of their aversion to the policy of the U.S. the great majority of the Arab leaders recognize the realities of the position of the U.S. in the world today and many of them hope that the situation in Palestine can be ended so that they can resume more normal relations toward the U.S. The position of the U.K. in the Arab world has not been enhanced by the policy pursued by that government during the past year and a half. Arab leaders are apprehensive of the intentions of the Soviet Union. They would probably prefer to get out of the present situation and into more normal relations with U.S. The tone and feeling of the Arab Delegations in the General Assembly of 1948 as compared with the previous session was much more friendly towards the U.S. in spite of all that transpired between November 1947 and September 1948. There is a feeling of some bitterness on the part of some of the Arab leaders over the willingness of the Security Council to take strong measures in July 1948 directed at the Arab states but absence of a similar willingness to do the same against the state of Israel in the fall of the same year. This feeling, however, does not permit them to indulge in the hope that there will be a change in the American policy. In spite of insinuations a year ago that the Arab states might leave the United Nations, they have not done so although they are undoubtedly quite cynical about the role of the UN. An economic boost to that area might well alleviate some of the bitter feeling in the Arab states.

When the General Assembly was considering the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission during the latter part of November and early December of 1948 there was considerable speculation as to how the Arab states would vote. If the Arab states, the Soviet Bloc and the other Asiatic states had all voted against the proposal it would not have passed. However, since the particular objective seemed to be conciliation by peaceful means and there did not appear to be any strong reaffirmation of the November 29, 1947 resolution the Arab leaders were able to indicate to their Asiatic friends their willingness to have them abstain or vote in favor of the December 11, 1948 resolution. (This required some prodding by the United States Delegation, however!)