501.BB Palestine/4–1349: Telegram
Mr. Mark F. Ethridge to the Secretary of State
291. Palun 126. For the Secretary from Ethridge. Two days after Commission’s talk with Ben-Gurion last week Lipschitz, one of three Israeli members of Jerusalem Committee set up in Foreign Office, called me and urgently asked to see me. Obvious his primary purpose was to arrange meetings here for Comay who seems to be second man at Foreign Office during Sharett’s absence. Comay came to Jerusalem and talked with Halderman and Yenissey, Turkish member of Jerusalem Committee. Afterwards he had three-hour talk with me, during course of which he disclosed Israel’s position on almost all matters under PCC consideration. Following is summary of Israeli views on primary questions:
Jerusalem: Comay said that Ben-Gurion had been angered by Yalcin’s observation that Commission was bound by its terms of reference and question of full internationalization was not therefore debatable. Ben-Gurion had reacted more strongly than had been intended and had therefore over-stated Israel’s position. Intent of Ben-Gurion’s statement was that if Commission felt bound to propose full international regime in letter and spirit of resolution, Israel would be compelled to oppose in GA. It was not Ben-Gurion’s intention to deny possibility of acceptable solution within resolution. He desired to correct PCC report which was sent to Lake Success and would write the Commission letter correcting impression left upon Commission. [Page 912] Comay’s main point was that Commission should strive to achieve plan acceptable to parties concerned, namely Israel, Transjordan (or other adjacent state) and UN. If Committee were to proceed without reference to states immediately concerned, product of its work would probably be unacceptable and would not contribute to solution of problem. He considered it possible to achieve plan which would be acceptable to all concerned. He was convinced that UN would accept plan containing more limited form of internationalization than might have been contemplated when resolution was adopted last December, provided plan were acceptable to parties concerned. Ben-Gurion, basis of his own extensive experience with UN here is convinced that GA would not only accept such plan, but would be extremely pleased to achieve settlement of problem.
Comay advised “month of masterly inactivity” while Transjordan and Israel try to work out through special committee agreement on Jerusalem. He thought there would be no difficulty about Jewish-Arab lines in Jerusalem since Israel would be willing to compensate for Arab expropriated property inside city. What Israel had proposed to Transjordan, in informal talks that seem to be going on now, is division of city into three zones: Jewish, Arab and international (Old City). Dayan told me later that Transjordan had shown reluctance to discuss any matters other than these strictly within armistice terms although Transjordan had previously evidenced willingness to effect opening of Bethlehem and Scopus roads and to deal with other technical matters preliminary to any peace settlement.
Comment: Ben-Gurion’s strong reaction in which he virtually announced that Jerusalem would be capital of Israel did in fact create strong reaction in Commission. As reported previously, French and Turkish delegates refused to allow their members of Jerusalem Committee to meet formally with Comay for further explanations of Israeli position. For USDel I said that whether other members met or not I would instruct Halderman to do so and to explore with both sides and all parties concerned fullest possible area of agreement. Commission finally agreed that Halderman should represent Jerusalem Committee in talks with Comay and convey information to Commission. I told Comay that I did not of course consider that he had so far helped us toward a solution and I hoped he would continue his talks with Halderman and give us his full views. He promised to do so “a little later”. I am sure what he has in mind is trying to work out a deal with Transjordan and present the Commission with written agreement, achieved perhaps in manner of Tulkarm agreement. Nevertheless, I am willing to consider any agreement that can be made between them although I am afraid it will give my French colleague apoplexy.
[Page 913]Comay has so far not even discussed anything substantive on Jerusalem. It is obvious from French plan previously reported that French will press for full internationalization including international force, special courts, distinct citizenship and special currency for Jerusalem. I consider that impossible and fantastic. I am afraid, however, that Turks will swallow it and that we may come to situation where there will be two reports to GA although I will do all I can to prevent it. Turkish attitude is not based so much upon any consuming passion for protection of holy places as upon distinct pro-Arab bias and upon, I fear, growing desire to put Israel in defensive position whenever possible perhaps a personal reaction to Israel’s refusal to give at any point. My own position, I feel, accords with Department’s and with my Contel 192, March 7.
It occurs to me Ankara may be giving Yalcin and Yenissey fairly free hand in this stage PCC work and that their reaction is largely personal. Yalcin, for example has consistently opposed Rhodes as meeting place and maneuvered for Geneva whereas Sarper, according to NY tel 450, April 31 did not think Turkey would object to Rhodes. PCC work on Jerusalem, refugees and other matters might proceed more smoothly if Department were able to instruct our Embassy Ankara to keep Turkish Government regularly informed of developments and to suggest importance of cooperation within PCC. French, although better informed re Palestine than Turks and having understandably more rigid position re Jerusalem may also have personal bias; consequently French understanding of US position might be improved through their Embassy. Washington views such as those reported Amman telegram 85, April 112 are case in point.
Refugees: Comay’s position on refugees was pretty much as has been reported with few additions. He said that at low point there were about 70,000 Arabs in Israel-held territory but number has increased to about 130,000 through infiltration and through taking over of new territory, such as Tulkarm and in Beersheba area. Israel did not feel, therefore, that it could take many more. He asked if Commission had any figure in mind. I told him Commission had not discussed figure because it stuck to principle of resolution but that my own feeling was that since Israel had once accepted state with 400,000 Arabs in it she should be prepared to take back at least 250,000 refugees and compensate others. He said it was completely impossible, that Israel was deterred at moment from reducing her immigration quota of Jews only by sentiment and political dynamite. On any practical basis, he [Page 914] added, immigration would certainly have to be cut because adequate employment, housing and services were not being provided for those who are coming in and Israel could not possibly double her burden in next two years. Later in conversation he said that it was probable that total number of Arabs in Israeli territory might reach 200,000 eventually through infiltration and “our taking a token number”. Aside from economic burden, Israel determined not to have any fifth column inside its lines particularly if faced by stronger Arab state backed by major power.
Comment: It is obvious that Israel has not changed position on refugee problem whatever. Israeli Cabinet yesterday considered memorandum of suggestions from Commission as to steps that might, be taken now to mitigate plight of refugees and also proposal of statement by Ben-Gurion clarifying Israeli position and mollifying Arab sentiment. No word has come from that meeting. Israel does not intend to take back one refugee more than she is forced to take and she does not intend to compensate any directly if she can avoid it. Ben-Gurion and Comay have both argued that refugees are inevitable result of war and no state in modern history has been expected to repatriate them. Both cite Baltic states and Turkey. They contend also that number greatly exaggerated and they can prove it. Israel refuses to accept any responsibility whatever for creation of refugees. I flatly told Ben-Gurion and Comay that while Commission was no tribunal to judge truth of contentions, I could not for moment accept that statement in face of Jaffa, Deir Yassein, Haifa and all reports that come to us from refugee organizations that new refugees are being created every day by repression and terrorism such as now being reported from Haifa. I have repeatedly pointed out political weakness and brutality of their position on refugees but it has made little impression. They are aware that world sentiment is being roused to some extent by plight of Arab refugees but they contend they are being subject to calumnies and vicious propaganda. I have answered that they are master propagandists of world and that if Arabs had tenth the genius at it they would rouse public opinion to where it would engulf Israel in wave of indignation, particularly in view of fact that world has so greatly helped Israel to come into being. They don’t admit that world has helped. Comay told me that but for US intervention at wrong time (apparently with proposal for second truce) Israel would be at Jordan. “And,” he added, “she needs space”.
Territorial Settlements: Comay said that there will be little difficulty with Lebanon or Syria and “only minor local adjustments of border on a give-and-take basis to increase our security” will be suggested. [Page 915] He thought either Lebanon or Egypt might be first to sign peace agreement. Israel, he said, has no territorial claims on Egypt and he did not think Egypt would make any on Israel. Settlement of Gaza strip, he thought, would be between Transjordan and Egypt rather than between Israel and Egypt.
As to Transjordan, Comay said that Abdullah had advanced idea of port on Mediterranean with corridor across Negeb but Israel had no intention of giving up Negeb or allowing it to be cut in half. He felt that something could be worked out to give Transjordan guaranteed access to some port, either Gaza or one further north. Any arrangement with Transjordan would depend upon the position of Arab Palestine. He repeated that if Arab Palestine were to fall to Transjordan, which he considers inevitable, a “new situation” would arise in which Israel would have to give greater consideration to her security. That would involve not giving up any territory in Samaria but of getting more by going to the Samarian foothills. Tulkarm, for instance, would sooner or later have to become Jewish. It would also increase security, importance of Western Galilee which Israel intended to hold in any case.
Comay did not feel that Abdullah would have any great reluctance to give up more of Arab Palestine because, he argued, “He is getting a bonus out of the war by additional territory and more population”. Comay insisted that Israel would not sign any peace with Transjordan that envisioned extension of British-Transjordan treaty to Arab Palestine. He said there has been mention of federation of Transjordan and Arab Palestine.
Comay thought that in southern Arab bulge, the armistice lines would pretty well hold.
Comment: Israel’s position as to Gaza strip is, I believe, that she does not want it with 330,000 Arabs in it, 230,000 of them refugees, particularly since she has back country upon which they have been living. She is probably content at the moment to let it wither. That is also true as to Tulkarm. Palestine Arabs with whom I have talked say that armistice clause not only created thousands of new refugees in that they will eventually be driven out of villages that were given up but that it was the death sentence of Tulkarm, which has lived on rich land that Abdullah surrendered. Palestine Arabs are bitter with Abdullah, Britain and US. They contend that our inactivity amounted to pressure upon Abdullah to sign.
It is obvious from Comay’s statement of Israel’s territorial claims that she is in direct contravention of US policy. When I told Comay that he was certainly aware that President and Secretary had only recently reaffirmed to Sharret US views on territorial settlement he replied, “yes, but we hope to change Washington’s mind”.
[Page 916]General Comment: In spite of all Department has done since January, Israel has stiffened rather than modified her position. Armistice talks emphasized Arab weakness because, as Bunche told me, Israel gave at no point and Arabs gave at every point where concession was necessary. Israel intends to exploit that weakness to the maximum.
Again it seems to me that Israeli position has brought into question whole US policy as to Palestine. One matter of concern is that unfair arrangements sponsored by UN and approved by US would have serious repercussions in Middle East and tend to discredit US, besides providing good basis for exploitation by unfriendly powers.