Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume VI

867N.01/4–1649: Telegram

The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Amman, April 16, 1949—8 a. m.

166. With conclusion of Trans Jordan–Israel armistice agreement, next item on Transjordan–Israel agenda is presumably initiation talks through special committee (Article VIII Armistice Agreement) leading to settlement remaining differences and to peace accord between two countries. Israel for its reasons is most anxious to commence such direct talks without third party soonest and is probably pressing Transjordan through various mediums in this regard. As Department is aware, Abdullah is also anxious to settle Palestine problem soonest but at present is taking no action re special committee in view public reaction in Transjordan and Arab Palestine to armistice agreement (last paragraph Legation’s 158, April 9¹). However, as resentment wanes, it may be expected Abdullah will appoint Transjordan delegates to special committee and instruct them meet early date with Israelis. In ensuing talks it is thought that in his desire for settlement and in belief RI [he?] could count on no outside assistance, he would be inclined accede somewhat too rapidly and generously to Israeli demands which include Jerusalem settlement and other points.

While it is realized that policy of US Govt is to encourage and promote steps which might lead to settlement Palestine problem, it is equally true that cardinal point of US policy is support UN. It would seem, however, that with commencement special committee talks and with probable accession by Transjordan to Israeli demands, UN, PCC and GA Resolution December 11 would be relegated to background position of insignificance and future of Jerusalem and other matters would be decided without taking into account world community. With this possibility in mind, it is suggested Department might wish consider instructing me advise King on friendly and personal basis that he might do well to proceed slowly re special committee talks in order await outcome Lausanne Conference and possible further negotiations under auspices PCC. Although King has often expressed his belief that UN has proven itself ineffective and impotent, it is thought he would nonetheless accept this advice, which might be coupled with reaffirmation US attitude re internationalization Jerusalem and US policy on final territorial settlement.²

Sent Department 166, repeated Jerusalem 89, for USDel PCC, London 27.

Stabler

1. Not printed.
2. The Department, in its reply of April 20, stated that it had “given careful consideration suggestion advanced ur 166 Apr 16 but after review all factors involved believes it not desirable approach King this sense.” (telegram 49, 867N.01/4–1649)