867N.01/5–2449: Telegram
The Chargé in Transjordan (Stabler) to the Secretary of State
215. Situation now developing with respect to special committee talks has many of earmarks which characterized “negotiations” on Arab triangle. Israelis are presenting strong and irrevocable demands as well as insisting on what Arabs should agree to receive in return. At same time Israelis are indicating that if their demands are not satisfied, they will obtain them by other means. Thus Israelis, in hope of intimidating Transjordan into acceptance, are starting familiar pressure treatment, including veiled threat of force. It cannot be doubted that Dayan’s visit to Jerusalem (Jerusalem telegram 370 to Dept1) was calculated attempt to have word conveyed to Transjordan that Israeli patience nearly exhausted.
It is true that at Rhodes Transjordan accepted in principle solution to matters mentioned in clause 2 Article 8 of Transjordan–Israel armistice agreement. (No mention need be made at this time of fact that Israeli refused discuss question of cease-fire until Transjordan had given agreement in principle to these points.) Such acceptance in principle still exists and Transjordan still willing to make agreements on these points provided Israel will satisfy certain Transjordan demands. It is one thing for Transjordan to state what it wishes to receive as compensation; it it another for Israel to state what Transjordan should be willing to receive. (For example, Israel seems intent on providing electricity for old city and on giving Arabs free use Bethlehem road. Israel does not appear interested in fact that Arabs have no particular desire for either.) Agreement on basis latter could hardly be defined as having been reached by negotiations, and consent in genuine meaning those terms.
Transjordan has been subjected to much criticism for giving in to Israeli demands in triangle area for it has been argued that if Transjordan resisted and Israel had resorted to force, world opinion would have been shocked and UN would have instituted measures to restrain Israel. However, it cannot be said that US response to Abdullah’s plea for assistance gave any such hopeful indication. As result this storm bitter criticism by Palestine Arabs and many others, both King and Governors, have been badly frightened and all indications point to [Page 1050] fact they will refuse acquiesce in any further attempts at “blackmail”. It can be said that Transjordan would prefer Israelis to make good their demands by force rather than meekly submit to threat of force. Only possibility for reaching agreement now would be for Israel to curb its voracious territorial appetite and show some signs of “negotiations and consent in genuine meaning those terms.”
In adopting above policy there is no doubt Transjordan has support and encouragement from certain non-Arab quarters. I also feel that Transjordan would run grave risk, from Arab viewpoint, in submitting further to Israeli demands, notwithstanding blandishments regarding “final territorial disposition”. However it would not be surprising if Transjordan were even now subjected to criticism by some quarters for not being “reasonable” and for not giving in to Israeli demands in interests of “peace”.
Basically, Arab demands boil down to return of certain Arab quarters Jerusalem now held by Israelis and it is unlikely these demands can be altered. Much has been said to effect that it would be in Israel’s own interests to make some conciliatory gesture toward Arabs. Discussions regarding Jerusalem would seem to offer good opportunity to make this gesture, but so far Israel has not accepted this friendly advice nor has any power shown itself disposed to press Israel in this respect. If it is still not possible for Israel to consider return certain Arab quarters Jerusalem to Arabs without making unreasonable counter demands, then it would seem preferable to bring adjournment special committee, leave status quo in Jerusalem and permit Lausanne conference to deal with Palestine question, including Jerusalem, as whole.
It would appear impractical to adopt courses of action suggested by Jerusalem in its telegram 370. First proposal on overall settlement could hardly be carried out without participation of UN which is precluded from special committee talks by armistice agreement. Moreover, on third party mediation there would seem little chance either side would agree on division of territories concerned. Probably Israel would request areas in northern Jerusalem far in excess what it is prepared give Arabs in southern Jerusalem. Consequently another deadlock would ensue.
Agreement on basis second proposal would appear to be difficult if not impossible to reach as Transjordan would be giving up its principal bargaining point in return for those concessions in which it is not particularly interested. Once having given up this point there would be little, if any, chance of ever obtaining satisfaction its main demand. Israel on other hand would obtain desired free access to Mt. Scopus which it would gradually turn into its own definition of “free access”. Since at this time there appears to be little possibility [Page 1051] that special committee, which seems to be operating in vacuum, can reach any peacefully arrived-at agreement, it would in my opinion be better to adjourn it sine die and without prejudice and hand over matters under its jurisdiction to PCC at Lausanne. In order to achieve this, however, it will be necessary for PCC and US to put pressure on Israel, which is at all times out to achieve its ends regardless of means. It would seem unfortunate, after all work which has been done to bring about peace in Jerusalem, to permit developing situation to imperil that peace.
Sent Department, repeated Bern 6 for USDel PPC, pouched Arab capitals, London, Jerusalem.