501.BC Indonesia/2–1649: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 1
88. Usgoc 296. Fol is summary “Beel Plan” left with Dept by Brit Emb this morning:
“Federalists and Republicans would be encouraged agree form interim govt at once, this based on BIO decree. As interim period not expected last more than two months Beel does not expect Rep objections to decree would be maintained. During interim period agreements would be worked out between Neth and Fed Rep of Indo re(a) Neth–Indo union (b) economic and financial matters (c) defence. These agreements would come into force on date handing over sovereignty. Above outline of plan has been agreed to by Neth Govt, pre-Fed Govt and Fed Contact Committee. Repub reps Batavia have also been given [Page 234] general idea of proposals, which they received favorably, and Rep leaders have been asked whether they will join in discussions thereof. Now decided Rep leaders will be regarded as a Rep Govt and not merely as individuals. Next stage should be meeting between Feds and Reps on general aspects of plan. If this successful there should be further meetings to arrange immediate setting up of interim govt under BIO decree. When this done Del of interim govt would proceed Hague discuss agreements referred to above. Elections to be held after transfer sovereignty and these would be matter entirely for Rep Fed Govt.”
In discussion above plan Brit Emb inquired whether or not Dept disposed support it to which reply made that as US member UNCFI an agency of SC Dept could not support any plan in preference to SC Res, to which US committed, unless UNCFI’s recommendations were in favor such plan. At same time Dept pointed out there appeared be little hope making plan operative until initial conditions of SC res were put into force, namely releasing political prisoners and enabling them negot with both Dutch and Federalists without stigma of negot under duress as would naturally be inferred if they negotiated while in Dutch custody. Also Dept pointed out two months period to negot points (a) (b) and (c) was short and plan envisaged transfer of sovereignty only after final agreement was reached on above points. Accordingly under best of circumstances “Beel Plan” means conditional transfer sovereignty in indefinite future whereas SC Res fixes definite date for transfer sovereignty. Moreover in Dept’s judgment plan does not go to crux sit which is how being about cessation of hostilities and Dept does not believe such cessation can be effected unless responsible Rep leaders are liberated and in position authoritatively order cease fire by guerrilla forces now operating in Indonesia and therefore outlaw those not responding.
During further discussion Brit Emb communicated texts various tels between Brit FonOff and Hague and in last analysis Bevin himself has misgivings re plan as he indicates critics thereof may well say Dutch intend (a) select Republicans their own choosing (b) determine proportions Republicans in govt (c) define functions interim govt (d) impose their own conditions about union, economic matters and defence and (3) [(e)] retain bases and forces in Indo whether Indonesians like this or not; Bevin concludes nothing to show Indonesians are to have any free choice in matter and Neth is offering early transfer power on own terms and without regard Indonesian point of view. He adds if above are not Dutch intentions it is imperative they should make both their motives and their intentions absolutely clear when they announce their policy. Furthermore Bevin is increasingly perturbed at delay and appearance Dutch are giving of ignoring SC Res and he proposes Dutch make interim communication to SC which will have effect of [Page 235] holding the position until policy can be formulated, but such policy must be of nature commend itself to SC.
In Dept’s thinking Brit increasingly concerned Neth Govt will fall, that without some such plan or announced policy as basis of negot nothing will be done to resolve Indo problem until new govt formed and that Indo problem will have serious repercussions on ERP and Atlantic Pact.
- Repeated as 28 to The Hague.↩