856d.00/2–2349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

secret
Participants: Mr. van Kleffens, Ambassador of The Netherlands
Mr. Helb, Counselor, The Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Butterworth, Director, FE
Mr. Nolting, NOE

Mr. van Kleffens and Mr. Helb called at their request. Mr. van Kleffens said he wished to leave with us a copy of a communication which was being delivered at The Hague to the Belgian, Canadian, French, British and United States Ambassadors, setting forth the position on Indonesia which the Netherlands Government had [Page 251] adopted. He requested that the contents of this memorandum be made known to the Secretary. He also requested that we regard the communication as secret until it was released by the Netherlands’ authorities in Batavia upon the return there of Dr. Beel. (Copy of the communication is attached1.)

Mr. van Kleffens read to us the communication. He said that his knowledge of it was limited to the text and that he was therefore not in a position to elaborate. He said that he felt, however, that this was a major step forward; that it represented a real attempt on the part of the Netherlands Government to meet the “essentials” of the position of the Security Council expressed in its resolution of January 28, 1949; and that he hoped that the U.S. Government would be able to support the proposal contained therein to the full.

In accepting the memorandum, I stated that I would not want to give an official reaction to it without thorough study; that I would wish to take it up with the Secretary; and that I would meanwhile seek some clarification of the Dutch proposal.

In the ensuing conversation the following points regarding the Dutch plan came out:

1.
Numbered paragraph 6 was interpreted by Mr. van Kleffens to mean that Republican leaders would be given full liberty, but that they would not be restored to governmental authority in Jogja or elsewhere. In this connection I suggested that the phrase “to consult with them concerning their residence” might well be deleted, inasmuch as it seemed to imply some restriction on their liberty of movement.
2.
Mr. van Kleffens interpreted the first sentence of paragraph 10 as meaning that sovereignty would be transferred on May 1, 1949, subject only to those conditions expressed in the latter part of this paragraph.
3.
I inquired why the Netherlands Government felt that more progress could be made in negotiations at The Hague than in Java. Mr. van Kleffens replied that better progress had been made in negotiations with the Federalists at The Hague and that he felt the same would be true at the proposed round-table discussions.
4.
Mr. van Kleffens emphasized that the Netherlands Government plan seemed to him significant and progressive as much for what it did not say—e.g., it set no conditions precedent, such as the cessation of guerilla activity—as for what it did say.
5.
It was inferentially brought to the Ambassador’s attention that the plan did not seem totally consistent with the Security Council Resolution. I agreed, however, to give it careful attention and to let him know the Department’s views as promptly as possible.
  1. See telegram 187, February 23, noon, p. 247.