501.BC Indonesia/2–2549
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed)
| Participants: | Mr. Jean Daridan, Counselor, French Embassy |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed, Chief, SEA | |
| Mr. W. S. B. Lacy, SEA |
Mr. Daridan called at his request and showed me two telegrams which his Embassy had received from the French Foreign Minister. The first telegram described in very general terms the Beel plan, which will be announced tomorrow in Batavia and The Hague. The second telegram directed the French Embassy in Washington to ascertain the Department’s attitude toward the plan as well as the possibility of its support of that plan. The French Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Mr. Cochran could impress upon the Republican leadership the desirability of an immediate settlement of the problem and the sincerity of the Netherlands as evidenced in their willingness to transfer sovereignty on the first of May. During a long and somewhat discursive conversation which followed I told Mr. Daridan (a) that Mr. Cochran would continue to devote his energies and his ingenuity to bringing the parties together on the basis of any plan which was mutually agreeable; (b) that the Security Council’s Commission for Indonesia would be obliged to report to the Council on March 1 in [Page 254] pursuance of the January 28 resolution; that the Council, and only the Council, could decide whether the Dutch proposals complied with the spirit or the letter of the January 28 resolution; (c) that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia could not go to The Hague, in my opinion, without the permission or perhaps the direction of the Security Council since it was clear that the Netherlands would invite the Commission under such conditions as the Netherlands considered desirable and that it would be improper for the Commission to operate within a frame of reference differing substantially from that provided it in the January 28 resolution; and (d) that whatever the merits of the plan, the Republic would undoubtedly cling to the January 28 resolution since the Netherlands proposals do not restore Republican leadership to Jogja.
Mr. Daridan made it clear that his Government hoped that Mr. Cochran, in his capacity as an official of the Department of State rather than as a member of UNCFI, might persuade the Republicans to accept the Dutch proposals. I pointed out that whether or not he was willing to do so, Mr. Cochran would undoubtedly find it extremely difficult to convince the Republicans of the desirability of their accepting the plan; that if Mr. Cochran made such an approach to the Republic, the Australian representative would undoubtedly register strong objections to the plan, both with the Indonesian Republicans and the Security Council; that India would probably do likewise and that Mr. Cochran might find himself, as a result, in an embarrassing position.
Mr. Daridan said that he fully recognized the great difficulties which would face the Department and Mr. Cochran in approaching the Republicans as his Government had suggested. He realized, moreover, that the Netherlands had given the Government of the United States and the Government of France virtually no time to make constructive suggestions as to the subject matter of the plan or the manner of its presentation; that in effect, the Netherlands Government was presenting interested parties with a fait d’accompli and expecting their support. I agreed.