890.00/9–949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | Participants: |
| For the United Kingdom: | For the United States: |
| M. E. Dening, Director, Office, Far Eastern Affairs, British Foreign Office | W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs |
| C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor, British Embassy | Livingston Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs |
| J. F. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy | Charles S. Reed, II, Chief, Southeast Asian Affairs |
| William S. B. Lacy, Asst. Chief, Southeast Asian Affairs |
I opened the conversation by suggesting the desirability of beginning a tour d’horizon of Southeast Asia and inviting Mr. Dening’s views on French Indochina. Mr. Dening stated that his Government had considered it highly desirable that the interested Asiatic powers indicate their approval of the March 8 agreement with Bao Dai and of his Government before the Governments of the United Kingdom or the United States volunteered their approval. He said that his Government had concluded that the reaction of the Asiatic powers to the Bao Dai effort was not as favorable as might have been hoped—their attitude appears dubious but not hostile. He continued to say that his Government believed that the course of events in Asia made it even more desirable that the Asiatic powers give Bao Dai their blessing before the Western powers announced their approval. Mr. Dening interpolated his opinion that French concessions to Bao Dai were not as extensive as those concessions which the Dutch seemed prepared to make to the Indonesians and that as a consequence, French unpopularity in the Far and Middle East had not diminished since March 8 in any appreciable degree. I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had in mind any approach to the Asiatic powers designed to encourage their early approval of Bao Dai. Mr. Dening replied that he did not know but that he would ask Mr. Bevin. I asked Mr. Dening how his Government proposed to respond to the French notification of the establishment of the Government of Vietnam under Bao Dai, adding that we felt that the French were not disposed to be satisfied with anything less than the accrediting of senior diplomatic representation to the Bao Dai Government. Mr. Dening replied that he did not know what course his Government would take.
[Page 77]I observed that my Government had made no decision in the matter of the recognition of the Bao Dai Government nor of the extent and character of support if any which we were prepared to give it, but that the Department was much impressed by the fact that there appeared as a practical matter no alternative to the recognition and support of Bao Dai; that inaction might well result in the control of French Indochina by the Communist Ho Chi Minh; that in view of this simple choice of alternatives, the Department had issued its statement on the March 8 agreement. Mr. Dening said he thought his Government would wish to press the French to make further concessions to Bao Dai and simultaneously to impress upon the Asiatic powers the simple choice of alternatives in the given premises (he did not dissent from my view that the choice of the alternatives was as simple as I had stated it). He added that he felt his Government was prepared to tell the Asiatic powers that they considered the concessions embodied in the March 8 agreement evidence of genuine effort on the part of the French to accommodate Indochinese nationalism.
I asked Mr. Dening his Government’s opinion of Bao Dai’s performance since his return to Indochina. He replied that his Government had been agreeably surprised, particularly by the favorable reception which Bao Dai had received in Tonkin. He added that officials of his Government held high opinion of Mr. Pignon whom he considered eminently realistic. In this connection, he referred to a conversation he had with Pignon in which Pignon said he realized he had been selected for his present position because, not being a politician, he could be disowned if his efforts met with failure. I took this occasion to refer to Mr. Pignon’s remarks at New Delhi that he was not particularly concerned with the manner in which Bao Dai disposed of internal affairs in Indochina nor with the manner in which he dealt with Ho Chi Minh, adding that it gave us pause to think since it seemed to foreshadow the unpleasant possibility that Bao Dai might choose to make a deal with Ho. Mr. Dening did not comment on this contingency but countered by referring to a radio Vietnam broadcast in which Ho Chi Minh expressed his gratitude to Stalin for the assistance the latter had provided him in the way of arms in his struggle against the French. He remarked that he considered this revelation of the close relationship which existed between Ho and the Kremlin had inclined the Indians toward a better understanding of the Communist character of Ho and his Government.
I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had carefully considered the consequences of Bao Dai’s failure. As Mr. Dening’s reply was of a negative character, I pointed out that a Communist-dominated Indochina would expose Siam and Malaya to immediate Communist pressure; I remarked that whatever its intentions, I did not consider Siam [Page 78] a tower of strength in such a situation, adding that I thought the Siamese were inclined to continue the habits they had formed in the 19th century of playing off one great power against another, and that they had not fully understood that Russian imperialism in the 20th century was of a different constituency than British and French imperialism in the 19th century. Mr. Dening agreed adding that a recent conversation with the Siamese ambassador at London had led him to conclude that at least that official was inclined to assume that Siam could have the best of both worlds in the event of USSR–Western conflict as it had after the Japanese war.
I then asked Mr. Dening if he felt we could afford to face the consequences of failing to give more than reasonable support to Bao Dai. Mr. Dening replied that it would be necessary for him to consult Mr. Bevin before he could reply, but that it was his hope that the Asiatic powers could be brought to realize the unhappy consequences of Bao Dai’s failure.
I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had made any estimate of the French military situation in Indochina. Mr. Dening replied that the French had advised his Government that they believed they could hold the frontier. I asked if it was his belief that the French could restrain the Chinese Communists from pouring across the Tonkinese border. Mr. Dening replied that he thought Ho would be particularly careful in encouraging large movements of Chinese troops into his territory since the Chinese were unpopular in Indochina. He added, however, that the French would certainly find the frontier difficult to hold. Mr. Reed observed that his knowledge of the terrain had led him to conclude that the French would find the border very difficult to hold indeed, and that the Chinese would, as a matter of good sense, choose to infiltrate in small groups rather than en masse.
I asked Mr. Dening if he thought recognition of Bao Dai by the interested Asiatic powers would strengthen him in the eyes of his Indochinese constituents. Mr. Dening said he was doubtful since he believed the Indochinese were relatively impervious to the attitude of foreign states. Mr. Reed said that he believed the Indochinese would be impressed by one thing only; further French concessions to Bao Dai of a real character, including the transfer of Indochinese affairs from the Minister of the Overseas France to the Foreign Office; that such concessions, if coupled with the recognition of the Asiatic states, would in his opinion have a profound effect upon the Indochinese people who ardently desire peace after years of war. I suggested that these various considerations seemed to me to indicate the desirability of Mr. Bevin’s and Mr. Acheson’s impressing upon Mr. Schuman the importance of the French Government’s continuing on the course of making real and genuine concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Mr. Dening said [Page 79] that he would present this view to Mr. Bevin but that Mr. Bevin was especially aware of French sensitivity in this particular. Mr. Lacy asked what Mr. Dening considered the effect might be of US–UK recognition of Bao Dai—whether indeed it would strengthen Bao Dai, or would, as some believed, prove a “kiss of death”. Mr. Dening replied that he thought US–UK recognition of Bao Dai, unless preceded by a favorable expression from the interested Asiatic powers, would have an unfavorable effect on Bao Dai and would cause certain members of the British Commonwealth considerable annoyance.
Mr. Dening and Mr. Meade continued a brief discussion which resulted in Mr. Dening’s expressing the opinion that Mr. Bevin must (1) impress upon the Asiatic powers and members of the British Commonwealth the fact that no acceptable alternative existed to the support of Bao Dai, and (2) encourage the French to make further genuine concessions to Bao Dai. He added that the nature of these” concessions and the manner in which the approach to the French should be made, should be left to Mr. Bevin and Mr. Acheson.
Mr. Meade asked if I could describe the Philippine attitude toward Bao Dai. I replied that I considered the Philippine situation had not yet crystalized; that we had consulted with the Philippine representatives in Washington before we issued our press statement on Bao Dai but that we had not attempted to influence them. I added that we were prepared to influence their position when we considered the time appropriate.
Mr. Dening asked that the conversations be brought to a close at 5:25 p. m. I suggested and he agreed that conversations would be resumed at 10:30 Monday morning, at which time Indonesia would be the topic of consideration.1