Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 1

851G.00/10–2049

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] October 20, 1949.

Prime Minister Nehru’s Memorandum on Indochina

There is attached a summary of the memorandum on Indochina, written by the Indian Consul General at Saigon,¹ whose previous post was Washington, which Prime Minister Nehru sent to you on October 13. It is suggested that to obtain the full impact of this document (Tab A) you read it in its entirety although, for your convenience, there is attached a summary (Tab B). The memorandum is extremely well written and appears to have been accepted by Prime Minister Nehru as the basis for his remarks to you on Indochina. The memorandum falls naturally into two parts, an exposition of the facts and conclusions drawn from these facts. In general, its exposition of the situation in Indochina is well done. Certain statements, however, are exaggerated:

1. I doubt that Ho Chi Minh has gained strength since the return of Bao Dai to Indochina as the evidence indicates that there has been some diminution, perhaps slight, in the number of supporters of the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam”.

2. Bao Dai is not the complete puppet which the memorandum would have us believe. If he were, the French would not be having difficulties in negotiating the supplementary accords called for by the March 8 Agreement.

3. Bao Dai’s supporters, listed by the memorandum as being only members of his rather large family and his former court, include also a portion of the two million Roman Catholics in Indochina as well as other quasi-religious groups; namely, the Caodaists and Hoa Hao.

4. The memorandum omits to state that Ho Chi Minh’s “Democratic Republic of Vietnam”, under the March 6, 1946 accord which it signed with the French, agreed to form part of the Indochinese federation within the French Union which puts entirely different light upon concessions the French made at that time.

However, it is in the conclusions drawn from these facts with which I disagree. I do not believe that by having the French treat with Ho Chi Minh, who is presumably the real leader of the Vietnamese people to whom Mr. Nehru’s memorandum has reference, we will be able to save Indochina for democracy. While such a plan might have been feasible at the time the Communists participated in the governments of Italy and France, from which they were later expelled, this is no longer so. However, the insistent French pressure since the end of the war, characterized by failure to accommodate the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese, has enabled Ho Chi Minh and the Communist leadership to consolidate its hold upon the very deep-seated nationalist movement. The Communist grip of the armed forces fighting the French appears particularly strong. It, therefore, seems beyond the realm of possibility that the nationalist movement could throw off its Communist control without external assistance. As you know, we have long felt that the strongest weapon the French could place in Bao Dai’s hands was a promise of ultimate independence or independence at a fixed date some time in the future. We have felt that by thus accommodating the nationalist movement the French would lure support from Ho Chi Minh and with their help Bao Dai might be able to establish a nationalist government. For reasons of French internal politics no French government has made a promise of ultimate independence for Indochina and it is further evident that no amount of pressure on our part would have brought forth such a statement.

It seems to me that the memorandum, while in a single sentence acknowledging Ho Chi Minh to be a Communist, generally takes the attitude that he is primarily a Nationalist. Accepting that Ho is a Communist, it can only be concluded that he is working toward extending Soviet domination in Asia. The refusal of the memorandum to recognize this imperialism because it is being carried out by Indo-Chinese instead of foreigners is its basic fault. No amount of legerdemain can conceal the fact that the Indians will not, at least at the present, recognize this new imperialism. Their emotional reaction to the imperialism of the 19th century is so great that it has blinded them to the fact that Russian imperialism in the 20th century is of a different consistency than 19th century imperialism.

I do not believe that we can make these views available either directly or indirectly to the French for the Department cannot be put in the position of urging at the present time a French government to negotiate with the Communists. Neither do I think that we can afford to allow the United Nations in any guise to intervene as a mediator in this struggle for such mediation would inevitably be a vehicle for forcing the French to yield the country to Communist domination.

We should continue the line of approach that we have followed with Nehru, expanding that approach to include the thesis that Communist activity, particularly Chinese and Vietnamese expansion into Southeast Asia, is an expression of Soviet imperialism. You will recall that Ambassador Henderson, during the past six months, has evidently succeeded in persuading the government of India that Ho Chi Minh is a Communist, a proposition which Mr. Nehru accepted in his recent conversation with you. We should now stress particularly the nature and overall menace of Soviet imperialism, an operation which will be delicate but no more so than was the effort to convince Mr. Nehru of Ho Chi Minh’s real political affiliations and ideology.

1. F. M. de Mello Kamath; memorandum and summary not printed.