851G.00/11–1049
Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in France for the Secretary of State, Temporarily at Paris1
The Foreign Office has informed us that Mr. Schuman will wish to discuss with Messrs. Acheson and Bevin the question of the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, and in this connection he will undoubtedly raise the question of Indo-China. With regard to the latter, we are told that what he specifically has in mind is the possibility of Nationalist troops retreating into Indo-China and the situation resulting therefrom, and also the possibility of the US and UK extending some form of moral support to the Bao Dai Government. We are told that he probably will not raise the question of economic or military support to Vietnam or recognition of the Bao Dai Government.
The Bidault2 Government has not since its formation met on the subject of Indo-China. The High Commissioner, M. Pignon, is leaving for Saigon tonight after a stay in Paris which was prolonged by the Government crisis. The Embassy took advantage of his enforced idleness to conduct a series of informal conversations with him. It was thought that the subjects covered in these talks might receive Government [Page 96] consideration before the Secretary’s arrival and that a tentative French Government position might emerge to serve as a basis for conversations between the three Ministers. This has not transpired, and our latest word indicates that Schuman will not be in a position to initiate substantive talks on Indo-China. However, the substance of our verbal exchanges with Pignon is given below.
The informal and purely exploratory discussions with High Commissioner Pignon covered current Indo-China situation and steps which might be taken by both the French and American Governments to improve the situation in Indo-China.
The Embassy outlined the measures to be taken by the French which it considered would not only ensure the best chance of rapid success of the Bao Dai experiment but also encourage further international support thereof by foreign powers, including the US. These were: Parliamentary ratification of the March 8 agreements, the early conclusions of the negotiations of the supplementary agreements and the effective transfer of administrative functions to the Vietnamese Government, the transfer to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the administration of the Vietnamese Affairs, and lastly, a public declaration by the French Government in the near future to the effect that the March 8 agreements represent only one step in an evolutionary process, that they are not intended permanently to define the status of Vietnam within the French Union, and that the final treaty defining that status will be concluded with a duly elected Vietnamese government.
M. Pignon informed us that he believed French government to be favorably disposed towards the early ratification of March 8 agreements, and that he was confident that upon his return to Indo-China, the negotiation of the supplementary accords could be accelerated and completed prior to the end of the year. He personally was favorably disposed towards the transfer of Vietnamese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but considered that the domestic political situation might make such a complete break impossible at the moment, and that as an interim measure, a special agency comparable to Britain’s Commonwealth Editions Office and responsible to the President of the Council might be created for this purpose.
As regards a governmental declaration on the evolutionary character of the March 8 agreements, he, himself, was personally well disposed towards this idea which he believed would be of great psychological value in the Viet Nam as well as in neighboring countries of southeast Asia. He considered, however, that such a declaration should only be made at such time as the negotiation of the supplementary [Page 97] agreements should have been concluded: coming earlier, it would jeopardize the successful conclusion of these negotiations and Bao Dai solution itself.
With regard to assistance which the US might extend, he mentioned action on our part to dissipate beliefs widely held in Viet Nam that the US favored the total withdrawal of French influence from that area and, once this was accomplished, would be prepared to extend practically unlimited financial and material assistance. He also hoped that the US and Britain could take a common position with France announcing that in the event a Chinese Communist invasion of Tonking, the three countries would take common action. He believed that the presence of American warships, notably aircraft carriers, in Indo-Chinese waters, would have a decided effect in making our position clear in this respect. He also hoped for assistance from the US in replacing and repairing military transport and combat equipment, and favored supplying military assistance directly to the Viet Nam government provided that this be done in consultation with the French.
Lastly, he spoke of direct ECA aid to Viet Nam which would have more of a psychological than a material benefit, and of a continuation of our past efforts to persuade the government of India to adopt a favorable attitude towards the Bao Dai government.