851G.00/11–2249: Telegram
The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State
401. From Gibson: Deptel 199, November 17.1 I do not believe there has been any change in French military policy re defense Sino-Vietnam frontier. Policy is still to defend frontier by every means at their command.
In reporting my interpretation of Alessandri’s2 personal reaction to present situation, I meant to indicate that General is realistically considering all possibilities, the worst of which is that Chinese, either in form of present Communist forces in southern provinces, or of armies further reinforced by additional Nationalist defections, may pursue their way in an organized mass into Indochina. In such an eventuality, though French will unquestionably resist from beginning, it is unrealistic to expect that they will be able to block any such invasion at frontier itself. This conclusion was not only strongly implied by General himself in our reference conversation, but is certainly studied opinion of majority of French military in positions of authority in Tonkin.
In stating problem would then consist simply of getting out “with as few losses as possible”, I am reporting what I consider to be on the basis of cordial and, I believe, frank relations, the General’s own personal views. He would not of course state them in so many words to a foreign official yet his implication was clear and undercurrent of other military opinion in Tonkin equally so.
Actually, while conservatively realistic to the point of bearing the worst of possibilities constantly in mind and planning accordingly, General is not pessimistic and considers chances this development as being remote.
Question of “rear guard action” evolves about point that best French defense can only be achieved in relatively open country where superiority equipment, if any, can be brought to bear. This is particularly true of fighter aircraft including recently arrived King Cobras on which they count so heavily and are ineffective in the rough mountainous jungle country of most of frontier.
Thus if circumstances require a “rear guard” action in relatively flat country of delta region would in sense be strategic military manoeuvre for French have learned from bitter experience in Tonkin most recently from inability to protect the Caobang-Langson road convoys that attempts to fight Oriental guerrilla in jungle terrain of [Page 99] frontier are virtually suicidal. Bombing or strafing in these areas is futile, while movement of mechanized equipment is impossible.
Accordingly in worst, French might be faced with withholding their major defenses until they reach area bordering Red River delta, an area of combat uncomfortably near the European centers, Hanoi and Haiphong. If further retreat were found necessary, it would inevitably pose problems of evacuation of the European colonies of two cities. This is only feasible by sea from Haiphong and given the state of road transportation facilities between the two cities, inadequate port facilities, lack of shipping would present a considerable problem.
Elimination of Vietminh as an organized fighting force in most of Tonkin by end February in event Chinese Communists establish themselves along frontier with well-disciplined troops and do not violate it on any organized scale is most favorable of all eventualities in Alessandri’s view. In this regard General is undoubtedly thinking primarily of delta and Namdinh–Phatdiem areas in French realization that frontier regions will thenceforth be subject to free exchange of arms and equipment. As long as French and Vietnamese Government forces control heavily populated fertile areas and cut Vietminh lines of communication into them, usefulness of any Chinese Red arms will be considerably restricted. Recent successes in extension of area of control in Red River delta and Phatdiem operation have lent support to General’s hope that this can be accomplished if required. He is also counting heavily on known antipathy of Vietnamese for Chinese and resulting increased degree of cooperation which may be expected from the great mass of the Tonkinese people if they become convinced they are in actual danger of Chinese domination.
In weighing the General’s opinions Department is reminded that Alessandri is unquestionably best, if not only, high ranking officer in Indochina qualified to pass judgment on these and related questions with any degree of authority. He is keen student of Oriental mind and thoroughly familiar with terrain in question from actual experience.
Pouched Hanoi. Department pass Paris.3 [Gibson.]