851G.00/12–149: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
4633. Dept’s views on Mar 8 Agreement remain substantially same as expressed in Aide-mémoire transmitted to Emb under cover instr 289, Jun 6. However, while Dept recognizes that Bao Dai has made relatively more progress than had been anticipated, and is encouraged by evident efforts of Fr Statesmen and particularly Pignon to give life and viability to present Vietnam Govt, Dept queries whether, in view of developments in Far East and notably in China and Indonesia, mere ratification of Mar 8 Agreement and transfer of limited powers stipulated thereunder to Bao Dai regime will be sufficient to insure success of or even afford fair chance of success to Bao Dai solution. Unhappily events beyond our control are marching on the mainland of Asia and it may well be that the Mar 8 Agreement is but another instance of too little and too late. This view is predicated upon belief that a mil solution or a polit containment of Communism is indeed beyond the capacity of France and of Western Democracies unless, at very minimum, the Bao Dai regime obtains the support of a substantial proportion of the Vietnamese. Such being the case, Dept considers problem as how best to obtain this support, and suggests that, as one [Page 102] of barriers to winning this support is the inherent Vietnamese distrust of Fr good faith, the two essential steps are:
- (1)
- Solemn declaration by France of timetable leading to independence of Vietnam within a relatively short period, and
- (2)
- Setting up of mechanism which wld in effect create the widest conviction of Fr intentions to abide by foregoing declaration.
Dept realizes any plan incorporating above considerations, particularly any forthright promise of ultimate and absolute independence, wld probably be unpalatable to Fr. Nevertheless, Dept wishes leave no avenue unexplored in prevention of Commie domination Indochina and is considering advisability and utility, after prior consultation with Brit, of approaching Fr with somewhat the fol proposal:
- (a)
- Immediately fol the ratification of the Mar 8 Agreement Fr to issue declaration providing timetable leading to independence Vietnam at fixed time in near future, stressing its hope that the century of close relations between Fr and Vietnamese will lead new state to associate itself freely with the Fr Union and emphasizing mutual benefits to be derived from such assoc.
- (b)
- Simultaneous with issuance timetable, Fr to propose internatl Comm to supervise steps leading independence and to assist Bao Dai regime in establishing viable govt (Dept’s current thinking is for Comm of three or five non-Soviet Bloc powers with Fr selecting one or two reps and Viets selecting similar number, and those selected agreeing upon additional member—it would be essential that certain number of these members be Asiatic and this action shld have beneficial psychological effect especially upon those Asiatic neighbors who have remained cool to Bao Dai under belief he is Fr puppet.[)] Or if UN approach appears preferable Comm under UN auspices might be set up from amongst those countries represented by career consular officers now in IC which wld afford means eliminating Soviet bloc representation and wld include India, Thailand and possibly PI.
- (c)
- At same time, Fr or possibly above Comm cld invite recognition of Bao Dai Govt by family of nations.
If some such plan cld be put into operation, Dept believes it wld be of great value in dissipating Vietnamese distrust of real Fr intentions, in providing Bao Dai with all attributes of sovereignty for which Ho Chi Minh says he is fighting, in creating proper atmosphere for return to peaceable conditions and restoration of country’s economy, and in affording other non-Commie countries chance to join in helping Bao Dai with both economic and military support without stigma of backing a puppet. Propaganda possibilities would be unlimited.
Dept wld appreciate Emb’s views in near future as to substance and timing this proposal.