Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VII, Part 2

Policy Planning Staff Files

¹

Policy Planning Staff Paper on United States Policy Toward Southeast Asia²

secret

[Washington,] March 29, 1949.

PPS 51

The Problem

1. To define U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Siam and the Philippines.

[Here follows an analysis of the Southeast Asia region as a whole, of regional economic considerations, of regional political considerations, of “SEA and Our Struggle with the Soviet World”, of “SEA and the Atlantic Community”, of “Toward a U.S. Policy in SEA”, of “Indonesia”, of “Indochina”, of “Burma”, of “Siam”, of “Malaya”, and of “The Philippines”, in paragraphs numbered 2–74.]

Recommendations

sea region as a whole

75. Before proceeding to recommendations for action, certain broad principles should be established and accepted. They are:

a. It is our continuing objective to encourage the SEA region to develop in harmony with the Atlantic Community and the rest of the Free World.

b. Conversely, it is also our objective to contain and steadily reduce Kremlin influence in the region.

c. Because there is slight hope of our achieving either of these objectives through a policy limited to unilateral relations with the individual SEA countries, we should adopt a wider concept—multilateral collaboration, primarily with certain British Commonwealth countries and the Philippines, in approaching SEA as a region.

d. This concept, however, has full meaning only if viewed in the context of a larger area embracing non-communist centers of power on either side of and below SEA. We should therefore view the SEA region as an integral part of that great crescent formed by the Indian Peninsula, Australia and Japan.

76. We should accept the fact that the crucial immediate issue in Southeast Asia—that of militant nationalism in Indonesia and Indochina—cannot be resolved by any of the following policies on our part:

(1) full support of Dutch and French imperialism,

(2) unlimited support of militant nationalism, or

(3) evasion of the problem.

Because the key to the solution of this issue lies primarily with the Netherlands and France, we should as a matter of urgent importance endeavor to induce the Dutch and the French to adapt their policies to the realities of the current situation in Southeast Asia, as set forth in this paper. Our first step should be, in conjunction with the British, to set forth to the Dutch and French in candor, detail, and with great gravity our interpretation of the situation in and intentions with regard to SEA. We should make a major effort to persuade them to join us and the states mentioned in the following paragraph in a constructive overall approach to the region as a whole.

77. Having done this, we should promptly discuss with the British, Indians, Pakistanis, Filipinos and Australians a cooperative approach based on the principles laid down in paragraph 75. We should be prepared subsequently to work with a wider group, always recognizing that while the area concerned is primarily Asian it is in our interest to leaven the oriental nature of the collaboration with sympathetic western influence. We should at the same time attempt to discourage the extension of this cooperative effort to include Middle and Near Eastern countries on the grounds that they constitute a separate-natural regional group.

78. We should avoid at the outset urging an area organization. Bather, our effort should initially be directed toward collaboration on joint or parallel action and then, only as a pragmatic and desirable basis for more intimate association appears, should we encourage the area to move step by step toward formal organization. If Asian leaders prematurely precipitate an area organization, we should not give the impression of attempting to thwart such a move but should go along with them while exerting a cautiously moderating influence.

79. We should, of course, seek to cast the multilateral approach recommended in the preceding four paragraphs within the framework of the U.N. insofar as our Charter obligations require it and, where there is no requirement, insofar as we consider it appropriate. We should, however, be willing to act cooperatively outside of that framework when that would be consistent with our Charter obligations and when to proceed through U.N. mechanisms would constitute a serious impediment to the achievement of our objectives.

80. In order to minimize suggestions of American imperialist intervention, we should encourage the Indians, Filipinos and other Asian states to take the public lead in political matters. Our role should be the offering of discreet support and guidance. Politically, Japan should be kept in the background.

81. We should seek vigorously to develop the economic interdependence between SEA, as a supplier of raw materials, and Japan, western Europe and India, as suppliers of finished goods, with due recognition, however, of the legitimate aspirations of SEA countries for some diversification of their economies. To achieve these ends we should emphasize primarily the fourth point of the President’s inaugural address.³ Every effort should be made to initiate and expand programs of technical assistance both through bilateral arrangements and through international agencies. The propaganda value of the President’s fourth point should be fully exploited.

To achieve our objectives, efforts should also be made to supplement conservatively private investment, with Governmental assistance.

82. We should greatly expand our cultural and informational program. It should be directed at developing an appreciation and respect for the humanistic values of western civilization and an understanding of international political and economic realities.

indonesia

83. Keeping in mind all of the considerations discussed in the analysis of this paper, we should seek, in collaboration with like-minded states, to bring about the creation of a sovereign Indonesian state which will satisfy the fundamental demands of militant nationalism in the archipelago. As the situation with respect to Indonesia is now exceedingly confused and as it would consequently be unrealistic to prescribe a hard and fast course of action to be followed by this Government for months and years to come, our policy should be guided by the following general principles, which of course are also subject to review:

a. Timing is of prime importance in the Indonesian situation. The longer the delay in accomplishing a transfer of authority from the Dutch to representative Indonesians, the weaker becomes the position of both the non-communist native leaders and the Dutch and the stronger becomes the influence of all extremist elements including the communists. The earliest feasible cessation of hostilities and transfer of authority from the Dutch to the Indonesians is therefore imperative, and will probably require additional pressure on the Dutch.

b. As it offers the only hope of halting military action on the part of the Indonesians, we must continue to insist on the restoration of the non-communist Republican leaders to the positions of authority they held prior to December 17, 1948, free of Dutch control.

c. From our point of view the most reliable and desirable Indonesian political figures to receive a transfer of authority from the Dutch are these same Republican leaders together with certain outstanding Federalists. As it is a combination of these two groups which can command the widest popular support and provide the only chance for a moderate anti-communist government, our aim is a unified Indonesian Government built around these two elements.

d. It is, of course, basic in our thinking that we should continue to deal with the present phase of the Indonesian situation primarily through U.N. machinery. Naturally, this does not preclude direct approaches to the Dutch and other states concerned with the Indonesian problem.

e. We should not be deterred from a considered course by Dutch threats to withdraw from the North Atlantic Pact. If the Dutch should reveal an intent to concentrate upon their Indonesian situation even at the cost of neglecting their responsibilities in Western Europe, then the Dutch ability to contribute to collective security in Europe would be subject to doubt and we should reexamine the Western European situation in the light of that fact.

f. Recognizing that the loss of its Indonesian Empire would be a severe blow to the Netherlands, we should be prepared in that event to assist the Dutch by a readjustment of the ECA program for the Netherlands, in order for that country to meet the new situation.

g. When a sovereign Indonesia comes into being, we and those states willing to collaborate with us will be confronted with the problem of assisting the non-communist nationalist leaders to retain their supremacy over the communists, and fostering any trends which will lead Indonesia in the direction of political and economic stability in harmony with the free world community. We should now accept this objective in principle, conscious that it will be a considerable enterprise, the exact proportions and nature of which cannot now be foretold. At the same time we should be prepared to exert our good offices to preserve, so far as feasible, multually beneficial phases of the Dutch-Indonesian relationship.

indochina

84. Because we are powerless to bring about a constructive solution of the explosive Indochinese situation through unilateral action, the determination of our future policy toward Indochina should await the outcome of the démarche recommended in paragraph 76 and the earliest feasible consultation with India and the Philippines.

burma

85. As the situation in Burma is at present so chaotic as to defy a feasible solution introduced from outside the country, we should defer any suggestions of a solution until the situation begins to be clarified. We should, however, keep in close touch with the British and the Indians regarding this problem and cooperate with them in any approach which they and we agree is likely to prove profitable.

siam

86. We should seek to strengthen Siam, help maintain the relative stability which its government has achieved, and generally cultivate that nation as a strategically located center of stability … in SEA. Siamese resistance to Soviet and Chinese encroachment should receive particular American support.

malaya

87. We should support British authority in Malaya until such time as there may occur a basic change in the Malayan situation affecting this policy. At that time, our policy should be reviewed.

the philippines

88. We should endeavor to induce the Philippines to assume an active and constructive role in developing a counter-force to communism in SEA and otherwise to further spontaneously our major objectives in Asia. We should encourage the Filipinos to take the initiative publicly in many projects which they, as Asians, can advance more effectively than we, but always to come to us for confidential and friendly guidance. This type of relationship, with which we have had little past experience, must be nurtured and exercised with patience, understanding and skill.

89. We should seek to maintain our tremendous political and cultural investment in the islands by conducting a major cultural and informational operation in the Republic and encouraging private American organizations to do likewise.

90. Because the economic health of the Philippines must be maintained if the Republic is to play the role which we expect of it, we should provide such aid as may be essential to develop in the islands a viable economy independent of continuing economic assistance from the U.S. Such aid as we grant should be extended in a manner designed to further our political aims, particularly that embraced in the fourth point of the President’s Inaugural Address.

1. Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1947–1953.
2. This paper was subsequently circulated for the information of the National Security Council as document NSC 51, July 1, 1949. It was referred to the NSC Staff for consideration in connection with the preparation of the report ultimately issued as NSC 48/1, December 23; regarding the latter, see memorandum by Executive Secretary Souers to the National Security Council, December 30, p. 1215.
3. January 20; Department of State Bulletin, January 30, 1949, pp. 123, 125.