893.00/1–2849: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 30—3:06 a. m.]
255. On January 27, officer of Embassy and Naval Attaché interviewed Kan Chieh-hou, just returned from Shanghai following series conferences with minority party leaders on behalf Li Tsung-jen. Kan said that, while these leaders not directly representing CCP, they are in sufficiently close touch with Communists that they can accurately report and interpret Communist policy. Leaders told him Communists have three peace requirements. First is no “middle road”; all political groups and factions must adopt same attitude toward CCP as KmtRC and Democratic League. Second is no further American influence in Chinese affairs, no further dealings with Americans including no acceptance American aid by any group. Third is no negotiations with any group on basis its possession military or territorial resources; negotiation only with individuals on basis past political performance and present political record. On basis above, Kan and President both convinced no agreement with Communists possible.
Despite Communist intransigence, Li intends attempt negotiate. Already has two delegates Peiping who made initial contact with Communists January 26. No report received on result contact. On 27th or 28th, plans send telegram Mao Tse-tung reaffirming sincere desire for peace in denying that he is creature of Americans and pointing out that, while Communists have claimed desire negotiate, their terms have been couched as ultimatum. As follow-up, Li then plans send Shao Li-tze and Chang Chih-chung [to] Peiping with instructions [Page 94] wait until Communists receive them for purposes negotiation. Purpose of above is to show clearly onus for continuing war lies with Communists, thus gaining popular support for Nationalists. Also hopes pressure public opinion and Communist hope that they can get Government surrender through negotiations may make Communists delay crossing Yangtze. Li convinced no possibility get fair agreement from Communists, but hopes use this technique stall for time.
Government would like defend Yangtze line but lacks required forces. Tang En-po82 deploying to defend Nanking-Shanghai Railroad over which he will withdraw when seriously threatened. Liu Ju-ming,83 with very inferior forces, will try prevent crossing between Wuhu and Nanking. Pai Chung-hsi will retreat to Wuchang when threatened. After Communist crossing, Government hopes establish defense line along Chientang River into northern Kiangsi and Hunan with Kiangsi-Hunan sector under Pai Chung-hsi. Government will hold this line longest possible, hoping for American assistance. This aid must include military mission. No question interference with China’s sovereign rights exists. American troops welcomed as would be American participation protection Taiwan.
We are in general agreement with contention that any agreement Government may reach with Communists will be at price of whatever resources it might have to preserve itself as entity in coalition government. Communists appear determined eradicate once and for all any political grouping which might conceivably form nucleus resistance their political and military control over entire country.
We think it highly unlikely Li’s maneuvers will delay Communist attempt cross Yangtze. Also, it is doubtful if they will succeed in rousing any considerable degree popular support for Government. However, they will establish clearly total character Communist aims, and should to some extent succeed in firming up resistance sentiment [of] south and southwest China leaders.
Sent Department, pouched Consulates.