893.01/2–2349: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 23—5:11 a. m.]
450. In struggle for power between Li Tsung-jen and “Canton faction” headed by Sun Fo, Li in fundamentally weak position because he does not control larger portion army, lacks financial resources and does not command allegiance of that considerable portion Kmt bureaucracy controlled by Generalissimo and C–C politicians. This fundamental weakness has been frankly acknowledged, and probably somewhat exaggerated, by Pai’s headquarters in statements to American Consulate, Hankow, appealing for US aid.
However, he has made some preparations recently in mobilizing popular support for his peace program. Most important single evidence [of] this is decision Legislative Yuan meet in Nanking rather than Canton. This is, of course, in direct defiance Premier’s publicly expressed wishes. At Yuan session, Sun Fo is certain to be violently denounced, both for his sponsorship of Government move south and for speculations he is alleged to have committed. Significant indication feeling many legislators was press report that legislators resident Shanghai had passed resolution accusing Sun Fo “deserting” Acting President [and] calling for return of Executive Yuan to Nanking.
Further tangible demonstrations that Li is making progress are meeting Control Yuan here and their resolution to support him, announcement that Executive Yuan joint office will soon open Nanking, and arrival Ho Ying-chin in capital. Li also has backing important newspapers in Shanghai and Nanking, which praise his twin program peace and reform while condemning Kmt for ineptitude and corruption and censuring Sun Fo cabinet for “running away”. Insofar as can be determined, support Li is growing among banking and business circles in Shanghai and Nanking and among that large but inarticulate section population who disregard larger issues and are principally interested in keeping destruction of war from their homes.
Li’s present position is similar in some ways to that he occupied while campaigning for Vice President. At that time he became symbol of revolt against arbitrary dictation by Generalissimo and party [Page 145] and succeeded in uniting behind him all dissident (and often mutually incompatible) factions for purpose his election. He has again become symbol, this time symbol of yearning for peace that pervades this war-weary country. So long as his peace efforts make perceptible progress, or even succeed in delaying (or seeming to delay) Communist assault on Yangtze, he should be able maintain and utilize for his support this mobilized public opinion.
Li is aware basic weaknesses his position, but is astutely capitalizing on support those who see him as chief hope for peace, in order either heal breach between himself and Canton group, or at least win over to his side as many as possible of powerful leaders Kmt. He is also endeavoring to bolster his position in concrete ways by making overtures for US aid and planning economic and political reform. Extent to which he succeeds in these efforts will determine his strength either as negotiator with Communists or subsequently as leader of resistance should Communists renew attack.
Sent Department; repeated Embassy Canton 96.