893.00/2–2349: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:58 p. m.]
Cantel 71. Recently we characterized the Chinese situation as “confusion worse confounded”. It is still that; or is it Gilbert and Sullivan? We have the Communists pretending desire peace, yet offering [Page 146] peace only on terms (surrender) known to be unacceptable to National Government. We have Li Tsung-jen, Acting President, admitting that peace is impossible yet going to great extremes publicly to demonstrate his desire for peace on any “reasonable” terms, the while he is hampered by tendency toward regionalism and sauve qui peut, and by Generalissimo behind scenes interfering and directing things himself. We have Generalissimo relinquishing his authority as Chief of State with a flourish and retiring to his mountain retreat at Fenghua, yet retaining the director generalship of Kmt which gives him supreme authority and a right to meddle. The present government was appointed by him and its members are his friends. His henchmen hold the strategic military positions. He bowed to will of the articulate and retired so that Li could negotiate peace, yet it seems evident he is confident Li would fail and that conditions would develop calling him back to power.
Regardless, however, of what is in Generalissimo’s mind, his henchmen are not yet ready to die as “war criminals” and are determined that Li will not, in a moment of weakness, accept clemency for himself at their expense. They scrutinize his every move and are determined to carry on resistance to communism as long as possible. Seeing no other likely leader, they are in effect marking time until Li’s failure and what they believe to be the inevitable re-emergence of Generalissimo. They realize the ineffectiveness of Generalissimo’s leadership in recent years, but he was the “proven” leader during those dire days of Japanese aggression and maybe he can do it again.
It is a black picture and one that gives little hope. Barring an act of God which would prevent reappearance of Generalissimo on scene, situation does in fact look hopeless. With Communist control of Manchuria and North China, generally considered as essential to domination all China, they are flushed with victory and adequately supplied with weapons of war. Opposed to them are reactionaries of the Kmt and the feudalistic leaders in southwest and northwest, whose armies are ill-equipped and uninspired.
Should Generalissimo reenter upon scene, as seems possible, we may expect an accentuation of the trend toward regionalism, with Generalissimo retiring eventually to the Foochow–Amoy–Taiwan triangle, leaving the leaders in the periphery to make their best terms with Communists. The Communists absorbed as they are with problems acquired through their capture of large areas and urban centers, may well permit degree of autonomy in such areas until such time as they feel strong enough to bring them under control. This would certainly take months; more likely years.
If, on the other hand, Generalissimo does not reenter scene, there is still an ever so slight possibility that resistance forces may get [Page 147] together under leadership of Li Tsung-jen. Li is not the ideal leader but no other appears available. He is giving remarkable demonstration of courage and willingness to disregard matters of prestige or sectional rivalry in interest of the State as a whole and he has grown greatly in stature since his assumption of Presidency. He is here in Canton now trying to bridge difference between the Kwangtung and Kwangsi cliques and to pull resistance elements together. His staunch supporter Pai Chung-hsi, probably the most influential Muslim in China outside northwest, has his armies still intact and encamped on route Communists must follow to reach south. His influence would be great in northwest where, I am told, Chang Chih-chung has found the five Ma’s determined to resist communism, or in their own words to “liberate ourselves”. I am told also that Chang Chun has had considerable success in rallying resistance elements in Szechuan and that Lu Han in Yunnan may be expected cooperate. Li Tsung-jen seems to confirm this. (Mytel Cantel 70, February 22 to Department, repeated Nanking 67, Shanghai 40).
The Communists defeated the National troops not by superior military forces or equipment, but by leadership and superior psychological approach. In spite of the diabolical efficiency of Communist propaganda, there remain large elements in country aware of Communist treachery and seeking desperately for means to continue resistance. They have been thoroughly disheartened by ineffectiveness of Generalissimo and Kmt and have no further will to resist unless inspired from elsewhere.
It is just barely possible under these circumstances that Li Tsung-jen, supported by Pai, may provide that leadership if he can bring the Kwangtung generals into line. He has demonstrated considerable ability since he came to power and, if Generalissimo will leave him alone, results might be forthcoming. If, as seems likely, Communist military progress has outdistanced their political planning it may take them some time to digest the areas already under their control and after they have taken the Yangtze urban centers they may well be prepared to tolerate for some time considerable autonomy in the peripheral areas. It is during that time we should watch carefully for some tangible evidence of leadership and will to resist of a character giving promise of success. Should Li prove to be such a leader, we should encourage him and offer him such support as proves feasible. Even should he fail, we might at least delay complete domination Chinese by Communists and make their task more difficult in the interim.
Sent Department Cantel 71; repeated Nanking 68, Shanghai 41.