Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

893.00/3–249: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, March 2, 1949—11 p. m.
[Received March 3—2:19 a. m.]

507. Following is substance my conversation February 28 and March 1 with Li Tsung-jen, W. W. Yen, Shao Li-tze and Chang Chih-chung concerning findings of “Shanghai peace mission”:

(1) Yen and Shao both think prospects for peace are very good although there will be many difficulties. They think CCP really does want peace. However, on other hand Mao Tze-tung and Chou En-lai both informed them that before genuine peace negotiations can be initiated it will be necessary call secret convention CCP leaders for purposes of (a) To win over extreme Leftist element within CCP in support of peace and (b) To determine place and personnel for eventual peace negotiations. As respects size of two delegations, CCP proposes there be four delegates on each side subject to later increase by mutual agreement. CCP also proposes future government of China eventually be composed in three equal parts of CCP, Kmt and non-partisans. In response to Shao’s question to Mao and Chou whether it would be possible for CCP to issue cease-fire order without delay for purpose of creating favorable atmosphere, Chou replied that this was impossible because of internal disagreements within CCP but that they were acting as though such order had been given.

(2) Mao and Chou evidenced little spirit of compromise re CCP eight conditions. They were adamant in demanding punishment for “four families” and emphasized condition calling for nationalization all troops within China. However they did not push for land reform south of Yangtze along lines employed north of river, apparently recognizing importance of variations in land tenure practice.

(3) Peace delegates actually did carry to Li letter from Mao stating that CCP is aware of difficulties which confront former.

(4) Li informed me that he is personally much concerned over intensity CCP anti-Americanism as reported to him by Yen and Shao. These latter both talked earnestly with Mao and Chou but did not believe that they had reduced bitterness of Mao and Chou over military aid given Kmt by US. Li expressed view to me that it might be helpful if US could at this juncture make public statement clarifying its position.

(5) Finally CCP leaders assured Shao and Yen that they have no intention to interfere with private enterprise and “small capital” in Shanghai.

(6) Yen and Shao, it seems to us, demonstrated degree of naivete in some questions they put to Communist leaders. Replying to Yen’s question re CCP policy on religious freedom, General Yeh Chien-ying replied: “Communists do not like religion but could not object to any one accepting it as long as he did not try to force it on others”. As respects Communist attitude toward foreign church colleges, Chou spoke critically of St. John’s University as “bourgeois and reactionary” though National delegates inferred mission colleges were not objected to as such. In reply to question concerning CCP attitude toward Soviet violations of Yalta agreement⁸² particularly at Dairen and Port Arthur, Chou blandly passed blame to US by replying that these Soviet acts were necessitated solely by American unilateral action in Japan and American postponement of final Japanese peace treaty. Chou replied to Yen’s question whether CCP is really of Russian or Chinese character by saying that of course CCP is Chinese but that because of common beliefs and purposes there is naturally close sympathy between Soviet and Chinese Communists.

Sent Department; repeated Shanghai 234, Canton 131, passed Peiping 73.

Stuart

82. Signed February 11, 1945; Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.