893.00/3–749
The Consul at Tsingtao (Strong) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)84
Sir: I have the honor to transmit the monthly political and military summary for the Tsingtao consular district for February 1949. The initial portion of this report is an introductory summary.
[Page 165]Introductory Summary
Mid-February saw an almost complete about-face in the political and military prospects for Tsingtao. Instead of withdrawing as planned, the Nationalist troops were ordered to remain. In turn, the American Naval forces which were in the main to move out, leaving only a small rearguard, extended their stay. Thus the timing for a communist takeover of Tsingtao and its environs again has been revised; current prospects lead to the estimate of several months of relative stability before possible assumption of control by the communist regime. The reinvigoration of the Taiyuan airlift from Tsingtao; the apparent intention of the communists not to attack the Yangtze line during peace negotiations, thus freeing Nationalist forces for holding Tsingtao; the probability that the negotiations will continue for some time; and the logical desire of the Nationalist Government to hold as many points as possible in North China for prestige and bargaining purposes, all lead to this conclusion. Thus Tsingtao, which was to have been lopped off the body of Nationalist China as a useless appendage, has been brought into the national scene and its fate is now dependent on the momentous events of the next few months.
. . . . . . .
Only the generous contributions of ECA to Tsingtao in terms of food and coal have kept Tsingtao afloat. The presence of the United States Naval Forces at Tsingtao is viewed as evidence of Nationalist intention to hold the city, and its withdrawal would initially be interpreted as the preliminary to departure of the Nationalist troops. Whereas in the past the U.S. Navy was regarded as the real protective force for Tsingtao, it is now recognized that the communists have no intention of posing a military threat to Tsingtao. Thus Chinese residents tend to gauge the intentions of the Nationalist Government toward Tsingtao by the activities of the U.S. Naval Forces. During the absence of Admiral Badger with his flagship for twelve days [this] had no visible effect on internal stability.
Evacuation of foreigners from Tsingtao was to all intents and purposes completed during the month. Somewhat over eight hundred non-Asiatics remain of whom over one-half are Soviet citizens. It is anticipated that the foreign community will hereafter remain stable.
The tension which pervaded Tsingtao in January and early February has almost entirely been eliminated. However with trade at low ebb and inflation rampant, Tsingtao’s citizens are anxious to have their fate settled in one way or another in order that a return to more normal business and living conditions may improve their lot. (End of Introductory Summary)
[Here follows detailed report.]
Respectfully yours,
- Copy transmitted to the Department without covering despatch; received April 5.↩