893.00/7–2149

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

No. 84

Sir: I have the honor to transmit a translation34 of an editorial entitled, “Strive Further to Strengthen the North China Party” from the Jen Min Jih Pao in Peiping, which was published in the Nanking Hsin Hua Jih Pao on July 5, 1949.

According to the editorial, the total membership of the North China section of the Chinese Communist Party is now 1,520,000. Of this number less than one percent were members of the party prior to the outbreak [Page 449] of the Sino-Japanese War, and more than 60% of the present membership joined the party after V–J day. The editorial recognizes that an immediate problem facing the North China Party is the fact that such a large proportion of its members has been so recently recruited that their doctrinatian has necessarily been rather superficial. Furthermore, the party organizationally falls very short of the ideal, as branch headquarters have been established in only 68% of the 100,000 rural districts of North China. Nevertheless the North China Party has served as a very important recruiting ground for cadres to be sent to other areas. The editorial states that more than 50,000 rural cadres have been drafted during the past three years from the old liberated areas and assigned principally to Manchuria, Central China and south of the Yangtze.

The editorial considers that the principal problems facing the party are:

1.
To raise the standard of knowledge of Marxism–Leninism and Mao Tse-tung ideology among party members;
2.
To encourage the study of economics in order to be able to carry out successfully the industrial and commercial tasks f reconstruction;
3.
To prevent sectarianism in the Party and eliminate the differences which exist between laborers and farmers, between urban and rural cadres, between laborer and farmer members and intellectual cadres, and between party and nonparty cadres;
4.
To maintain close contact with the masses, consulting the views of the masses in all matters;
5.
To solidify the alliance between the laborer and farmer and between the Communist Party and other democratic parties and persons;
6.
To guard against sabotage by Kmt bandit groups;
7.
To increase the party membership and set up new branch headquarters.

Comments:

The Chinese Communist Party is what is known as a “soft” party. It has an exceptionally small hard core of long-time party members. This means that the great mass of party members who must be relied upon to carry out day to day administrative activities have not had an opportunity to be thoroughly educated either with regard to the party line or to the particular job they have been assigned to handle. Nevertheless, because of the urgent need for more and more cadres to serve in newly occupied areas, the party must continue recruiting.

In order to overcome this general party weakness in political training and administrative skills the main reliance at this stage is being placed upon education and persuasion. It would seem that the party cannot at this point indulge in widespread purges or severe punishment of those who deviate from the party line. A further manifestation of the party’s weakness, both quantitative and qualitative, is the strong emphasis on a united front with other “democratic” parties and [Page 450] persons. This is essential at this stage if the party is to cope successfully with the vast problems confronting it. The ignorance of economics, which the Communists frankly confess in the editorial, is doubtless one of the most potent factors compelling them to a policy of attracting and utilizing in relatively important positions, many who are not party members.

It must not be inferred from the weaknesses exposed in this self-critical article that the Chinese Communist Party will not be able to overcome them. So long as there is no powerful, active, organized opposition, it may only be a question of time until the CCP is able to transform itself into a disciplined, monolithic party which can afford ruthlessly to purge deviationists and crush outside obstruction. Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
John Wesley Jones

Counselor of Embassy
  1. Not printed.