Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

841.85/10–1849

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman ⁸⁴

undated

Subject: British Naval Convoy at Shanghai

Reference is made to our conversations of October 10 and 13 with respect to the report that the British Navy was prepared to escort British vessels “bound for Shanghai and the territorial waters in the mouth of the Yangtze”.

In response to our inquiry a reply has now been received from the British Foreign Office, and a summary of the instructions which have been issued to the British Navy in this regard is attached for your information.

It will be noted that, in general, the British Navy is prepared to extend full protection to British Merchant vessels as long as they are outside the territorial waters of China, but that protection will be extended to British merchant vessels within the territorial waters of China only in the event of an actual attack or bombing and then only if the ships are not “in confined waters which are Communist dominated”.

The British Embassy has informed the Department that no indication has been received from the Foreign Office with respect to the date that these instructions were put into effect but that a further inquiry in this regard has been sent to London. It would appear unlikely, however, that there has been any convoying on a large scale in view of the fact that only two British flag vessels are known to have entered Shanghai since the port closure order without clearance from National Government authorities, the Edith S. Matter and the Leong Bee, both of which were detained for extended periods on their departure by the Chinese Navy.

This Department is presently engaged in studying the international law aspects of the British Government’s willingness to convoy merchant vessels in the area of China and is also analyzing the possible effects of this action on our position vis-à-vis U.S. commercial shipping in that area and on our general policy toward China. I will expect to communicate with you further in this regard when our study is completed.

[Annex]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Summary of Instructions to British Navy

(A) Merchant ships will be entitled to Naval protection in full on the high seas up to the limit of territorial waters (3 miles) i.e. including Tungsha Banks buoy and Kiutoan Spit buoy but not westward of the latter. But for this purpose the shipowners must, in their turn, both arrange a clear communication system with His Majesty’s ships and also make their courses and rendezvous as arranged. There can be no guarantee of protection if ships fail to make their signals effectively received or to turn up at the rendezvous at the time agreed.

(B) Once having entered territorial waters they would not be escorted by His Majesty’s ships. Ships would only enter to protect them if they had actually been attacked or bombed except that in no circumstances will His Majesty’s ships enter to protect them in confined waters which are Communist dominated.

(C) If they are arrested in territorial waters and turned back they will have to go back. Once on the open seas again however they are free. If a Nationalist warship therefore continues with the Merchant ship on the high seas and either detains her or forces her to go back to a Nationalist base etc. then again His Majesty’s ship will assume the duty of protection against this. But here again the presence of His Majesty’s ship on the spot at the relevant time cannot necessarily be guaranteed.

84. Memorandum drafted October 18–19 and handed by the Secretary of State to President Truman on October 20.