393.115/12–849: Telegram
The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: You will recall that several Isbrandtsen Company vessels have recently visited Shanghai and that all have been intercepted and delayed by Chinese Nationalist naval patrol craft, three under alleged threat of violence and two by reported shelling.
In the case of the merchant vessel Flying Independent of the Isbrandtsen Company, the Department of State stated on 16 September 194923 the policy of the United States Government to be (a) nonrecognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government’s purported blockade of Chinese ports, and (b) not to convoy commercial shipping into Shanghai or other Chinese ports; and that the Department of State considered the decision to move vessels into Chinese ports to rest entirely with the shipping companies and masters.
Since the case of the Flying Independent, the Navy has received several appeals from the Isbrandtsen Company to provide protection for its ships in Chinese waters.
The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 253, 80th Congress), Sec. 206, subparagraph (b), states in part that “the Navy shall be generally responsible for … and protection of shipping.”24
Nevertheless the Department of the Navy, in accordance with the stated desire of the Department of State, has taken no action with naval forces to assist the several Isbrandtsen ships in their reported difficulties with Chinese naval patrols.
While being aware that an effective “port closure” by the Chinese Nationalist Government would assist the anti-Communist forces in China, it is the understanding of the Department of Defense that one of the primary reasons the United States did not recognize the declared closure of certain ports is because the Chinese Nationalist Government, at the time of the declaration, did not have actual control of the ports declared “closed”. The responsibilities of the Department of Defense in the premises, however, would not appear to have been altered thereby.
In addition to the responsibility to protect United States shipping, as has been indicated above, the Department of State will appreciate that all components of our military forces have the fundamental responsibility to support United States policy, and other obligations such as the protection of American lives and property.
[Page 1184]Anticipating future similar situations, it is considered that the following factors may make more difficult the discharge of those responsibilities:
- (a)
- The apparently successful visits of some ships may encourage similar visits by the same or other shipping companies;
- (b)
- The ability of United States commercial interests to negotiate with the Chinese blockading units as well as with appropriate Communist port authorities will undoubtedly vary with the fortunes of the Chinese Nationalist Government;
- (c)
- The infiltration of Communists into the Chinese Navy renders more probable a Communist-engineered incident to promote violence against American interests; and
- (d)
- The Nationalist control of the Yangtze estuary may be effectively challenged by the increasing Communist sea and air power, further confusing the problem.
The purpose of this letter is to invite the attention of the Department of State to the anomalous position in which the Department of Defense is placed and the need for policy clarification, and to the possibility of claims for damages against the United States Government by the Isbrandtsen Company. It is believed that a solution to the problem which would be satisfactory from the military point of view would be for steps to be taken to have the de facto blockade regularized.
Sincerely yours,