893.00/3–2949
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Trevor W. Swett of the Office of Controls
[Washington,] March 29, 1949.
| Participants: | Mr. Swett, CON |
| Col. Li, Chinese Purchasing Mission | |
| Mr. E. T. Cummins |
On March 29, I met Colonel Li, a member of the Chinese Purchasing Commission. He is an Armored Force specialist, Chief of the Logistics Division, Armored Force Command, on extended duty in Washington. During a long conversation, he stressed several points:
- 1.
- The Chinese Nationalist Government he feels can still operate effectively against the Communists, given adequate materiel and a U.S. Advisory Mission with authority to train troops, allocate supplies and decide on procedures. He feels that a Mission of several hundred would [Page 504] be necessary. I noted that Constantine Brown55 has mentioned a mission of 1500. He thinks this figure would not be excessive.
- 2.
- He feels that the American military missions and Advisory Group personnel have emphasized only what is wrong in Chinese plans and procedures and have not presented constructive criticism or helpful suggestion.
- 3.
- Armor can be even now very effective in China. This should comprise basically light tanks, preferably armed with 75 mm Hows rather than with only 37 mm guns as at present. (He suggested removal of turrets, the howitzers to be installed with simple shield protection.) Some M–4 medium tanks would also be of great use when heavier fire power is needed. He states that the only effective armor the Chinese have is ex-American scrapped tanks, largely M–5’s, which he (Col. Li) had repaired and re-welded at Honolulu.
- 4.
- A vital present military defect in the Chinese Army is psychological. Poor morale and unwillingness to fight is evident. Inflation has resulted in low pay or none. Troops have inadequate rations. The soldiers know that their families are hungry.
- 5.
- To correct the present involved and unsatisfactory situation economic assistance for the country and simultaneously food supply and equipment assistance for the Army are required. The military factor is of primary importance, but ECA56 help limited only to civilians will not correct present conditions. American economic assistance should be arranged to include, for the troops, in addition to equipment and training, economic and financial assistance—rations and pay.
- 6.
- The younger officers in the Nationalist Army feel hampered by present regulations, especially those covering promotion, which are difficult to change but which must be changed if efficiency is to result. Col. Li is one of these younger senior officers (apparently about 38 years old), a graduate of Whampoa,57 and of several U.S. Service schools including Ft. Benning and Leavenworth (1945).
- 7.
- He states that the Generalissimo is now in a position where he is forced to, and can do nothing else than, accept American advice on training and supply.
- 8.
- The Communists are largely armed with Japanese equipment received from the Russians; also they have much Czech-made armament, obviously received from the Russians.
- 9.
- The Communists have much American equipment formerly in Nationalist possession. This he states is chiefly infantry equipment. When I asked about the quantities of U.S. rifles so lost, he said that in fact they were not, when lost, of shooting value since there was no cal .30 ammunition for them. He explained that we had furnished M–1’s, which as semi-automatic clip-fed weapons in practice need a greater ammunition supply than the single shot bolt action M 1903 type. He did not know what amount of cal .30 ammunition had been furnished to China, but thought the last important transfers thereof were in 1946. (Note: Much cal .30 ammunition was authorized for [Page 505] China last fall, and shipped.) The standard Chinese rifle is the Mauser, 7.9 mm.
Nothing Col. Li said indicated real appreciation of the financial obstacles which U.S. economic and military aid to China on the scale he deems necessary would meet, even if legislative authority were granted.