Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.00/4–449

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

[Washington,] April 4, 1949.

Attached is a sample of the many suggestions we have been getting about sending a U.S. Commission to China.⁶⁶ Although I should like Butterworth’s views and have not yet raised this with him, my own present reactions follow:

I. Purpose

a. Fact-finding

If the commission is to be a fact-finding commission, it would have to have a large staff and would require many months in China to approximate or even to check the information we already have about the situation in China. We have had many hundreds of Americans in China during the past three years, and many thousands prior to that. I believe that the basic facts are known to us. I do not believe that a temporary commission would substantially alter our view of the facts.

b. Policy-advisory

If the commission is designed to advise the President or the Secretary of State on what our policy toward China should be, it must be carefully selected, furnished with as complete information as possible, and related to constitutional authority in such a way as not to force the hand of the government of the U.S. with its recommendations. Our China policy must be fitted into our capabilities and our other responsibilities; the President and the Secretary of State must be able to deal with China in relation to other urgent and pressing matters.

c. Propaganda

If the purpose in sending such a commission is to play a propaganda role with respect to either foreign or domestic politics, considerable advance study must be given to the propaganda effects of the various types of conclusions or recommendations which such a commission might develop. To register a passing interest in China by sending a commission might have beneficial short-range effects—but if nothing tangible results, the long-range effects would show a net set-back. If the primary purpose of the commission is propaganda, more thought should be given as to whether the Chinese Government should not bring the China situation to the attention of the United Nations. In this way an international commission could be sent to China, political opinion could be mobilized on a much broader scale, and the U.S. would not have the unilateral responsibility for any follow-up indicated by the commission’s report. Thus far, the Chinese Government has been reluctant to present the case to the UN.

II. Composition

Any such commission should be kept small in number (not more than 3 if possible) and should consist of persons of national or international reputation. The persons selected, if they have any previous experience with China, will have inevitable policy implications, hence selection would be a very difficult task. Names which occur at the moment: Barry Bingham,⁶⁷ Robert Gordon Sproul (University of California), George Johnson (Dean of Howard Law School). A single Special Representative of the President is another possibility.

III. Prestige factor

Frank consideration of the decline of U.S. prestige in China during the past two years might lead to the conclusion that the dispatch of a commission to China might lead to a serious humiliation for the U.S. in the reception accorded such a commission. It is a point which would require most careful checking with Ambassador Stuart.

IV. Alternative suggestion

The following alternative plan of action might be feasible:

1. Call Ambassador Stuart home for a month’s consultation (FE is studying desirability of this now).⁶⁸

2. Assemble in Department a panel of prominent Americans to consult with the Secretary, Stuart, Butterworth and Kennan⁶⁹ on China, along the lines of the group assembled last year on Germany.⁷⁰

The panel should have:

(a) Background material furnished in advance by the Department.

(b) Top Secret factual briefing by Departmental officers and by Ambassador Stuart.

(c) Several days of policy discussion with senior officers of the Department present.

(d) An opportunity to reach any conclusions or recommendations which might come out of the group discussion.

3. Let the question of a next procedure await the panel’s consideration. A commission to China might result; in any event we would be on a firmer basis for any further action.

66. Not printed; it was a resolution to be presented on January 19 to the Foreign Traders Association of Philadelphia, Inc., to petition President Truman to send a commission to China to make a public report and for the adoption of a positive policy based on the findings of the commission.
67. Louisville editor.
68. See telegram No. 510, April 22, 7 p. m., to the Ambassador in China, vol. viii , “Successive moves of the Embassy office in China …”.
69. George F. Kennan, Director of Policy Planning Staff.
70. Subsequently such a panel was organized; see Department of State Bulletin, August 22, 1949, p. 279, and ibid., September 5, 1949, p. 358.