893.00/6–649: Telegram
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 7—1:46 p. m.]
Cantel 535. Did not comment Department’s 638, May 25 to Nanking, repeated Canton 239, re Chennault plan as thought I had made myself clear on futility further support bankrupt Kmt regime (telCan 285, June 390).
Chennault plan should be profitable commercial airlines, but detrimental interests US. Only way we could justify action suggested would be that it offered prospect alternative Communism. If end result is to be Communist-dominated China, we not only could not justify prolonging suffering Chinese people which would ensue, but would also make Communist task easier by providing them with material to rally racial feeling in support of resistance to foreign intervention.
The conditions that enabled Communists win all North China, despite preponderance materiel and manpower on Nationalist side, still exist, if anything, in exaggerated form. There is complete bankruptcy of leadership in Kmt as exemplified most recently by appointment Yen Hsi-shan, sole surviving warlord, to premiership. Military leadership is the same or no better than that defeated in the North and we could have no assurance that military leaders in zone suggested by Chennault would take our advice any more than did Gimo. From personal observation and from reports of our people in West China, it seems obvious that mass Chinese people those areas cordially detest their present overlords and would welcome any change. They would hardly appreciate our action in maintaining their overlords in power. This is true in areas ruled by the 5 Ma[s]91 as well as in Szechuan and Yunnan. Although the Ma[s] can be expected, even without help from US, to put up strenuous resistance against Communists, they will not have the support of the people and must inevitably succumb to Communist attack. In Szechuan the leaders are bickering among themselves, distraught at the thought that the Nationalist Government may move Chungking, thus inviting earlier Communist attack, and in Yunnan even the Government having declared complete autonomy is merely waiting to make the best terms possible with Communists. Am convinced Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, the latter having the only good armies in southwest China, will inevitably at proper time make peace with Communists. Li’s manoeuvres seem too much of character calculated strengthen his [Page 527] bargaining position. Kwangtung generals realize resistance Canton impossible and are arranging establish safe haven provincial capital Hainan Island. Gimo sits on Taiwan doing what he can to divert Communist attack some other part China and it is almost openly admitted in Canton that life of government in Chungking will be short; that forces of resistance will eventually rally around Gimo on Taiwan and endeavor survive until what is considered to be the inevitable war between US and USSR.
In other words, disintegration is so far advanced, morale so low and the desire of the people for peace so strong that any effort support continued resistance in West or Southwest China seems doomed in advance to failure.
The cycle is complete. Those inspired young leaders who so successfully led the Kmt to control have grown old and corrupt; have lost the mandate of heaven, and are fleeing for safety abroad or to Taiwan. Their followers for the most part are endeavoring adjust themselves mentally and physically to a Communist regime. The people want peace.
In this situation, our best course, it seems to me, is to let Kmt resistance die a natural death and prepare as best we can for a new and even more difficult era of Communist-dominated China.
Sent Department Cantel 535, repeated Nanking 363.