[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Views on Specific Questions Regarding Chinese
Request of 15 August for U.S. Military
Assistance
Question 1: Is it practicable, even with the
aid requested, for the Nationalist forces to hold the defensive line
specified in the letter from Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary of
State, dated 15 August 1949?
Answer: The line delineated in paragraph 4 of
the letter of the Chinese Ambassador is not truly a military position,
since it follows generally the boundaries of provinces and other
administrative subdivisions of China rather than taking advantage of
terrain of natural defensive strength. It is over 1,000 miles in length
and has already been pierced along its eastern flank in Fukien and
Kiangsi Provinces and in the northwest in Kansu Province. It is
obviously impracticable for the Nationalist armed forces to hold this
line in the face of superior Communist forces, irrespective of the
provision of United States military aid in the amounts requested in the
letter of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Further, it would be
impossible, in view of the compartments of terrain and the concentration
capabilities of the Communists, for the Nationalist armed forces to
prevent their enemy from piercing stronger defensive lines further to
the West, although such military operations would not necessarily result
in wresting from Nationalist control the area of West China as a
whole.
Question 2: Is the proposed establishment of
bases and training of forces for a counterattack practicable?
Answer: The question presupposes a
counterattack or counter-offensive by the Nationalist forces and this in
turn must be predicated upon either or a combination of the following:
-
a.
- Attainment by the Nationalist forces, primarily through
reinforcements, of the military capability of halting the
Communist advance in order to create conditions necessary for
counteraction; or
-
b.
- Extensive changes, adverse in nature, in the Communist
position resulting primarily from losses, faulty maneuvers, or
other errors sufficient to permit the passing of the initiative
to the Nationalists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that
there is scant likelihood of either or a combination of these
conditions coming to pass; rather, in the light of the
Communists’ superiority in military strength, tactics,
logistical support, command arrangements, and morale, the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff
feel that planning and the undertaking of preparations at this
time for a major Nationalist counterattack or a counteroffensive
are both unrealistic and impractical.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt if the army training bases in Kwangtung
and Szechwan Provinces will remain in Nationalist hands for a sufficient
length of time for the training there of the twenty new divisions
proposed by the Chinese Nationalist Government. In addition, the air
base at Canton may soon be lost and thereafter the air base at Chengtu.
Further, it is extremely doubtful if the plan for the training of
Nationalist forces for a counterattack is a practicable one and that
sufficient instructors could be provided for this training.
In view of the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the
opinion that neither a Nationalist counteroffensive nor the Goverment’s
plans in preparation therefor are practicable at this time.
Question 3: Do the Nationalists now have “a
unified system of command, an over-all program of defense and attack and
a practical plan of coordinating the action” of various areas and of the
three arms of the services?
Answer: The Chinese Government is divided into
two major political factions, one headed by the Generalissimo and the
other by Acting President Li. The allegiance of the navy and the Air
Force is to the Generalissimo rather than to Li. It is believed that the
majority of the regional commanders of the army regard themselves as
loyal to the Generalissimo. However, General Pai, of the Central
Command, is a follower of Acting President Li, and all of the
Nationalist commanders in northwestern China are relatively autonomous
and thus tend to be very independent in their actions. The political and
military leaders of Nationalist China in general seem concerned
primarily with the retention of their present positions and the
furthering of provincial interests rather than those of non-Communist
China as a whole. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe that the
Nationalist Government has, in fact, a unified command, an effective
over-all program of defense and attack, and a practical plan of
coordinating military action.
Question 4: Are the figures of Nationalist and
Communist strengths accurate as stated in the letter from Chinese
Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated 15 August 1949?
Answer: The estimates of Nationalist and
Communist strengths in the letter from the Chinese Ambassador are
somewhat higher than those assembled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
discrepancy, however, is probably due to inclusion in the Chinese
Nationalist Government figures of local and irregular troops.
Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not take issue with the
strengths stated in the letter
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from Chinese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated 15 August
1949.
Question 5: How much of the $125,000,000 of
United States military aid to China in 1948 is still unexpended?
Answer: As of 31 August 1949, 90.4% of the
materiel and supplies purchased by funds of the current aid program had
been shipped to China. As of 1 September 1949, the sum of $1,949,512,
earmarked by the Chinese Government for specific items was unobligated.
However, contracts are being let for these specific items and the
balance remaining after contract payments therefor will be required for
transportation costs. Therefore, to all intents and purposes, the funds
of the current aid program for China are now exhausted.
Question 6: Are the types of materiel
specified in the Chinese Ambassador’s letter and accompanying memoranda
those which are most urgently needed and could they be delivered?
Answer: The logistical support requested in
the annexes, with tabs and exhibits is in consonance with the Chinese
Nationalist Government’s prepared military plans and would be urgently
needed if the implementation of these plans were undertaken. Also, the
types of materiel are similar to those supplied under the $125,000,000
program referred to in Question 5 and coincide generally with those
requested as first priority during 1948 and 1949. However, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, do not consider the
plans for counterattack and counteroffensive, as proposed by the Chinese
Nationalist Government, to be practicable and realistic at this time.
Since logistical support must be related to specific military plans and
particularly to the scope and nature of the operations projected
therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot agree to the provision of
amounts and types of materiel for plans that, in their opinion, are not
feasible.
In regard to the matter of the delivery of the materiel specified, the
production capacity of the United States is undoubtedly sufficient to
provide these items. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe
that their supply by the United States in the quantities and categories
requested is now warranted.
Question 7: What degree of United States
supervision would the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider necessary if such
aid were granted?
Answer: The degree of United States
supervision required would depend largely upon the size and type of the
Chinese military assistance program. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would not
at this time favor adoption for China of the procedure employed by the
United States military mission to Greece nor would they recommend
resumption of the procedure for advisory activities on a Ministry of
Defense level
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as followed by
their former joint mission to China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that
United States supervision of military aid is a detail which can best be
considered when the specific practicable operational plans that are
contemplated under the general plan of operations are known.
