At their 75th Meeting, with the President presiding, the National Security
Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Economic Cooperation Administrator, the Director,
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Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of
Economic Advisers, considered NSC 68/33
on the subject and adopted the draft report contained therein subject to the
following amendments (NSC Action No.
393):
[Attachment]
Report to the President by the National Security
Council
top secret
[Washington, December 14, 1950.]
Report by the National Security Council on United
States Objectives and Programs for National Security
1. The invasion of the Republic of Korea by the North Korean Communists
imparted a new urgency to the appraisal of the nature,
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time, and scope of programs required to
attain the objectives outlined in NSC
68. The aggression by the Chinese Communists in North Korea has created
a new crisis and a situation of great danger. Our military build-up must
be rapid because the period of greatest danger is directly before us. A
greatly increased scale and tempo of effort is required to enable us to
overcome our present military inadequacy.
2. It must be emphasized that the programs and estimated costs in the
tabulation in Appendix A of NSC 68/3 are
not final. In the critical, complex, and rapidly changing international
situation, it is impossible to blueprint the specific steps and the
costs involved. It is our intention to keep this problem, now so greatly
accentuated, under continuous scrutiny. The principal value of these
first estimates is that they furnish a starting point for the major
effort essential to our national security and to our national
objectives.
3. The several programs hereinafter briefly described* are all conceived to be mutually
dependent. In accordance with the underlying concept of NSC 68, they represent an effort to
achieve, under the shield of a military build-up, an integrated
political, economic, and psychological offensive designed to counter the
current threat to the national security posed by the Soviet Union.
the military program
4. Present conditions make unacceptable the delay involved in the phasing
of our military build-up over a four-year period. It is evident that the
forces envisaged earlier for 1954 must be provided as an interim program
as rapidly as practicable and with a target date no later than June 30,
1952. We must also proceed at once to establish a production and
mobilization base that will permit a very rapid expansion to full
mobilization. Such a course is essential in order for us to build
rapidly a military strength capable of fulfilling our two fundamental
obligations: (a) Protection against disaster; and
(b) Support of our foreign policy.
5. The estimates of forces herein which constituted our initial interim
goal were based on the assumption that hostilities in Korea would
terminate in FY 1951. If this assumption
proves invalid, or if the general world situation continues to worsen,
these force levels will have to be increased.
6. In arriving at these estimates of forces, with full consideration of
the objectives of NSC 68, the following
basic tasks were envisaged:
-
a.
- To provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western Hemisphere
and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe.
-
b.
- To provide a minimum mobilization base while offensive forces are
being developed.
-
c.
- To conduct initial air and sea offensive operations to destroy
vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity and to check enemy
offensive operations until allied offensive strength can be
developed.
-
d.
- To defend and maintain the lines of communication and base areas
necessary to the execution of the above tasks.
-
e.
- To provide aid to our allies to assist them in the execution of
their responsibilities.
7. It should be realized that the forces recommended herein:
-
a.
- Will not insure that the United States will be absolutely secure
against attack by air or unconventional means.
-
b.
- Will not be adequate to defeat the probable enemy unless augmented
by full mobilization of the United States and her allies.
-
c.
- Will not be adequate to defeat aggressive Soviet or
Soviet-directed actions in Soviet-selected areas around the
periphery of the USSR, although they will act as a deterrent to
further Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression.
foreign military and economic assistance
8. The magnitude and phasing of the MDAP
reflected in this report are generally designed to accomplish the
following: (1) to provide nations which are participants in the North
Atlantic Treaty with those quantities and forms of military and economic
aid which they will require in order to raise, organize, train and equip
by 1954 the forces set forth as necessary for the defense of the North
Atlantic Treaty area in defense plans currently approved by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (D.C. 28, dated 28 October 1950);4 and (2) to furnish military assistance
which will, in varying degrees, assist certain other nations in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East (Greece, Turkey and Iran) and in the Far East
and Southeast Asia (Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,
Formosa, etc.) which are now receiving military assistance to restore or
maintain internal security and, in the case of several countries, to
perform limited defensive missions in the event of major external
aggression. A very substantial portion of the total aid proposed,
perhaps 75% thereof, would take the form of armaments produced in the
United States, the remainder being primarily devoted to furnishing
Western European nations with those additional resources which they will
require, in addition to their own, in order (a)
to support a complementary European production program of the magnitude
now envisaged as
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necessary,
and (b) to raise and maintain the forces which
they must provide.
9. It should be specifically noted that the phasing of the MDAP is on an entirely different basis
than that of the U.S. military programs—the former being timed, in
accordance with the assumptions of the North Atlantic Treaty Defense
Plan, to provide forces adequate for the defense of the North Atlantic
area by 1954, whereas the target of the latter is to obtain the required
U.S. forces as rapidly as practicable. Since the factors which governed
the selection of the earlier date in the case of U.S. programs have
equal applicability to North Atlantic defense measures, it is of the
greatest importance that the phasing of the latter should, to the
maximum degree possible, be brought into consonance with the phasing of
U.S. programs. Therefore, every method should immediately be explored,
and thereafter continue periodically to be explored, for accelerating,
if possible to 1952, the completion date of the program envisaged in
current North Atlantic Treaty defense plans, including, but not limited
to, consideration of (a) additional measures
directed toward encouraging, persuading and enabling other North
Atlantic Treaty nations to increase and speed up their contributions;
(b) new methods for accelerating the work of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (c) the
possibility of setting earlier production targets for MDAP armaments to be produced in the
United States; and (d) the possibility of the
United States assuming a substantially greater proportion than presently
proposed of the actual task of physically producing the capital and
replacement requirements of the forces to be raised. To the extent that
such acceleration can be achieved, the amounts of U.S. aid required will
tend to be telescoped even more sharply in the earlier years and will
also be increased in the aggregate. Even in the absence of any such
acceleration, the further refinement of NATO defense plans and their firm pricing on an
international basis may indicate a U.S. aid requirement appreciably
larger than that now proposed.
10. In the event that the number of nations receiving assistance is
increased or in the event of a major change in current military
assistance objectives with respect to present aid recipients in the
Middle or Far East, as, for example, in the case of Formosa or
Indochina, MDAP figures would have to
be reviewed.
11. Our objective in providing economic aid outside the NATO areas is to create situations of
political and economic strength in the free world especially in critical
areas whose present weakness may invite Soviet thrusts. However, as a
consequence of increased demands on U.S. resources resulting from the
military defense program, claims
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on U.S. resources for foreign aid have been limited to programs that
will meet most urgent and immediate needs. These programs have therefore
been restricted to those fulfilling three broad purposes: (1) investment
to increase the production and facilitate the distribution of critical
materials directly needed for defense; (2) aid to strengthen the defense
effort of our allies; and (3) aid to enable governments which are or can
be expected to become friendly members of the free world to win the
confidence and support of their own peoples as a solid foundation for
political stability and national independence. More specifically, United
States economic assistance should also be designed to reduce economic
dependency of countries on the USSR and its satellites in order to (a) curtail the volume of shipments of items to
those Communist dominated areas and (b) reduce
availability of foreign currencies to the USSR for strategic purposes in
such areas as Southeast Asia and Australia. To reduce the drain on U.S.
resources, aid programs have been held to the minimum believed necessary
to effect these purposes.
the civilian defense program
12. The civilian defense program should contribute to a reasonable
assurance that, in the event of war, the United States would survive the
initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives.
Civilian defense programs are designed to serve to minimize casualties
in the event of attack, to provide emergency relief immediately after
attack, and to help preserve the productive core of the nation. Civil
defense programs are tailored to domestic military defense programs and
require close and continuing coordination with them. In this regard
civil defense programs are currently being reviewed with the objective
of revising them, as to timing and magnitude, in accordance with the
more urgent and increased military program now being developed.
the stockpiling program
13. The stockpiling program is designed to afford the United States those
strategic and critical materials, essential for the prosecution of a
five-year war, which would not be forthcoming from United States wartime
production and imports from accessible sources.
14. Plans developed up to the end of November, 1950, had been designed to
have these stockpiles complete and physically on hand in the United
States by 1954.
15. The stockpile program is currently being reviewed with the objective
to revising in accordance with and subject to the increased military
requirements now being developed. In addition, stockpile
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objectives themselves are undergoing
constant review, particularly in the light of such questions as the
possible impact on the economic stability of nations friendly to the
United States, substitution of other less critical materials, tests of
necessity, and changes in military specifications.
the information program
16. The information and educational exchange programs are designed to
develop the maximum psychological effect from the political, diplomatic,
economic and military measures undertaken by the United States and its
allies and to convey the implications of these measures effectively to
the minds and emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly
influence governmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and
among other peoples. The primary effort will be directed at creating, in
the areas and the nations of most critical importance to the achievement
of the national objectives of the United States, (a) popular and governmental confidence and resolution in
support of the shared interests of the peoples of the free world, and
(b) psychological resistance to the further
expansion, whether by overt or covert means, of the influence of Soviet
Communism.
17. The peoples of the Soviet Union and its satellites, as well as the
peoples of the most vulnerable areas of the free world, are primary
targets of this psychological offensive.
intelligence and related activities
18. An intensification of intelligence and related activities is vitally
necessary as a safeguard against political or military surprise and is
essential to the conduct of the affirmative program envisaged in NSC 68. The intelligence and related
programs projected in response to NSC 68
provide for such an intensification of effort. They are being put into
execution as rapidly as possible without reference to the phasing of the
other programs presented in this report.
the internal security program
19. The elements of the accelerated program recommended by the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference constitute a balanced internal
security program within the framework of the original NSC 68 project. There is every reason to
believe that if these basic elements are realized they will contribute
substantially to the accomplishment of the objectives outlined in NSC 68 by insuring the adequacy of the
nation’s internal security, which is an indispensable part of a
nationally secure United States. The early realization of the objectives
outlined by the
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ICIS and the IIC is essential in order
to strengthen our defenses against the dangers of espionage, sabotage,
and other types of subversion by impeding the individual and collective
will of subversive elements to act to the detriment of internal security
by increasing the physical hazards as well as the legal obstacles and
penalties incident to the commission of subversive acts. Additionally,
it will afford greater protection to the nation’s critical governmental
and industrial facilities; it will make more secure the orderly
functioning of government; it will minimize the possibility of the
clandestine introduction of unconventional attack media and of the
exportation of strategic materials and information; and it will thus aid
in thwarting the strategy and tactics of the Kremlin which are designed
to weaken, dominate and destroy us as a free people.
20. In the light of developments since the preparation of NSC 68 and in view of the resulting
revisions in The Military Program, ever-increased emphasis should be
afforded the projected internal security program to the end that the
level of internal security preparedness contemplated by 1954 may be
attained by 1952, or as soon thereafter as circumstances permit.
