Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

Department of State Atomic Energy Files

Summary Log of Atomic Energy Work in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, May–September 1950

[Extracts]

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

I. International Control of Atomic Energy¹

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II. Combined Policy Committee²

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III. Relations With Foreign Countries

a. eur

1. United Kingdom

State and Defense perceive no policy objection to approval of an export license application covering one and one-half tons of Kell-F (a special plastic) for use in the British low separation diffusion plant, subject to a finding by the AEC that there are no legal obstacles. The British made a special request for this material in order to proceed with the LSD, which will have the purpose of furnishing uranium enriched slightly in U-235 for charging their two Windscale reactors. Defense has expressed the view that the operation of the British LSD is a sound step from the standpoint of economical utilization of available uranium.

2. Canada

a. State and Defense have approved the Commission’s acceptance of a Canadian offer to sell all plutonium in excess of Canada’s research requirements. As an ancillary development, it was learned that the British had requested one kilogram of plutonium from the current Canadian stocks in exchange for a suitable quantity of uranium. The United States Government has no objection to this proposed sale, since it is not considered as prejudicial to the bi-lateral arrangements with the Canadians.

b. The AEC, through direct negotiations with the Canadian National Research Council, completed understandings whereby the AEC will contract for the entire output of uranium ores of Canada during the next eight years, including up to 8,000 tons of U3O8 in this period.

c. Routine approval was given to the Canadian request for a shipment of uranium rods for the Chalk River pile covered by the allocation agreed to by the CPC in January 1948.

3. Sweden

a. The new American Ambassador to Sweden³ was given a thorough briefing regarding atomic energy problems in that country, including information regarding Swedish uranium deposits, the 1945 assurances, the Swedish atomic research program, the activities of Robinson⁴ during his tenure as Attaché at Stockholm, and export controls.

b. See Export Controls (IV)

4. Norway

(See Netherlands for account of projected Norwegian-Dutch collaboration in atomic energy research.)

5. Portugal

a. Unilateral British representations for removal of an exorbitant import duty on structural steel for the Urgeirica plant proved successful without the necessity of U.S. association as had been requested by the AEC members of the CDA.

b. Rumors persist that the atomic energy installations of other European countries, namely Sweden, France and Switzerland, have succeeded in securing small lots of uranium ores produced from mines in metropolitan Portugal other than those comprising the British (CDA) concessions. We have received no confirmation of these rumors.

c. We are awaiting the AEC’s views regarding our proposal that all offerings of small lots of Portuguese ores outside of the CDA operations be handled through the Embassy, whether these offers originate in Portugal or from American citizens. We have suggested that the AEC merely acknowledge letters from American parties, stating that the matter will be investigated through the Embassy before any inquiries are made of Portuguese officials regarding the issuance of licenses for export to the U.S. The United Kingdom Government feels strongly that undue interest on our part in small lots of Portuguese ores will have a deleterious effect on the operations of the CDA in Portugal. We are inclined to agree.

6. Switzerland

See Export Controls (IV)

7. Belgium and the Congo

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Netherlands

The Department was informed through this office by a leading Dutch nuclear physicist of a prospective agreement between Norway and the Netherlands for cooperation in the field-of atomic energy research. Under the proposed plan, the Dutch would supply about 10 tons of uranium oxide which had been purchased before the war and concealed during the German occupation. These ores would be processed in Norway and the resulting refined uranium used to charge the Kjeller heavy water reactor now under construction near Oslo. The project would be supervised by a mixed commission of scientists from the two countries. This new alignment apparently side-tracks a Norwegian-Swedish alignment which has been impending for some time although the Netherlands spokesman indicated that scientists of other countries might eventually be invited to participate in the project.

9. France

See Export Controls (IV)

10. Italy

The Embassy at Rome has been advised that the AEC’s interest in certain uranium deposits in Northern Italy is not strong enough to justify special investigation. However, if a field party is sent to do work in other parts of Europe, it may be desirable to have it also survey the Italian occurrences which are comparatively low grade but still of some interest.

11. Germany

a. Low grade uranium deposits in Bavaria have been called to the attention of HICOG by certain German engineers. AEC is interested in securing further information and representative samples, and HICOG has been requested to report whether a qualified person is available to make the required investigations.

b. See Export Controls (IV)

12. USSR

See Intelligence (VI)

b. ara

1. Brazil

The Brazilian Congress adjourned temporarily for the election campaign without having acted on the three pending bills providing for an embargo on the export of monazite with varying provisos for Government sales. The Embassy has recommended that since it is doubtful whether a quorum will reconvene before the new Congress takes office in January, that the U.S. Government prepare to offer to buy reasonable quantities of monazite to confirm our interest in monazite which the Embassy has been emphasizing for the past two years.

The Department is supporting negotiations at Torquay⁵ for a possible reduction in the import duty on thorium and cerium products as requested by Brazil in view of the Embassy’s feeling that this will further our efforts to obtain monazite from that country.

2. Argentina

a. The Argentine Government has issued regulations authorizing I.A.P.I.⁶ as the sole selling agency for beryl. Finalization of a sale of beryl to an AEC contractor has been delayed because I.A.P.I. has not been able to acquire any beryl under the low prices it has offered producers and holders of beryl.

b. A National Commission for Atomic Energy was established in June of this year.

3. Chile

The Department is awaiting receipt of the AEC staff report on the investigation of certain radioactive mineral areas in Chile conducted by a joint team of Chilean and American geologists in the spring of this year. It is intended that the report will be transmitted to the Chilean Government when available.

c. nea

1. Iran

Samples furnished by the Iranian Government have been analyzed and show some radioactivity. Steps are being taken to acquire additional data regarding the deposits through the Embassy, but the Embassy will be cautioned to play down the matter with the Iranian Prime Minister in order to avoid undue excitement regarding the presence of uranium in Iran.

2. India

a. At the request of the GOI, the United States Government has agreed to the deletion of paragraph 3 of the agreement on beryl.⁷ It is expected that the Indians will soon carry through with the commitments made in the agreement to ship 400 tons of beryl to the United States during the first year of the agreement.

b. Several approaches by private parties for the purchase of Indian monazite have been unsuccessful. GOI policy ostensibly still continues to prohibit the export of the raw material, and the Government is proceeding with its plans to process substantial quantities of monazite in India. The thorium recovered will be retained for atomic energy research and development. The rare earth products presumably will be sold in part through the French company, STR, to supply the needs of consuming countries, including the United States.

3. Indonesia

Our Ambassador has been requested at the earliest appropriate time to discuss informally at the highest level with the Indonesian Government the accession of that Government to the applicable provisions of the Netherlands monazite agreement of 1945.⁸ This is provided for in the Hague agreements consummated in December 1948.⁹

d. fe

1. China

See Export Controls (IV)

2. Japan

Nothing to report.

3. Korea

This office has learned that prior to the outbreak of hostilities in South Korea, the Russians were making active efforts to maximize production of monazite from North Korean sources. The significance of these activities with respect to the USSR atomic program is unknown.

IV. Export Controls

a. germany

Mr. Donnell¹⁰ completed his survey of German manufacture and control of atomic energy items in August. His conclusions are that the Germans have made considerable progress in the manufacture of and use of nuclear, research equipment including some highly specialized items and that a qualified person should be attached to the Military Security Board to keep tabs on German activities, particularly with a view to working out procedures to:

1. Prevent the shipment of items to the East which would be useful to the Soviet atomic program, and

2. To check on activities of German institutions in the field of atomic energy research and development.

b. france

The Embassy is being urged to emphasize to the French in discussions scheduled for October, the need for expeditious establishment of the executive controls over atomic energy items which had been foreshadowed since early this year.

c. switzerland

The Swiss continue to procrastinate on the matter of establishing controls over export and transshipment of atomic energy items. Prolonged discussions with certain Swiss officials have achieved little more than the agreement that those items manufactured in Switzerland should be incorporated in the arms embargo legislation. Although this would also take care of transshipments of these items, it would still leave loopholes for transshipment through Switzerland of the remaining items on the AEC lists. We are considering moving in concert with drastic procedures now being considered as necessary to force the Swiss to adopt controls over items on the Commerce 1A and 1B lists.¹¹

d. liechtenstein

The American Consulate General at Zurich, acting under instructions from the Department, has interviewed the owner of a firm in Liechtenstein which has begun the manufacture of vacuum pumping equipment considered superior to any produced in Europe. The owner states that he will continue to permit the sale of pumps to all destinations except Russia when it is known the equipment will be used in the country of purchase. In view of the fact that the firm has orders from Czechoslovakia for three pumps, including one which may have an atomic energy connection, we are considering asking the Consulate General to obtain a broader commitment from the owner to extend the ban on shipments to all Soviet-dominated countries.

e. denmark

In view of the lack of a reply from the Danish Government to an approach made by our Embassy in the spring for establishment of suitable controls over atomic energy items, the Embassy has now been requested to press for an early reply.

f. sweden

Perhaps the most important action taken in the export control field to date to impede the Soviet atomic energy program resulted from very satisfactory cooperation on the part of the Swedish Government after representations were made by our Embassy regarding shipment of specialized equipment required by Eastern German plants engaged in the manufacture of nickel wire mesh in quantity. (This material is known to be destined for the Soviet gaseous diffusion plant similar to our Oak Ridge operation.)

g. china and taiwan

Exports from the U.S. of atomic energy items to Communist China and Taiwan have been suspended.

h. united kingdom

The United Kingdom has agreed to follow a policy similar to that of the United States in suspending shipments of thorium nitrate (except small quantities included in omnibus orders for chemicals) to China and Taiwan.

V. Relations With the Economic Cooperation Administration

Nothing to report.

VI. Intelligence

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VII. Miscellaneous

a. radioisotopes

The AEC has liberalized some of the requirements with which countries participating in its program for the international distribution of radioisotopes must comply. Thus progress reports need be submitted only once instead of twice a year, the publication of results obtained from the use of isotopes purchased under the program is no longer obligatory, and the undertaking to accept all qualified visiting scientists to laboratories where these isotopes are being used has been modified.

The Department has also noted the Commission’s proposals (1) to increase the number of isotopes currently distributed under the program so as to include, inter alia, stable isotopes and minute quantities of heavy water suitable for non-military experimental purposes; (2) to perform special irradiation services on behalf of participating countries; and (3) to modify the conditions under which isotopes may be exported and used so as to include isotopes for industrial research and application. The Commission, however, has not yet taken final action with reference to these proposals.

b. oak ridge institute of nuclear studies

Although applications have been received from a large number of foreign nationals to attend radioisotope courses at the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, the Commission states that no new courses are yet scheduled in which other than American citizens may participate.

[Here follows an Annex to the Summary Log, dealing with intelligence matters.]

1. For documentation on international control of atomic energy, see pp. 1 ff.
2. The Combined Policy Committee did not meet during the period covered by this summary log. For the minutes of the meeting of the American members, September 7, see p. 572.
3. W. Walton Butterworth was appointed Ambassador to Sweden on July 5.
4. Howard A. Robinson, a nuclear physicist, served as Attaché at the Embassy in Stockholm from December 1948 through December 1949.
5. For documentation on tariff negotiations which opened in Torquay, England, on September 28, pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see pp. 692 ff.
6. Argentine Trade Promotion Institute.
7. The draft agreement of October 20, 1949, is described in telegram 244 from New Delhi, July 29, 1950, p. 567.
8. Reference is to the Secret Memorandum of Agreement between the Netherlands Government and the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, signed in London, August 4, 1945, not printed. For documentation on the negotiation of the agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, pp. 9–36 passim.
9. Article 5 of the Netherlands-Indonesian Agreement on Transitional Measures which took effect with the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia on December 27, 1949, provided that the United States of Indonesia assumed the rights and obligations specified in treaties and agreements which had been concluded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands where applicable to the jurisdiction of the United States of Indonesia. For documentation on the interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of Netherlands rule in the East Indies, including material on The Hague negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 57 ff.
10. Alton Donnell, former Chief of the Export Control Branch of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.
11. The lists are identified in footnote 3, p. 563.