Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

400.118/12–2350: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions ¹

secret

Washington, December 23, 1950—8:15 a. m.

Reference is made to Dept’s circular airgrams Mar 10, 1950, 9:45 a. m.² and Aug 16, 1948, 12:50 p. m.³ re establishment of export controls over atomic energy items.

The increasingly critical international situation arising from the Korean war makes it imperative that all practicable measures be taken to ensure against diversion to Soviet-dominated countries of materials and equipment which would contribute to the Soviet military potential. The President’s announcement of Sept 1949⁴ re an atomic explosion in the USSR emphasizes the particular significance of items having direct or indirect relation to atomic energy development.

Experience over the last two years has indicated that control of only those items being manufactured or exported from a country is not adequate to achieve the objective of complete denial of all items on AEC lists to the Soviets. Many cases have come to light of transshipment of materials through Western European countries to the USSR or its satellites which might have been prevented had adequate transshipment inspection and licensing been in practice on the countries concerned. At this time several countries have instituted broad controls over all AEC items under procedures similar to those in effect in US. Among the countries which have taken this step are UK and Canada. The French Govt is expected shortly to publish the items on AEC lists for control purposes. Attempts are now being made to induce the Swiss Govt to apply broad controls over all AEC items, including provisions for screening shipments through Swiss free ports. In view of the lack of transshipment controls, AEC has been forced to a policy of withholding action on export license applications covering items on AEC Lists A and B destined for Switzerland until Swiss Govt takes satisfactory action in this respect.

Dept and AEC staff are of the view that all Govts having significant trade in items on AEC lists should now broaden the scope of their controls in order to achieve consistent practices in all friendly countries at the level now established by US, UK and Canadian controls. In order to evaluate the present status and required further action, Dept requests each of the Missions listed for action at the close of this airgram to review the current status of export controls pertinent to AEC items in the country to which accredited and to evaluate the prospects of achieving the objective of full controls. In the preparation of the requested report, it would be desirable to include answers to the following questions:

1. How is screening of Lists A and B items accomplished?

2. Are procedures adequate to cover items in transit through the country?

3. What sort of border customs inspections are being applied?

4. Have items been publicized for control purposes?

5. What penalties are applicable to violators of regulations if such are in effect?

It may be desirable to consult informally with representatives of the Govts to which the respective Missions are accredited in order to ascertain the probable attitude toward the Govt to tighter controls and in particular over transshipment of AEC items through the country. It is suggested, however, that the Missions not make a formal approach regarding the transshipment phase until the receipt of further instructions from Dept, after the requested reports have been received and evaluated.

A separate airgram is being sent to other American diplomatic posts which have not heretofore been informed of the control program for AEC items but where transshipment of goods could possibly occur, as the normal avenues to Soviet countries are closed by institution of tighter controls. These posts are being requested to evaluate the possibilities of securing the cooperation of the respective governments to which accredited in the institution of appropriate controls to meet the situation in each case.

Acheson

1. Sent for action to: Brussels, The Hague, Stockholm, Oslo, Rome, Copenhagen, Bern, Paris, Vienna, Trieste; for information to: London, Frankfort, Berlin, Luxembourg, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Helsinki.
2. Not printed.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 739.
4. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1949, p. 487.