Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

310.393/3–1150: Telegram

The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State

secret   priority

New York, March 11, 1950—6:28 p. m.

241. For the Secretary and Rusk. In view of mission, it is of decisive importance that Department without delay take careful inventory of situation re Chinese representation question in UN. We feel this is essential now because (1) SYG Lie’s current activities and statements, however well intended, threaten to cause confusion, and (2) our exploratory discussions here indicate that US position is not clearly understood by other members SC. Reasons for misunderstanding are summarized below:

1. Re SYG Lie’s activities, little need be said other than that he is admittedly waging campaign designed to bring about seating Chinese Communist representative in SC and other UN organs. In our judgment, his activities do present serious problem to USUN in terms of our relations with SYG and other delegates. Our line has been and, subject to further instructions from Department, will remain, to avoid actions which might be interpreted as controversy between US and SYG. We have attempted to make clear our position to him privately, as reported in memorandum of conversation held by Gross and Ross with Lie, dated March 7.

2. Regarding US position, we have had lengthy conversations with Egyptian and Ecuadoran delegates during past few days, and these are separately reported. In order to assist Department in evaluation these discussions, it may be helpful for us to summarize at this point factual background of US Government activities during past few weeks, country by country.

First, Ecuador. Department will understand, of course, that our activities with respect to Ecuador, referred to immediately below, have undoubtedly been made known to SYG and other dels concerned by Ecuadoran Del in NY. We have learned press here has some information concerning US approaches to Ecuadoran Foreign Office.

On January 12, on instruction from Department, I made the following statement in the SC:

“The resolution submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union is directed at unseating Dr. Tsiang on the ground that his credentials are no longer valid because they emanate from a government which the Soviet Union no longer recognizes. Each member of the council is of course free to vote on this proposal in accordance with its own views concerning the question of recognition. The US Government recognizes as the Government of China the Government which has accredited Dr. Tsiang to the SC. My Government therefore considers that Dr. Tsiang’s credentials remain valid and will vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution.

I should like to make it clear that the US Government considers that the Soviet Union draft resolution presents to the council a procedural question involving the credentials of a representative of a member. Accordingly, a vote against the motion by my Government could not be considered as a veto, even assuming that seven members of the council vote in favor of the resolution. I wish to make it clear that my Government will accept the decision of the SC on this matter when made by an affirmative vote of seven members.”

Embassy Quito advised Department 12 January (Quito’s No. 6) that Foreign Office had informed Embassy of Ecuador’s “present intention” to break diplomatic relations with Chinese Nationalists and to delay recognition Communist Government “for some time thereafter”. Foreign Office requested US views.

Pursuant to instructions from Department (Deptel No. 3, dated January 17 to Quito) US Ambassador January 18 handed Foreign Office memo which, among other things, said that while US Government realizes that international political decisions involving recognition are for each country to make independently, “we wish to observe that breaking of relations by Ecuador with Chinese Nationalist Government would have important effect upon voting situation, already delicate, in SC in connection with Soviet efforts unseat Chinese Nationalist Government representative”. After further reference to UN situation, message delivered by Ambassador expressed US view that “Ecuadoran Government might wish to consider deferring, at least for present, breaking relations with Nationalist Government”.

USUN outlined its views for consideration Department in USUN No. 98, dated January 31, suggesting that in absence countervailing considerations, we should “cease activity designed to discourage other members UN” from taking such action which they believe wisest from their own point of view re representation question.

Prior to receipt USUN’s No. 98, Department sent to certain AR missions Depcirtel dated February 1, 1 a. m., instructing them to explain our point of view re recognition, to make clear that decisions re diplomatic relations are for government to make independently, explaining the advantages we attach to continuing exchange views, and developing harmony of action among American republics on this matter “to extent possible”. This Depcirtel did not explicitly refer to UN seating question as did the message in Quito’s No. 6.

Upon receipt information copy Depcirtel, USUN pointed out to Department in USUN’s No. 113, February 2, possible significance omission of reference to this question and suggested that question of whether Chinese representation in UN organs was identified with national recognition policy too important to leave to implication, but should be made explicit.

Shortly thereafter I had benefit of discussion foregoing in Department. I was advised Department was then considering nature of reply to Cairo’s telegram No. 75, January 24, in which Embassy reported that Egyptian Foreign Minister was “unhappy about happenings at Lake Success” re Chinese representation and would like Department’s ideas or suggestions. Following my discussions in Department, Embassy Cairo was advised (No. 94 to Cairo, February 4) of US view that Chinese representation in UN bodies is that each member must decide for itself what position it will take, together with an explanation of our position.

Re Cuba, USUN has received copy Embassy despatch Habana No. 450, February 28. Embassy Cuba reports Chinese Ambassador Pao, accredited to Peru, while in Habana advised American Embassy that re matter recognition Chinese Communist Government, Pao had gained the impression that “Cuba would follow the lead of the US”. No reference is made in Embassy despatch to Cuban attitude re Chinese representation question.

Turning now to discussions here, it is important in our view to consider significance our talks with other dels in NY in light of foregoing summary of US Government activities.

USUN discussions past few days with Dels of Ecuador, Cuba, Egypt, and France indicate clearly these four governments intend to maintain present position. None of the four is “in a hurry” to recognize Communist Government or to vote to unseat Nationalist representative in UN organs or to seat Communist representative. France will abstain in vote; other three will vote against unseating Nationalist or seating Communist.

Lengthy discussions of Gross with Viteri-Lafronte (Ecuador), to be reported separately, make it perfectly clear that Ecuadoran position is based on desire Ecuador to comply with what it considers the “US request” embodied in Embassy message January 17 referred to above. After careful exposition by Gross of sincere view US Government that seating question was one to be decided by each SC member for itself, it became clear Ecuadoran Del was puzzled by what he considered double talk. On further pressing by Gross, Viteri-Lafronte produced his instructions from Quito as well as Spanish translation American Embassy message January 18 to Foreign Office. He explained that President of Ecuador attached greatest importance to “ties of understanding and friendship which bound our two countries” and was aware that consequences of Ecuadoran vote in SC would “hardly affect Ecuador at all, but would be of very great importance to the US”. He said his government could not take such a decision without being certain that US Government considered it to be to its own best interests because otherwise Ecuador might “take the risk of causing US harmful consequences which it would not under any circumstances want to do”.

Gross replied that we considered it to be to our own best interests in this situation to encourage Ecuador to make a decision from the point of view of “Ecuador’s best interests”. Viteri-Lafronte replied again that Ecuador’s best interests lay in the direction of taking action which was of greatest benefit to the US. If the US advised Ecuador that for any reason we felt it to be to our best interest to have the Chinese Communist representatives sit in UN organs, Viteri personally felt his government would vote for that and would understand the special reasons why we would continue to vote against.

In summary, it appears to me we face following dilemma in light of action we took on January 18. So long as January 18 request remains “effective”, it will be difficult for USUN to convey to Ecuadoran Del US view that Chinese representation question is indeed one for Ecuador to decide in accordance with its own wishes and interests. Such assurances are likely to be construed as a poorly disguised suggestion that Ecuador is now “released from our request” and that we now would prefer them to vote to seat the Communist representative.

SYG Lie appears to be busy creating this impression. Chilean delegate, Santa Cruz, confirmed this to me today and said Latin American delegations generally were of opinion US now “would like to see the end of the deadlock”. I denied this, repeating our true position.

Re Egypt, USUN believes on basis conversation with Fawzi Bey that Egypt is not only “in no hurry” to seat Chinese Communists, but is likely to refrain from changing its position until and unless US set the pace. Egyptian view seems based upon feeling that in this matter US leadership responsibility “cannot be avoided” and that US should not expect smaller countries “to make our decision for us”.

Following my most recent trip to Washington last Monday, in conversing during the past week with Lie, Shone, Chauvel, Fawzi and Tsiang, as well as Viteri-Lafronte, I have stated the position of the US as follows:

1. With regard to the question of the recognition policy of the US towards China, this is a matter within the special competence of the President and the Secretary of State. USUN has no responsibility in this matter and therefore it is not appropriate for USUN to comment on the question, other than to say that it remains US policy not to recognize Communist Government.

2. With regard to the question of Chinese representation in the UN, the position of the US has not changed in any particular, but remains as stated by Gross in the SC on January 12. The US position may be summarized as follows:

(a) The US continues to recognize Nationalist China and does not recognize the Communist regime in China.

(b) In the present situation, the US representative will vote against unseating the representative of the Nationalist Government or seating a Communist representative in the SC or any other UN body.

(c) The US considers that this matter is a procedural one and that our negative vote is not a veto.

(d) The US will abide by Whatever constitutional majority decision is taken in any UN body.

3. The US does not intend to seek “to bring pressure” or otherwise to encourage, discourage or to influence other governments or dels to vote one way or the other on the issue of Chinese representation in the UN. The US considers that this issue is one to be decided by each individual government in the light of its own circumstances and interest, just as the US and the UK are doing. To emphasize this, I have pointed to obvious differences in US and UK attitudes.

4. We hope the Russians will return to and begin for first time to participate fully in the work of UN bodies. We believe in the principle of universality on which the UN was founded. We feel that responsibility for the relative [in]effectiveness of certain UN activities at the present time, notably in connection with efforts to establish an effective system of international control for atomic energy, rests squarely on the Soviet Union which has acted illegally and irresponsibly in absenting itself from UN bodies, and that the US and governments other than the Soviet Union and its satellites bear no share whatever of this responsibility. We feel that any decision with respect to meeting the Soviet tactics should give due weight to the question of how much of a price should be paid to the Soviet Union to induce them to “walk into” the UN.

Meanwhile, I also met with press at their request on March 8 and outlined US views in foregoing sense (text of transcript sent to Bancroft).

In light of publicity concerning Lie’s approach to problem and his statement to press March 10, we assume probability he will continue urge his views not only on SC members, but also on other UN dels in NY. Accordingly, we consider it important to avoid misunderstanding or misinterpretation our position this whole matter. There are three principal points on which we should appreciate Department’s urgent instructions:

(1) Do the statements we have been making here as outlined above correctly reflect US position re (a) Chinese representation; (b) charges of US “pressure” and (c) Soviet responsibility for present situation.

If answers to foregoing are affirmative, we would suggest that so far as possible further discussion of matter be centered in NY, although we would recommend that circular be sent to US missions to member governments of UN (other than Soviet and satellites) explaining our position in terms set forth above for their information and background, but not for action. It would also seem desirable to issue an appropriate instruction to Embassy Quito pointing out our present position and reasons for it. We consider it essential that approaches to Ecuadorans in Quito and NY be thoroughly coordinated and synchronized.

Gross