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Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Meeting With the President
item 6. U.S. position in the U.N.
I reviewed with the President the difficult situation in which we found ourselves with our Allies and in the Security Council by reason of the Russian ability to play on the Korean situation, Formosa and [Page 257] the Chinese Communists. I said that by keeping these matters connected they could mobilize certain nations in opposition to us, some on each issue.
I pointed out the great need for circumspection in regard to Formosa and the importance of not having the Communists seating issue arise for a vote on the merits. To seat the Chinese over our objection would whip up opinion here against our Allies. We could not meet the views of our Allies as long as the fighting in Korea continued.
I pointed out that the long-range consideration of not interfering with quarrels which were sure to arise between the Russians and the Chinese Communists was one which we shared with our Allies. The great difficulty was how to preserve our unity. It seemed to me that the best chance of this was by talking the matter out with the British and trying to have the whole thing referred to the General Assembly for discussion, first, on the general criteria to be employed in such cases, and later on for an application to this case. The discussion of the criteria would undoubtedly involve acceptance of the principles of the Charter and the decisions of the Security Council. Here we were in a strong position. The Chinese would be in a weak one. They might be tested out as to their intentions in supporting Communist revolutionary movements in Southeast Asian states. If the General Assembly could come to a decision one way or the other after full debate, it might furnish a method of preserving our unity with our Allies.
The President expressed approval of this general analysis of method and approach.