320/10–3150: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
Delga 200. Gadel 64, October 23. Two Yugoslav draft resolutions were discussed yesterday at special meeting of US, UK, French and Canadian representatives. There was general agreement that neither proposal has much merit but that it is unlikely Yugoslavia will consent to withdraw them, particularly “duties of states in event of outbreak of hostilities” (A/C.1/604). Representatives felt Yugoslavia [Page 427] probably would consent for second resolution to be referred to IC for study provided it gets satisfactory action first resolution.
Representatives agreed that for political reasons it is highly desirable, if at all possible, to avoid embarrassing Yugoslav delegate by rejecting first resolution outright.1 With this in mind, Soskice (UK) volunteered try to redraft first resolution in such manner as to eliminate its bad features and yet retain enough be recognized as Yugoslav proposal. Representatives will meet again to examine Soskice’s draft.
Representatives not sanguine that Soskice’s draft will provide satisfactory compromise. It was considered, however, that even an unsuccessful effort to reach such compromise will be useful if and when the representatives find themselves obliged to recommend that Yugoslavia withdraw both resolutions or at least consent their being pigeon-holed in IC or postponed for consideration by 6th GA.
Meeting decided each delegate should remain free to conduct conversations with Yugoslavs.
- On this point the U.S. minutes of the meeting read: “The four Delegations agreed that the best solution would be to persuade the Yugoslav Delegation to withdraw its resolutions. As an inducement to do so, Sir Frank Soskice [Representative on the British Delegation to the General Assembly] suggested the possibility that in the course of [First Committee] debate statements be made promising Yugoslav support under the Charter or Uniting for Peace in the event of Cominform aggression. It was felt, however, that no Delegation was in a position to make definite commitments of action by its government, although it was most important in private conversations to impress upon Yugoslavia the fact that Western opposition to the two resolutions does not mean the Western democracies wish to avoid assisting Yugoslavia in case of aggression against her. It was agreed that in the debates one or more delegations might indicate that the ultimate objectives of the Yugoslav resolution are achieved by Uniting for Peace resolution and that Yugoslavia will be able to avail itself if necessary of the machinery established by that resolution.” (IO Files, Doc. US/A/C.1/2234, October 30, 1950)↩