Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files

Draft of Position Paper From Background Book for Colonial Policy Discussions

confidential

[Washington ], June 15, 1950.

III, B, 2—The Relationship Between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly and the Question of Whether the Trusteeship Council Is Obliged To Carry Out Any Decision of the Assembly or Has The Power To Reach Its Own Conclusions on the Point at Issue

background

The status of the Trusteeship Council vis-à-vis the General Assembly, in particular the extent to which the Council is bound to carry out requests or recommendations of the Assembly, became a prominent question during the Council’s Sixth Session in Geneva.¹ It was injected in varying degrees of intensity into the debates on Jerusalem,² the terms of reference of the Council’s visiting mission to the Pacific,³ the Assembly’s resolutions on political, economic, social and educational advancement in trust territories,⁴ and the flying of the United Nations flag over trust territories.⁵

[Here follows exposition of public statements on the subject of the relationship between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, by the delegates of various governments.]

anticipated position of belgium, france, and united kingdom

On the basis of the debate in the Sixth Session of the Council, these three governments may be expected to view the Trusteeship Council as a deliberative body acting by a majority vote of its member governments. These governments cannot be denied their discretion in acting upon issues before the Council. Although the Assembly has the authority to call upon the Council to report on its action in certain matters and might then itself draw up recommendations to be brought to the attention of administering authorities, the Assembly would be going beyond its normal functions in calling upon the Council to carry out in toto certain specified steps without expecting the Council to give independent deliberation to the wisdom of those steps.

recommended united states position

In order to arrive at a position for the United States it is necessary to consider not only the views of the two sides but also the fundamental problem which has given rise to the issue.

The contention of the non-administering group in the Council has been based by them primarily upon the interpretation of Articles 85 and 87 of the Charter. These Articles are as follows:

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Both of these Articles make clear that the Council in acting on matters covered by them operates under the authority of the Assembly. With respect to strategic areas the Charter provides that the Security Council shall avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council. The nature or extent of this relationship is not defined except that the Trusteeship Council is to assist the General Assembly and Security Council in certain functions.

Those Members of the administering group who have expressed their opinions lay stress on three points: first, the establishment of the Trusteeship Council as one of the principal organs of the United Nations in Article 7, paragraph 1; second, the fact that the Council was established as a balanced organ on which administering and non-administering Members are equally represented; and third, the Charter provision in Article 89 that decisions of the Council shall be made by a majority of the Members present and voting. From these three points it is maintained that as a principal organ the Council is a deliberative body entitled to make its own assessment of problems. And in order that consideration of trusteeship problems by the United Nations should not be too far to one side, either pro-colonial or anti-colonial, the Council had been established as a balanced organ. If the General Assembly could direct the Council to make a decision one way or the other, the purpose of the Council’s balanced membership would be destroyed. Moreover, each delegate on the Council votes upon instructions from his government. Those governments may or may not agree with a recommendation or request to the Council from the Assembly. In the event that they disagree, entirely or partially, they must vote in the Council as they think proper on the substance of the issue.

Possibly a legal opinion could be sought to determine either the nature and extent of the authority of the General Assembly over the Council, or the degree of independent judgment residing in the Council. Certainly the member governments of the Council should give careful consideration, in instructing their representatives, to the fact that a resolution has been passed by the General Assembly, and that such decisions of the General Assembly should normally be respected and complied with. But to press for a legal determination of the constitutional position of the Council may not be wise in view of the basic problem giving rise to the controversy.

For the Council the fundamental point at issue in the difference of opinion is of course the growing tendency of some non-administering Members to employ the General Assembly as a court of appeal on issues which divide the Council. Because the prevailing sentiment in the Assembly tends to be anti-colonial these Members feel that they can by this means keep a stronger and more constant pressure on the administering authorities, and also on the Trusteeship Council.

While this policy may prove successful in the short-run, it is potentially dangerous to the successful operation of the trusteeship system. The discordant note initiated in the Sixth Session as to the constitutional position of the Council will continue and constitute an ever present wedge between the two groups in the Council. Britain, Belgium, and France will resent more and more the threat of an appeal to the Assembly being held over their heads. And should the Assembly continually press too hard and too fast so that the administering authorities are constantly being placed in an embarrassing position the skepticism of some of them as to the value of the trusteeship system may develop into a policy of retrenchment and reduced cooperation. This would place the United States in an increasingly difficult position between the anti-colonial and colonial powers.

In this circumstance it is important not only that the non-administering group not unwisely attempt to pressure the administering authorities and the Council by means of the Assembly, but also that the administering authorities make all possible effort to meet in the Council as many points of the non-administering group as they can. Otherwise, the Assembly may begin to address its recommendations directly to the administering authorities and to by-pass the Council, since under Articles 85 and 87 this apparently can be done. The moderating influence of the equally balanced Council would thereby be lost and the administering authorities faced with ill-founded resolutions.

The United States has long felt that the Assembly should not endeavor to pass detailed resolutions on the substance of the Council’s work. Committee 4 is too large a body and has not the time to give proper attention to consideration of conditions in trust territories or even to debates in the Council. Recommendations directly from the Assembly to the administering authorities should not, therefore, be encouraged.

Under the language of Articles 85 and 87 of the Charter it would be difficult to maintain that the Council does not operate under the authority of the General Assembly. Such authority, however, should not be exercised by the Assembly in such a way as to deny to the Council the independent deliberative qualities which would seem to be inherent as a principal organ composed of member governments.

The United States should endeavor to point out to the non-administering Members of the Council the dangers in abuse of the Assembly’s powers and to the administering authorities the dangers in forcing non-administering States to by-pass the Trusteeship Council. In the Assembly moderation will be required as to the nature of resolutions. Those supporting Council actions or requesting reports from the Council or asking the Council to undertake certain studies present little difficulty, but those passing upon substantive issues affecting the Trusteeship Council must be carefully drawn. In the Council the administering authorities will have to exercise careful discretion in their opposition to the non-administering authorities to avoid having substantive issues taken to the General Assembly. In this effort to settle the fundamental problem, it is important that the United States be free to increase its efforts to act as an intermediary between those factions taking the extreme views in the Council. Continual support of one side or the other will prejudice us in the eyes of the other.

conclusions

From the foregoing analysis the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The United States should inform the British, French and Belgians that we do not believe it advisable at this time for the General Assembly or the International Court of Justice to undertake definition of the respective positions of the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council, since a restrictive definition of the Council’s powers would be disadvantageous and a broad definition might result in direct recommendations from the Assembly to the administering authorities.

2. The United States should urge the British, French and Belgians to exercise utmost care to avoid provoking the non-administering authorities to take issues from the Council to the General Assembly.

3. The United States should inform the British, French and Belgians that as may be appropriate we intend to impress upon the non-administering Members of the Trusteeship Council and General Assembly the danger to the operation of the trusteeship system of attempting to use the General Assembly unwisely as a court of appeal to exert pressure on the administering authorities and Trusteeship Council on difficult substantive matters.

1. The sixth session of the Trusteeship Council met from January 19 to April 4, 1950. The official records of the Council for this as well as for all sessions beginning with the first in 1947 are printed in separate volumes, comprising the summary records of meetings, annexes made up of documents and petitions relating to agenda items, and supplements containing reports of visiting missions of the Council to trust territories. Reports of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly appear in the official records of that organ; reports of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a strategic area, are published in special supplements in the official records of the Security Council.
2. Documentation relating to the problem of Jerusalem is scheduled for publication in volume v.
3. The tour of the Visiting Mission to the Pacific Trust Territories took place in April and May, and, as this visitation included the United States-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the United States Government (specifically the U.S. Navy) cooperated closely with the Visiting Mission in its survey. Papers relating to this subject are located in the Department of State central indexed files, case 350.
4. These matters are covered from the point of view, of United States policy in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ii, pp. 340 ff.
5. The General Assembly in December 1949 adopted a resolution which requested the Trusteeship Council to recommend to the Administering Authorities that the flag of the United Nations be flown over all trust territories side by side with the flag of the Administering Authority concerned. Very considerable opposition to this resolution was registered at the time by the various colonial powers, who succeeded in forestalling an implementing resolution at the sixth session of the Trusteeship Council. The United States Government had no objection to flying the United Nations flag in the Trust Territory under its authority, but due to the vigorous opposition of the other administering authorities finally took up the position that the governments concerned should be left free to determine the conditions and circumstances in which effect would be given to the resolution. A separate position paper was prepared for the colonial policy talks on this subject, which is not printed (Agenda Item III, C, 2, dated June 22, 1950).