835.10/6–550
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Clarence E. Birgfeld of the Division of East Coast Affairs
Subject: Conversations of Mr. Arnold with President Perón and Argentine Treasury Minister Cereijo
| Participants: | Mr. H. A. Arnold, President, E. R. Squibb & Sons, Argentina |
| Mr. DuWayne Clark, EC | |
| Mr. Clarence Birgfeld, EC |
Mr. Arnold stated that during the last three weeks he had talked with President Perón and Argentine Treasury Minister Cereijo three times, and with the Argentine National Economic Council once. He said he had originally asked to see Perón in order to talk with him prior to leaving for the United States, and that Perón had suggested he call on him at the same time that Cereijo was to report the results of his trip to the United States. Mr. Arnold did this, and participated in Perón’s meeting with Cereijo along with a number of cabinet officers, including Gomez Moralez, Minister of Finance, and Antonio Ares, Minister of Economy.
Following a brief report by Cereijo on the results of his visit to the United States, Peron led the criticism by noting the 50 to 60 million dollars in interest that Argentina would have to pay under the Export-Import Bank arrangement made by Cereijo. He contrasted this with the absence of any interest payments on the 30 percent basis which Argentina had followed up until now in liquidating the commerical arrears. Following this opening by Perón, the other cabinet Ministers criticized severely Cereijo’s proposed arrangement with the Export-Import Bank, as well as that with the private banks.
Mr. Arnold said that he defended Cereijo’s accomplishments in the United States, pointing out that the important objective is the reestablishment of Argentine credit, and that payment of interest was merely one of the costs of re-establishing that credit. Mr. Arnold said that whereas Cereijo had been unhappy on first seeing him present at this meeting, he afterwards practically embraced him since he (Arnold) was the only one coming to Cereijo’s defense.
In subsequent interviews with Perón, Mr. Arnold said he stressed the importance of going through with the financial arrangements which have been projected.1 He pointed out to Perón that failure to [Page 726] do so might bring about a severe reaction in the United States, and also would prevent any Argentine in the future from risking rapprochement with the United States since he always would have in mind what had happened to Bramuglia2 and Cereijo.
Mr. Arnold said Cereijo is opposed by the entire cabinet, and that he draws his only support (which, however, is not negligible) from Evita. In response to a query, Mr. Arnold said he judged that this gave Cereijo a fifty–fifty chance of survival, although, of course, one could never know when Evita might wake up some morning blowing cool instead of warm as far as Cereijo was concerned.
Ambassador Remorino apparently is the cabinet’s chosen candidate for Cereijo’s job, according to Mr. Arnold, and he said further that Remorino is trying hard to unseat Cereijo and obtain for himself the presidency of the National Economic Council. In these efforts, Remorino is aided especially by Nicolini, Minister of Communications. With respect to the position of Foreign Minister, Remorino informed Mr. Arnold that he would not have the job, since his head would always be in danger of being cut off, and that he preferred to be six thousand miles from Argentina rather than be in Argentina in any position other than that of President of the National Economic Council.
Mr. Arnold stated that Remorino, in his campaign to unseat Cereijo, has been circulating reports to the effect that he (Remorino) had everything on the right track and had the right friends in the Government and the Export-Import Bank to secure financial assistance at least double that secured by Cereijo. Remorino is attempting to put across the point that things would have turned out better if he had been left in charge, and that in fact Cereijo merely mixed things up by interrupting at the time he did.
Mr. Arnold said that Perón and his government are preferable to any foreseeable alternative governments in Argentina in his opinion. Mr. Arnold said that there is no effective conservative opposition whatsoever. On the other hand, Perón has communism very much under control, although he fears communism and talked considerably about the threats of communism in Mexico, Guatemala, Chile and Brazil. Perón said that he would have no trouble in Argentina, since contrary to what Mr. Truman would be able to do, he could always get rid of them by having them awake one morning to find they had plotted an unsuccessful revolution the night before, and thus throw them out of the country.
Mr. Arnold believes that Cereijo is more powerful than his predecessor Miranda, and that this power is one of the reasons why the remainder of the cabinet is trying to force his overthrow. According [Page 727] to Mr. Arnold, Cereijo has key men in all the important offices of the different ministries, and the various cabinet members fear this power which encroaches upon them. The unseating of Cereijo will be difficult, however, so long as Evita is his champion; and Cereijo is of considerable aid to her, since he administers the various funds in which she is interested.
In one of his conversations, Perón commented to Mr. Arnold on the difficult terms demanded by the private bankers. Obviously referring to the gold guarantee, Perón stated that he wished that the bankers could be a little less like bankers to the extent of realizing the political difficulties of selling such terms in Argentina.
Perón mentioned several times the fact that Argentina would be on the side of the United States in the event of another war, which he expects. Perón said he could not understand why people doubted his sincerity on this point, but that it really did not matter, since there would not be any way of staying out of the next war. Commenting on Argentine neutrality during the last war, Perón said that Argentina had nothing to offer at that time, whereas it now has a well trained army and one of the world’s largest merchant fleets, among other things.
In response to a query, Mr. Arnold said that neither he nor Perón had, at any time during their three meetings, mentioned the question of the Rio Pact.
Mr. Arnold said that he had the impression, although the subject was not discussed, that Perón feels that some additional large sum of money should have been given to Argentina merely as a quid pro quo for being on the side of the United States in the event of a third world war. Mr. Arnold feels that Perón is having difficulty in handling his army, since there is nothing for the army to do.
Perón asked Mr. Arnold to ascertain the reaction in the United States to Cereijo and to the arrangements which he had tentatively worked out. Perón asked that Arnold bring back with him his personal impressions based on interviews with Government officials and American businessmen, especially bankers.
- In a letter to Mr. Miller of May 23, 1950. from Buenos Aires, Chargé d’Affaires Lester D. Mallory had said in part that he had encouraged American businessmen, in their contacts with the President, to make representations favorable to Minister Cereijo and to the loans negotiated by him. (835.10/5–2350)↩
- Juan A. Bramuglia, predecessor to Señor Paz as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship.↩