Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/10–2050: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, October 20, 1950—7 p. m.

2294. Excon USDel.

1. First stage meeting completed today.² All conference documents being sent by today’s airpouch.

2. We believe result is salutary clarification viewpoints three governments and considerable advance in UK views toward those of US. No real evaluation of situation can be made, however, until list of commodities are exchanged. One of significant results first phase discussions has been separation of the strategic aspects of Excon problem from that of economic impact. Separation of these problems should place burden of proof on UK and France to show in concrete way economic result of application controls agreed upon by technicians.

3. Another step forward is apparent readiness UK and France promptly embargo items in short supply. This should contribute in large measure to extending Excon controls so it will subsequently be difficult deny the strategic importance of items being embargoed because needed for defense western Europe.

4. One of most difficult problems that arose in first stage was interpretation paragraph 5 of ministerial minute,³ i.e., as to whether it required the three governments to institute such controls as might be agreed between them, irrespective of whether other countries participating in the Paris organization followed suit. We took strong position that it did while the French delegation expressed some doubt and reserved their position. The UK delegation considered that it might be necessary to reconsider in the light of discussions in the CG any items of which the control by the three governments alone would be likely to be ineffective. It was agreed that the delegates would seek governmental interpretation of this paragraph and that communications would be exchanged on the subject through diplomatic channels with view to reaching agreement on interpretation of this article before the meeting reconvenes November 7 to consider the report of the experts.⁴ As requested in ourtel 2240 October 18,⁵ Department’s urgent comment, repeated Paris, is requested.

5. With respect to paragraph 4(a) of the ministerial minute it was felt that the question of common defense requirement might be appropriately considered in NATO. Working groups have been appointed to draft report outlining present position of the three countries in regard to export of goods required for defense and containing recommendations as to the manner in which this question should be submitted to NATO.

6. No agreement was reached on question of quantitative control. As to exchange of information there was subcommittee agreement that each of the three governments would (a) take such action as is required to assure that information of actual export of each item is available for exchange; (b) exchange such information monthly; (c) review such items to ascertain whether controls are warranted; (d) where there is evidence of excessive rise in demand take action at once to restrict further exports accordingly. A working committee will explore question of quantitative control in an effort to have agreement for reconvening meeting November 7.

7. With regard to paragraph 4 of the ministerial minute concerning loss of essential supplies and means by which loss could be made good, it was agreed that this could only be considered after precise indication of scope of additional controls and possible impact was available. This matter was therefore postponed until stage three of meeting beginning November 7.

8. It was agreed that the meeting would be in three stages, viz: Stage 1: (now completed) to draw up instructions to technical experts and insofar as necessary agree on interpretation FM minute; stage 2: Beginning October 26, meetings of working groups; stage 3: Consideration of detailed proposals of exports and agree on recommendations to government, beginning November 7.

9. The instructions to experts provide that military intelligence advisers should be associated with the technical discussions at all phases of stage 2 and such advisers may if necessary be asked to give their collective consideration to any particular problem of assessment of strategic significance.

10. The instructions to experts also provide that during stage 2 the assessment of economic impact should be made separately in order to permit the officials at stage 3 to consider the economic impact as separate element and the technical experts in stage 2 to be free to focus their attention on strategic aspects only. It is envisaged that the economic advisers of the three delegations should meet during stage 2 as the work of the technical experts proceeds in order to be able to present their views on any economic impact for separate consideration in stage 3.⁶

11. Criteria for selecting items for control were agreed upon which we believe to be satisfactory.

12. Following timetable has been agreed upon:

(a) October 25: Exchange of lists of items proposed by the respective governments for control;

(b) October 26: Meeting of working groups to collate lists and arrange schedule of technical discussions by experts;

(c) October 30: Commencement of experts meetings;

(d) November 7: Reconvening of stage 3 with view to permitting statement of final result of tripartite talks to be made at CG in Paris now scheduled for November 15.⁷

Douglas

1. Although signed by Ambassador Lewis E. Douglas, this telegram was prepared by the United States Delegation to the London Tripartite Conversations on Security Export Controls, October 17–November 20, 1950. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of Embassy in France, served as Chairman of the Delegation, and Nat B. King, First Secretary of the Embassy in France, and Willis C. Armstrong, Associate Chief of the Economic Resources and Security Staff of the Department of State, served as Vice Chairmen. The Delegation also included advisers from the Office of the Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Department of Commerce, the Munitions Board of the Department of Defense, and the Embassy in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom Delegation, headed by Eric A. Berthoud, Assistant Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, included advisers from the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Supply, and the British Delegation to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. The small French Delegation, headed by Étienne Crouy-Chanel, French Minister-Counselor in London, also included Jacques Fouchet of the French Foreign Ministry.
2. For the official summary of Stage I of the London Tripartite Conversations, see the Agreed Report, document TRI/31 (Final), p. 234.
3. The reference here is to the Agreed Minute of the United States, British, and French Foreign Ministers, September 19, p. 187.
4. Regarding the interpretation ultimately agreed upon by the three governments, see paragraph 9 of the Agreed Report, TRI/31 (Final), p. 239. Stage III did not actually begin until November 15.
5. Not printed.
6. The operative portions of the instructions to the experts are in Annex C to the Agreed Report, TRI/31 (Final), p. 234.
7. Stage III of the London Tripartite Conversations was actually held November 15–20. The meeting of the Consultative Group was rescheduled for November 29. For the report on the results of that meeting, see telegram 3069, November 30, from Paris, p. 246.