763.00/11–2450: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Donnelly) to the Secretary of State
1017. Reference Deptel 992, November 22.1 Advantage taken of General Irwin’s2 presence in Vienna today for discussion with British and French Commanding Generals of maintenance law and order in first bezirk of Vienna during Soviet month. Three Commanding Generals were in agreement that difficulties likely to arise only in following alternatives:
- (a)
- Soviets would ostensibly disassociate themselves from local Communist inspired disorders and would maintain only normal patrols in first bezirk;
- (b)
- Soviets would actively intervene with their military forces in which case they would obviously be participating in overthrow of Austrian Government. Neither [In either] alternative, action by VIAC would be taken only upon request from Austrian Government for assistance of occupation forces in maintenance law and order. If Soviet chairman of VIAC failed to act on Austrian request, next senior VIAC commander (i.e. American) would inform Western High Commanders [Commissioners?] of VIAC impasse. Three Western High Commanders [Commissioners?] acting jointly would demand [Page 424] immediate meeting AC. If Soviet chairman of AC in turn refused convene AC, three West High Commanders [Commissioners?] would then instruct VIAC Commanders to take appropriate measures to meet Austrian request and endeavor restore law and order in first bezirk.
It is the consensus of opinion of three Commanding Generals and VIAC Commanders that in first alternative mentioned above Western troops could probably be moved into first bezirk without consequences other than strenuous protests by Soviet element that Western elements were violating control agreement and quadripartite procedure. It is recognized, however, that in second alternative any western use of force would be met by Soviet force. Question would, therefore, arise as to how far Western Commanders might go in use of force to implement their directives. This is, of course, decision for three governments to make. Re US forces, reference is made to NSC 63/1 which limits American counteraction to Soviet measures to “show of force,” rather than “use of force.”
Three Western Commanding Generals further agreed that best measure to cope with any likely disorders in first bezirk was further strengthening of Vienna police. To this end, they are again reviewing supply situation with view to augmenting reserve stocks of Vienna police in indicated categories.3
- Not printed; it reported that the Departments of State and Defense concurred that the problem of maintaining order in the first bezirk of Vienna during the month of Soviet Chairmanship should be investigated and that a tripartite policy should be agreed in order that immediate action could be taken in any emergency. (863.50/11–2250)↩
- Lt. Gen. Stafford LeRoy Irwin had replaced General Keyes as Commanding General of the United States forces in Austria at the end of October.↩
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In telegram 1061, December 1, to Vienna, not printed, the Department of State concurred that the Austrian police should be strengthened, and added:
“Dept believes West HICOMS shld act independent of Sovs to preserve order in first bezirk despite provisions VIAC Agreement Jan 1947 if Sov action shld prevent operation normal procedures stipulated that agreement. …
State and Defense agree all proper steps including use of US troops shld be taken to prevent unlawful seizure of power by Communists. Troops shld not be used except as last resort and only after it is clear order cannot be maintained by Aust police.” (863.501/12–150)
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