Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/1–1450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

secret
priority

Washington, January 14, 1950—2 p. m.

33. For the Amb. Delau 394.² In view of Zarubin’s tactics at Aust Deputy session Jan 13 we consider tripartite approach shld be made by you and your Fr and Brit colleagues to Vishinsky (urtel 96 Jan 12, Audel 226³). Oral démarche and proposed Aide-Mémoire shld be designed to obtain assurances as well as appropriate instrs to Zarubin that negots may continue on the Aust Treaty without meeting such obstacles as now raised by Sov Del and that Treaty may be concluded on basis of existing agreements without creation of further obstacles. Stress shld be placed on Vishinsky’s commitment in New York⁴ that no difficulties wld be encountered in dealing with the other articles if the Sov position on Ger assets settlement were met. You shld remind Vishinsky that agreement on Ger assets settlement was conditional on satisfactory agreement on remaining disputed points in Treaty. Discussion shld be avoided on issues involving specific articles, particularly Arts 16 and 27.

You may use Delau 387,⁵ London’s 155⁶ and other material forwarded from London as background for your info for oral démarche but detailed discussion with Vishinsky shld be avoided. Approach shld revolve about simple question of conclusion Aust Treaty. The content of your approach is left to your discretion in agreement with your Fr and Brit colleagues.

It is recommended, however, that the following considerations be borne in mind as the basis of the approach:

1. No position shld be taken which wld lead to any indication of willingness on our part to concede to the Sov position on Arts 27, in particular, and 16.

2. Approach shld be designed to avoid giving impression that Western states are over eager to conclude Aust Treaty as such impression, in conjunction with factors discussed in recent messages, wld tend deepen Sov suspicions re our objective in concluding Treaty or induce them to believe that we will accept Treaty at any price.

3. Objective of approach shld be to obtain either positive assurances that negots will be continued on previously agreed basis and that Russian-Austrian negots will be expedited without creation of further obstacles or flat Sov refusal to continue negots on a reasonable basis.

It is recommended that approach be made as soon as possible in order that appropriate instrs may be dispatched to Deputies before next meeting Jan 20. Pls inform Dept as soon as possible when démarche will be made in order that publicity may be released here. We propose for release here simple factual statement to effect that démarche has been made and a description of difficulties which have been encountered in negots.

Vienna pls inform Gruber of foregoing message.

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as 177 (Andel 228), Paris as 193, and Vienna as 76.
2. Not printed; in it the United States Delegation reported that Zarubin “continued to make progress on treaty dependent on Vienna talks re which he had no additional information.” (663.001/1–1350)
3. Neither printed; in the former Kirk expressed his view that an approach to Vyshinsky seemed desirable if Zarubin maintained his negative attitude; while the latter transmitted the Department of State’s concurrence in a tripartite oral protest if no conclusive result were reached at the meeting on January 13 (663.001/1–1250).
4. Regarding Vyshinsky’s New York commitment to the Western Foreign Ministers, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 1146 ff.
5. Not printed.
6. Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 434.