663.001/9–1550: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at New York1
Tosec 17. For Perkins. Fol reply from Pace2 on Dept’s proposals, for future procedure on Aust Treaty:
“I am, of course, aware that the proposal for a Four-Power Declaration would be made in implementation of NSC 38/6.3 I am also aware that from a propaganda standpoint such an approach has certain value.
However, I note that NSC 38/6 envisages that the Four-Power Declaration is proposed as a substitute for the Austrian Treaty only in the event that an appropriate provision is made therein to assure that Austrian security forces will, prior to the initiation of the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Austria, be reasonably adequate to maintain internal security. Although it appears to me that it is extremely doubtful that the USSK would accept the proposal for a Four-Power Declaration, such a possibility does exist. If the Soviets immediately accepted the proposal and early withdrawal of Western occupation forces ensued, sufficient equipment under the U.S. Military Assistance Program will not be available to equip the Austrian army to the extent necessary to provide for the internal security of Austria. Due to the priority requirements resulting from the Korean operations and the resultant tense world situation, all of the equipment for the Austrian army will not be stockpiled in Germany and Austria until about 1 September 1951. Accordingly, if the Western Powers agree to make the proposal and if the Soviets should accept it, I request that the Department of State take necessary steps in the implementation thereof to afford sufficient time prior to ratification to enable us to advance the date for the completion of the Austrian program.
I consider that the Soviet drain on Austrian economy is so severe that the initial negotiating position envisaged in the proposal, with respect to the renouncement of Article 35 of the draft treaty, should be maintained by the Western Powers throughout the negotiations. If the Soviets reject the proposals on these terms, I believe that the idea of a Four-Power Declaration should be abandoned.
Subject to the points I have mentioned above, I concur in the proposal for a Four-Power Declaration. However, it is my belief that, because of the security implications involved, the question of Austria should not be referred to the United Nations General Assembly this fall. It is entirely possible that, if the issue were introduced in the [Page 467] General Assembly, the Soviets might maneuver the Western Powers into a position involving the immediate withdrawal of occupation forces, which would be unacceptable from the standpoint of Austrian security.”