Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.00/2–1150

Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of German Affairs¹

secret

[Washington, February 11, 1950.]

Germany in the European Context

Our over-all objective as regards Germany may be stated as finding ways and means of preventing Germany from again menacing our safety and that of the nations which compromise what we call “the democratic world”. There are three main ways of seeking to achieve this objective. (1) We can seek to make the Germans convinced believers in democracy. (2) We can control and repress the Germans by prohibitions and supervisions based in the last analysis on force. (3) We can so weave Germany into a larger whole as to contain satisfactorily the energies, economy and political ambitions of the Germans.

We are in fact proceeding along all three of these paths. The first is a constructive but exceedingly long-term effort which by itself frankly offers no solid ground for hope in the near future. The second is exemplified in the High Commission, the Occupation Troops, the Military Security Board and the Ruhr Authority. It is negative, and if long-continued without counterbalance from a more positive and constructive approach is bound to create a bitterness and hatred which will turn against us the moment our vigilance is relaxed. Its success is also dependent on the continuation of a common will in the democratic world to repress Germany forcibly. History teaches us that we cannot count on the permanence of such a will. In addition to all else, this method imposes too great a strain when we are also trying to “contain” the Soviet Union.

It is therefore on the third method that we are chiefly dependent for success. And it is in fact this method which is the theoretical basis for our main policies in Germany today. Our first decisions during and immediately after the war with respect to Germany were predicated upon the organization of Europe on the basis of agreement among the large powers. Lacking that agreement, it became necessary to reach an area of agreement in some kind of organization of a smaller grouping of powers, more like-minded in their political and economic concepts.

We have created a Government in Germany, we have turned many powers over to it and hope to turn over more progressively. We have admitted Germany to the Ruhr Authority, we have brought Germany fully into ERP. We are following a policy of bringing Germany into as many Western European and world organizations as possible. But these actions in detail may get us nowhere. Germany had a government before the war. Germany also formerly belonged to organizations, “cooperated” with Europe. By themselves these things only restore the status quo ante. They will be meaningful in terms of our objectives only if they are first steps towards and predicated on the existence of or formation of a European (or larger) unity into which Germany can be “integrated”, by which Germany can be “contained”, in which Germany can play a peaceful, constructive but not dictatorial role. This larger unity does not exist and is not in sight.

In looking at the European and world scene from the viewpoint of what we are doing in Germany it is desirable to point out certain aspects of the German situation which throw a light on our future policy problems.

There can be no doubt that the great mass of the people of Western Germany are politically apathetic as yet. The government which is emerging in Western Germany is not truly representative as yet of a politically conscious people or of the sentiments which may emerge as political activity is more fully revived. The present German leaders are on the whole sympathetic to the West and are probably the most cooperative Germans we shall have to deal with. It is therefore imperative that the political consciousness of an awakening people be guided in the right direction with sufficient force to resist the new pressures and opinions that are bound to form in Germany.

We may expect a serious diminution of Allied power and influence in Germany. Our powers are becoming increasingly of a negative character deriving from our ability to disapprove of German legislation and to withhold aid or to refuse to permit the use of counterpart funds. Our ability to obtain action of a positive character, on the other hand, is essentially dependent upon our obtaining the agreement of the Germans. Not only is our power declining, but also our influence. As was to be expected, the Germans are quick to seek for divisions among the Allies and to exploit them. They have little respect for the French, whose power they recognize to be weak. The financial difficulties into which Britain has fallen (together with the association of Britain with the dismantling policy) have caused the British influence to wane. Only the American influence is high, and I think McCloy is right when he says that the time in which that influence can be important is limited.

As German political life continues to develop, two main forces will increasingly assert themselves. One of these is the desire for the unification of Germany and the recovery of the Eastern territories. The other is the desire for more positive steps directed toward the amelioration of the German economic position. These are natural tendencies, and if they find some possibility for solution in the policies of the Western Powers, we may be able to maintain a position of influence in Germany. There are, however, very serious dangers in them to our position. The fact that only the Russians can offer a return of the Eastern territories is a fact against which there is no real safeguard. That fact becomes more dangerous to us as the time approaches when American aid will be sharply reduced and the prospects of trade with the East will become more attractive. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that, once American aid becomes nominal, the attraction to deal with the Soviets will become irresistible to the Germans if markets in the West are not available because of unilateral restrictions based upon fear of competition. The present German hatred and fear of the Russians and the Western orientation of her present leaders will tend to keep Germany looking to the West at some economic sacrifice if her advances are not rebuffed by what she considers selfish interests. Here again the position in Europe as regards Germany is far from optimistic. The French and British see in Germany mainly a dangerous source of economic competition. They are only mildly concerned at the present economic situation in Germany; they consider that American capital will make up the deficit and their paramount interest lies only in protecting themselves from German competition and the maintenance of long-term controls designed to that end. Our joint three power policies on Germany are in this respect growing basically farther and farther apart.

I believe that if there is no other reason for unifying Europe it would be necessary to do so in order to solve the German problem. The vitality of the Western European countries has been greatly sapped by two wars. Despite great losses of the German manpower in the wars, the Germans are probably still the most vital and energetic people on the Continent. They represent a decisive factor in the West in our struggle with the Soviets. They must be won to our side and their attachment to us must rest on something deeper than the provision of American aid and the temporary maintenance of a force of occupation in Germany. The time to do this is very short. Unless we can give more vitality and content to the idea of a European Union, North Atlantic, or some other kind of grouping, and can do so in a very short time, we run the risk of losing the battle of Germany. On the political side, a political concept of European integration has emerged which has great appeal to the Germans but it is not growing so as to offer hope to the still weak German state and is not forceful enough to cause Germany to grow along lines we desire. On the economic side the OEEC has been disappointing. It has produced practically nothing except plans for the division of American aid and arrangements of a more technical character which have absolutely no political sex appeal.

In dealing with the question of European “integration”, we have placed our main stress on the economic side. It is certainly time to question whether this is the right way to go about solving the problem. The economic problems involved in integration are too difficult to solve as economic problems. The abolition of import restrictions, and various other steps which are necessary, are too painful if viewed solely from the economic side. Furthermore, I doubt whether it is technically feasible to get what we are after in Western Europe with respect to economic solutions without having an instrumentality which can adopt common political decisions. Convertibility of currencies among the European countries cannot be achieved unless many matters which are now regarded as purely internal problems are dealt with on a common basis.

It seems to me that political decisions must be taken which logically force the economic decisions. This can be illustrated by drawing an analogy from our own experience. It was necessary to create the concept of the United States in the Articles of Confederation before it became possible to wipe out tariffs and trade restrictions between the states under the Constitution. Once the concept of the United States had been accepted, the adoption of further steps to bind the states more closely became logically inescapable and politically inevitable. It is difficult to imagine how, except under direct physical attack in which case it would be too late, the climate calling for political integration can ever be more impelling than it is today.

It is entirely possible that the great advantages which we won in 1947, 1948 and 1949 are slipping away. We have certainly lost the initiative. Our losses in position in Europe are as yet intangible. The Communists have made no great gains in any of the countries west of the curtain. However, there seems to be great uncertainty and loss of faith in the future. The Marshall Plan was directed toward combatting hunger and despair, chaos and confusion. It assumed the ability of the European countries with the friendly counsel of the U.S. to create themselves conditions for their salvation. They have not shown their ability to do so and the money is running out. Examination of this basic “ERP approach” would seem to be in order as actual and open participation in European affairs may provide the only answer.

The uncertainty of the Western European countries and their weaknesses are reflected in the handling of almost every problem upon which we are called to deal in Germany. One of the striking things of the course of developments since the war has been the decline of the British and French as great powers. It is all too clear that the French do not occupy this position and the British are increasingly Unwilling to bear these responsibilities. Their unwillingness rests fundamentally upon the tremendous cost of doing so. This has affected not only their military position but their attitude toward many problems which arise from day to day. Many problems with which we are confronted in Germany and other areas obviously result from the increasing attention which the British are paying to the financial costs. In problem after problem, their actions are governed almost wholly by the probable effect of what is to be done upon the British financial position and the British competitive position. In consequence, the task of leading and organizing the whole of the non-Soviet world has fallen increasingly and ever more heavily upon the United States.

Returning to the European scene, it is the lack of leadership and the lack of vital ideas which is the threat to the success of our policy. I do not think we can expect what we are trying to accomplish to be successful if the European councils are dominated by the worries of Cripps² over the effect of one thing or another on the British financial position. It is also all too clear that the role of the United States in this, which began with friendly counsel, has now degenerated into nagging the Europeans for some action to appease Congressional sentiment and will likewise produce no useful result. Perhaps over a long period of time, something might emerge from all of this, but it does not seem that we have that much time.

The disgust within this country now displayed towards Britain and the attitude of our Congress towards further aid to merely prop up an unsound situation will almost certainly result in the adoption of policies which can only eventually lead to complete bankruptcy for England. During the further decline of Britain it must be assumed that she will become more isolationist and even less inclined to make the necessary move towards the Continent. On the other hand, forcing Britain to make a choice toward the Continent over the Commonwealth without others assuming some responsibility for the continuing stability of the Commonwealth area could lead to a decided loss of stability in various areas of the world. This would clearly not be in our national interest. We must accept the fact, however, that despite the domestic shortcomings of the present British Government, it is impossible for her to become an effective Continental power without disrupting the Commonwealth structure and mere pressure and threats from our representatives cannot alter this fundamental. If we are therefore to find a solution to the problem of European integration it seems that we must find some way of “freeing” the U.K. so as to allow her to become a Continental power. This would, we believe, free the log jam as the sentiment in France would cause her to move forward if she can foresee the U.K. in a position to help counterbalance Germany. This may require, however, as no one else seems to be in sight, that this country be prepared to take Britain’s place overseas and that we assume unto ourselves at least the partial obligations of the sterling block. Any solution along these lines has the basic aspect of a “share the wealth” plan and would of course require a most vigorous program by the Administration beginning with a forceful statement of the world situation to the American people.

One should certainly not judge the present world or even European situation in terms of the German problem alone but more importantly in light of the overriding Russian menace that in itself makes the German problem acute. The German problem is however inseparable from the problem of a strong western alliance which seems so essential in the face of Soviet designs. Certainly we cannot contemplate under present world conditions a Europe divided by selfish aims, be they German or French or British.

This does not seem to be a time when we can rely on technicians to formulate complicated economic plans. If we decide our present course in Europe is becoming unproductive, only bold imagination in the political field can provide a catalyst dramatic enough to turn the tide.

1. In a covering memorandum Byroade indicated to William J. McWilliams, director of the Executive Secretariat, that the paper had been requested for discussion at a meeting on February 14 with Secretary Acheson; George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department of State; Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State; and Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff. No record of the meeting has been found in Department of State files.
2. Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer.