Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.5/10–1450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

top secret

Washington, October 18, 1950—5 p. m.

2902. Dept has been giving serious consideration to problem of extent and timing of permission for Gers to manufacture certain ordnance items, particularly in light Bonn’s tel 221 Oct 14.² We agree with viewpoint expressed in last sentence reftel. Our view is that possible production of ordnance items shld depend entirely upon integration of Ger into western defense plans. Such integration will in itself give us certain increased security re Ger and we cld with greater security permit Ger production of certain types arms. This view is entirely in accord with both ourtel 2459, Sept 29 and last para urtel 2612, Sept 27 which urges Allied planning proceed but approach to Gers be postponed until question of Ger participation in Eur defense is settled. If, however, plans for Ger mil integration do not proceed as contemplated or are not accepted by Gers, we wld have to reconsider problem although inclined believe it wld be wiser to permit no manufacture of ordnance items.

This is again case of road from which there is no turning back once we have embarked on it. We believe that in absence Ger mil integration we shld keep Gers dependent on West for supplies of such arms as police forces may require.

In this connection we were surprised at your mortar proposal, especially as regards size.³ We are aware of course that mortars were specifically mentioned in N.Y. agreement reported in Secto 45. This however was in context that Ger police wld be utilized as stepping stone to Ger units which we have desired to avoid and was one reason we sought agreement in Wash for allowing discretion and flexibility in implementation as reported in ourtel 2459. Unless you consider mortars of this size to be useful and essential equipment for new police formations along lines of 30,000 agreed in N.Y. suggest at this stage in confusion over method of bringing Ger into integrated force that it wld be better to delay on procurement from any source of this weapon.

It will be evident that we fully agree with recommendations of HICOM Security Comite that Gers shld not be required to purchase police equipment abroad if decision is made to permit Gers to produce for their own or fon order similar equipment.

Do not have immed answer question reftel re possibility supplying required item from US stocks. Investigating and will advise separate tel.⁴

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as Tosig 164.

2. Not printed; it transmitted Adenauer’s list of weapons for the new mobile police including pistols, automatic rifles, machine guns, and mortars. The HICOM security committee had agreed to ask their respective governments to examine this list to see if the weapons could be manufactured locally or should be purchased abroad, and McCloy concluded that:

   “authorization for German arms manufacture should not be determined merely in relation to police equipment but in connection with broader issue of German contribution to European defense on which we recommend discussion in HICOM be avoided at present stage until further progress made by Defense Ministers.” (762A.5/10–1450)

3. Calibre 8 and 12 centimeters.
4. In telegram 2903, October 10, to Frankfort, not printed, McCloy was advised that there was little likelihood that any of the items on Adenauer’s list were available from U.S. Army stocks (762A.5/10–1450). Subsequently Bonn reported that the Security Committee had refused to permit mortars for the Federal police and had refused also to require the procurement of arms from abroad. Telegram 229, October 20, from Bonn, not printed (762A.5/10–2050).