Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

396.1–ISG/12–1350: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Intergovernmental Study Group on Germany to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

London, December 13, 1950—9 p. m.

Sigto 384. Department limited distribution. Re your 4222, December 12 to Frankfort, repeated London 2994.

1. Your telegram gives substance to concept of contractual arrangements which, as we indicated in Sigto 378, December 12, repeated Frankfort 619, Paris 1156,¹ we felt was needed in order to enable judgments to be made as to how to go forward. We recognize that it is a blueprint, what is not entirely clear to us is extent to which the various proposals would be disclosed in discussions with Germans and necessarily before that with the British and French.

2. We recognize that arrangements of general character described in reference telegram are logical end of road WE powers have been following since 1948, in absence of agreement to unify Germany. The general development and substance of contractual arrangements appears to us to be along right line although there are undoubtedly numerous points of detail which require study. However, there are two aspects of the proposals which seem to us to be of major importance and regarding which we have serious questions:

a. Is it necessary and is it wise to define at this time the abandonment of supreme authority in Western Germany as one of the essentials of the package? We have difficulty in seeing how it can be abandoned with respect to Western Germany without affecting Berlin situation. Whatever legal justification could be made for such a decision, we wonder whether it would not afford Soviets ground for asserting we had abrogated Four-Power arrangements respecting control of Germany, including Berlin, and that they therefore cease to have legal effect. Although Soviets have accused us of violating these agreements, we do not believe they have up to now denied their continuing legal effect.

Another facet of this question is whether decision to terminate supreme authority will not force us into consideration of all outstanding questions with Germany, including frontiers and all unsettled claims, et cetera. It would be difficult to continue to maintain position that these questions will be settled in peace treaty. We recognize that you intend to deal with many of them and are prepared to face eventuality of dealing with others. Our question is whether prior decision to terminate supreme authority will not deprive us of any flexibility in choice of questions we are prepared to deal with, both in our relation with Germans and with other Allied countries.

b. We are also concerned with your suggestion that no method of enforcement of negative military controls be retained and that we rely instead on “normal peace treaty procedures”. We do not believe that such procedures would have any effectiveness. We wonder whether we should give up controls in the military field and the atomic energy field on the basis of having reached agreements of the character described in your telegram, or whether such action should not be left to a later stage.

3. With regard to both foregoing points, is it really necessary to go as far as proposed for purposes of getting German participation in defense, since balance of your proposal would in fact give Germans equality. Various agreements you propose involve fundamental questions. It seems to us difficult to make them except as treaties. Taken together with abandonment of supreme authority and German rearmament, they virtually place final seal on division of Germany. Do you think that Germans would wish to take such degree of initiative, or might they not prefer to have some link left with Eastern Germany such as the fiction of supreme authority might provide.

4. We do not think the British are ready at this time for a step as drastic as you contemplate. While we believe that they recognize the inevitability of the restoration of German independence, we think they would want more controls than you envisage. As reported in Embtel 3417, December 12, repeated Frankfort 617, Paris 1150,² we do not believe that they are prepared to abandon supreme authority. As seen from here, we believe that your full proposal would be bitterly opposed by French. Possibility of Four-Power meeting and French anxiety to have another go with Soviets,³ which is shared to lesser extent in this country, would make acceptance at this time by British and French of your complete package extremely unlikely.

5. Your proposals do not provide for participation by or consultation with smaller Allied countries except as they would be brought into negotiations of treaties referred to in paragraph 5 Believe their relationship requires further consideration.

6. Re paragraph 10 your telegram, we would urge that, if proposals of kind you have in mind are to be put forward at Brussels, they should be stated in very general way. As stated above, proposals set forth reference telegram are logical conclusion to policy we have been following. However, they would be a terrific jolt to British and French and should not be thrown at them without careful preparation.

We note reference telegram was not sent Paris. Department may wish to consider repeating it and this message to Paris.

Sent Department Sigto 384; repeated information Frankfort 628 eyes only for McCloy.

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. For documentation on the Soviet note of November 3 to the United States, United Kingdom, and France, calling for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see pp. 902 ff.