Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762.00/4–550: Telegram

The United States Commander, Berlin (Taylor) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

secret
priority

Berlin, April 5, 1950—4 p. m.

587. Reference Deptel 2252, April 4 [3], to Frankfort, repeated Berlin 96, Paris 1453, London 1495, Moscow 285.² Department had evidently not received our telegram 572, April 3, repeated Dept 475, London 27, Paris 134³ when its reference telegram was sent. While realizing that logical tie-up could be made between all-German and all-Berlin elections, we nevertheless do not believe latter must necessarily be dependent on former or prejudicial to its effectiveness.

Initiative has already been taken by US and followed up by Federal Government re all-German elections.⁴ Even though it may be advisable postpone further definitive proposals by Western allies on this subject until after Foreign Ministers meeting in May, we do not see why action re Berlin need await this step. Arguments in favor early action here are:

1. Need for western allies to recapture initiative here before May Day and Whitsun. All Germany election proposal has not gained us any particular initiative as regards Berlin.

2. Possibility, as explained our reference telegram, that Soviets may make some major proposal on or about April 15.

3. Expressed impatience of at least Suhr with any protracted delay in concrete proposal for all-Berlin elections and possibility City Assembly action may be undertaken without our agreement if agreement delayed too long.

4. Having initiated discussion this subject with British, French and Germans, it would be embarrassing for us to hold back now. Further point for consideration is that, in order reap fullest advantage from any election and reunification proposals, a series of moves seems offer better chance of keeping subject alive than one combined move. First step was Mr. McCloy’s statement for all German elections. Second was federal government’s follow up. Logical sequel to these would be Berlin City Assembly’s action and expression of western commandants concurrence in principle. This could be followed or preceded by HICOM general statement re Bonn declaration (although we would prefer HICOM make no public statement re Berlin until action taken here), while Foreign Ministers statement in mid May would again bring subject into headlines.

In view Department’s hesitancy as expressed in (3) of its reference telegram, we suggest that since Soviets will almost certainly reject Berlin proposal because of its origin and conditions, chances there accepting all German elections would be diminished if Foreign Ministers statement reiterated Berlin proposal in making concrete suggestions for all-German ones.

Berlin aspect would, of course, be covered by all-German statement of Foreign Ministers, as Department suggests. We feel, however, this has dual disadvantage of (1) not putting sufficient emphasis on Berlin and (2) in coming too late for May Day and possibly even for Whitsun rally.

I therefore urge that serious consideration be given these factors with view to obtaining tripartite agreement for all Berlin proposal to be made April 13 if possible and in any case not later than April 21.

Sent Frankfort 587, repeated Department 488, London 29, Paris 140, Moscow 23, Department pass Moscow.

Taylor

1. The source text was sent as 488 to the Department of State.
2. Ante, p. 617.
3. Ante, p. 836.
4. Regarding McCloy’s statement and the declaration of the Federal Government on all-German elections, on February 28 and March 22, respectively, see telegram 1644, February 24, and the editorial note, pp. 602 and 615.