Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149

Policy Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

secret

[Washington, April 20, 1950.]

[FM D B–21b]

Negotiations With the Soviet Union

General Attitude toward the Soviet Union

Our general attitude toward the Soviet Union arises from the recognition of the fact that the posture of the Kremlin toward the West is, on grounds of basic doctrine, one of irreconcilable hostility and of disbelief in the possibility of permanent coexistence. Our attitude is therefore compounded of the following elements:

(1) A determination not to tolerate direct aggression against any of the NAT states or any other state toward which we have assumed special security commitments or have a special security interest, and an equal determination to place ourselves in readiness, as rapidly and thoroughly as possible and in conjunction with our Allies, to meet such aggression if it occurs;

(2) A willingness to consider at any time the wisdom or necessity of extending or modifying these security commitments as the scope or direction of Soviet aggressive intentions and capabilities appears to alter;

(3) A firm adherence to our commitments under the UN Charter having to do with the pacific settlement of disputes, and with action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression;

(4) A resolve to engage more vigorously and effectively in the prosecution of the “cold war” particularly in those areas most seriously threatened by indirect aggression and, to the extent feasible, within Soviet and satellite territory and to take jointly and severally whatever steps may be necessary to (enable us to check such aggression and to recapture the initiative in “the political, economic and propaganda fields;

(5) A readiness at any time to negotiate with the Soviet Union on any issue, large or small, on which agreement seems likely and even, in the absence of such likelihood, to continue or initiate whatever form of consultation, within or outside the UN, proves to be possible, provided that such consultation is agreed by our Allies² and seems likely to strengthen rather than weaken the moral position of the West; and

(6) Recognition of the advantages of continued Soviet membership in and collaboration with the UN, provided the Soviets do not attach conditions to such collaboration which are destructive of the essential objectives of the Western powers and of the UN itself.

The further implementation of point (1) will be considered by the NAT Council³ in conjunction with the reports of its various committees. Certain eventualities which might arise under point (2) will be considered by the three Foreign Ministers. Certain objectives under point (3) will be considered both by the three Foreign Ministers and by the NAT Council in conjunction with proposals for broadening its scope and functions. Point (4) and, to a limited extent, point (5) are examined in this paper.

Negotiations with the Soviets

In view of the increasing pressure here and in Europe for broad negotiations with the Soviets, it seems worthwhile to review once again as briefly as possible (1) whether such negotiations are desirable or necessary at this time or in the near future, (2) if so, what should be their general scope and content, (3) in what forum should they be conducted, and (4) when should they take place.

1. Are they desirable? There is rather general agreement in the West that a broad negotiation with the Soviets now will not lead to positive results because neither side will yield on fundamentals and it is fundamentals which must be settled if tension is to be relaxed. Only a substantial relaxation in tension will satisfy the peoples of the world that the negotiation has succeeded. Such a relaxation is possible only when Western political, economic and military strength has developed to such a degree that the Kremlin concludes that its strategy, if not its goals, must be modified. From this point of view a broad negotiation, as contrasted with continuing piecemeal negotiations in normal channels, is undesirable because it will fail and may aggravate tension.

Are they necessary? On the other hand, it is clear that neither the conscience nor the nerve of the West is as steady as could be desired. This deficiency can be corrected in part by developing strength but there is increasing evidence, reflected in statements by leading public figures and in the press of many Western countries, that the public may not be satisfied in its own mind until at least one more effort at a general settlement with the Soviets has been made. It may, moreover, be unwilling to postpone the effort until we are stronger. In fact, it may prove that Western opinion will not support the drastic measures necessary to establish a position of strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the military, political and economic fields until it has once more been demonstrated that settlement by negotiation is at this stage impossible. Regardless of our preferences, therefore, we should prepare for the eventuality that broad negotiations may be necessary this year. No negotiation should be undertaken, however, until the principal Western powers are in agreement as to their necessity and their character.

2. Scope and content. It can be safely assumed that the Soviets will (a) consider the offer of such negotiations as a sign of weakness and confusion in the West, (b) not be prepared for real compromise, and (c) utilize the negotiations primarily for propaganda purposes.

The difficulty of the Western governments will be that (a) they must not make vital concessions for which they can expect no honest quid pro quo at this time, yet (b) they must convince their peoples they are making a sincere effort to reach agreement. This difficulty is not insoluble and if solved the negotiations may mark a substantial gain in the resolution, understanding and unity of the Western peoples.

To accomplish these purposes the negotiation, if held, must deal with the principal outstanding issues between East and West. The Western public will not be satisfied either with an ineffective assembly devoted primarily to speech-making nor a narrow conference limited to two or three of the lesser current issues. The negotiation, moreover, must if it is to carry out the Western intention of taking the initiative in the cold war, deal not only with issues created by Soviet intervention in the West but also with conditions in the East created by Soviet denial of fundamental liberties to its subject peoples, particularly in the satellites. A negotiation which will meet these desiderata should deal with such problems as the following: (1) control of atomic energy, (2) disarmament, (3) Germany, (4) the Far East (China, Japan, Southeast Asia), (5) implementation of Declaration on Liberated Europe (Yalta),⁴ (6) Human Eights, (7) peaceful settlement of disputes through UN machinery, (8) Cominform activities outside the Soviet sphere, and (9) the Iron Curtain against the free flow of information.⁵

We do not need to fear the broadest sort of scope as long as we recognize that the object of the exercise is to demonstrate to the people of the West that our position on these issues is reasonable and just but is unacceptable to the Soviets. With this end in view we should present on each of the above issues concrete proposals which will be reasonable and just and which, taken together, will debunk the Soviet peace offensive and enable us to take the offensive in the cold war.

It must be recognized, however, that the Soviets for their part will, should general negotiations be held, present certain proposals which would be wholly unacceptable to us and which would be primarily designed to embarrass us propagandawise. Such proposals might include: (1) immediate conclusion of a German peace treaty to be followed by troop withdrawal; (2) CFM negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty to be followed by troop withdrawal; (3) general diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and its admission to all organs of the UN; (4) withdrawal of French forces from Indo-China; (5) cessation of US military assistance to Korea; (6) termination of NAT and MDAP; (7) abolition of existing stocks of atomic weapons and limitation of conventional armaments; and (8) a new “Pact of Peace.” The Western powers would presumably wish to feel assured that they were in a position to deal with such Soviet proposals, before initiating general negotiations.

3. Forum. The possible forums which have been suggested include: (1) the UN Assembly, (2) a general disarmament conference, (3) the UN Security Council, (4) Atomic Energy Commission (for this subject only), (5) the CFM, (6) the Big Three, (7) Truman-Stalin or their representatives, and (8) diplomatic channels.

Of these, (1) and (2) are so broad as to be obviously ineffective and intended for propaganda only; (4) is too narrow because limited to one subject only, even if the most important; (6) and (7) are too narrow because they exclude any representative of the European continent; (8) is too undramatic to meet the popular demand. The UN Security Council and the CFM would appear the preferable bodies. The first has the advantage of being within the UN framework and of including states representative of the various areas of the world, over and above the Big Five; on the other hand, it has the disadvantage of including two states, India and Yugoslavia, which profess a kind of “neutrality” and the behavior of which at the meeting would be unpredictable. It should be noted that the Soviets would presumably sit in neither of these bodies without the Chinese Communists.

It is supposed that whichever body met would, unless its meeting ended in total and avowed fiasco, refer at least some of the problems it had considered to other appropriate organs for continued examination and report to governments. In this way topics, such as atomic energy, lifted out of proper channels for this meeting, would be restored to those channels at its close.

4. Timing. There should be no hurry to proceed with such a negotiation. Lapse of a few months may demonstrate whether the public demand was a transitory reaction to the Soviet development of the H-bomb and projected US development of the H-bomb or whether it represents persistent sentiment which requires satisfaction if the resolution and sophistication necessary to an adequate development of strength are to be engendered in the West.

The question should be discussed by the three Foreign Ministers and, if there is a common feeling that negotiation with the Soviets may soon become necessary, a tentative agenda might be agreed and instructions issued for preparatory work. The negotiation should not in any case be opened, however, until there is general agreement among the Three (1) that it is necessary, (2) on procedure, and (3) on the joint positions to be presented. The negotiations could hardly be held, moreover, until representation of the Chinese Communists has been accepted.

5. UN Considerations. Considerable sentiment exists to the effect that the situation created by the Soviet walkouts must be corrected soon if the UN is not to suffer serious damage. It is presumably with this situation in mind that the Secretary General has proposed a special meeting of the Security Council under Article 28 of, the Charter. Should the Western powers agree that negotiations should be initiated with the Soviets and that they should take place in the Security Council, that decision would automatically take care of this situation, assuming that the Chinese representation question had first been settled. Indeed the settlement of the Chinese representation question alone might suffice to relieve present anxieties concerning UN. However, it is believed that the three Foreign Ministers, in considering the advantages and disadvantages of negotiations with the Soviets and of holding a special meeting of some kind for that purpose, should also have in mind the UN aspects of the problem. It is possible that, even though they should decide that a general negotiation with the Soviet Union is undesirable at this time, they might nevertheless feel that the interest of the UN demanded that, before the next General Assembly, there be a special meeting of the Security Council under Article 28 which might solemnize the settlement of the Chinese representation question and might deal with two or three other issues of primary UN concern. It is not our view at this writing that a special Security Council meeting of this limited character could meet the central purpose of strengthening Western morale and resolution, but it is possible that it could, under certain circumstances, have an invigorating effect upon the UN and hence deserves serious consideration.

1. This paper was one of a series of policy and background papers prepared in the Department of State for the United States Delegation to the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London on May 11–13 and the tripartite meetings of experts which preceded the ministerial meetings. Regarding these meetings, see the editorial note, p. 1192. A cover sheet attached to this text indicates that the paper, which was drafted in the Office of Eastern European Affairs, was fully approved within the Department of State and by the Secretary of State.

   The Department of State files contain four versions of the paper printed here. There were only minor drafting differences between FM D B–21 of April 12, not printed, the earliest version of this paper, and the text printed here. FM D B–21a of April 14, not printed (a copy of which is included in the Department’s Central Files under 396.1–L0/4–1450), was identical with the text printed here but had a different cover sheet. FM D B–21c of May 6, the last version of this paper, incorporated certain amendments, indicated in footnotes 2 and 5, below, which were recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on FM D B–21, set forth in an undated memorandum from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense, were circulated in the Department of State as document FM D B–21/1 of May 3, not printed. All versions of the FM D B–21 series are included in the CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149.

2. In FM D B–21c of May 6 (see footnote 1, above) at this point the wording was modified to read: “is agreed by our Allies, is consistent with paragraph (4) above.” It was explained in FM D B–21/1 of May 3 (see footnote 1, above) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended this amendment in order to assure that moral positions might not be achieved at the cost of weakened security positions.
3. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council held its fourth session at London, May 15–18, immediately following the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers. Documentation on the participation of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is presented in vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
4. For the text of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, included as Part V of the Report of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, February 11, 1945, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 971.

5. In FM D B–21c, May 6, which incorporated amendments recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see footnote 1, above), the final sentence of this paragraph was revised to read as follows:

   “A negotiation which will meet these desiderata should deal with such problems as the following: (1) control of atomic energy and international regulation of all forms of armament and armed forces; (2) general settlement of problems with respect to Germany, Austria, and Japan, to be considered concurrently with (1) above if practicable; (3) China and, Southeast Asia; (4) implementation of Declaration, on Liberated Europe (Yalta); (5) human rights; (6) peaceful settlement of disputes through the United Nations machinery; (7) Cominform activities outside the Soviet sphere; and (8) the Iron Curtain against the free flow of information.”