711.5622/4–2350: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 1

secret
priority

1210. Embtel 1202, April 22.2 Soviet note of 1 [21] April in rebuttal to ours of 18 April does not vary widely from what might have been expected, namely adherence to line decided upon by Politburo with no deviations and no concessions. It does not seem to be measurably stronger or more provocative and the phraseology is in consonance with customary Soviet diplomatic language. As already reported the Soviet note of twenty-first and ours of eighteenth are published in full and on bulletin boards in streets of Moscow, being eagerly read in silence by crowds. There is, some reason to believe Russian public were anxious over original Soviet note of 11 April and policy adopted by Kremlin of publishing both subsequent notes may reflect Politburo reaction thereto. At least a few Soviet citizens have indicated impatience with what they accept as true version, namely an attempt to photograph Soviet defences (this idea is fostered in Soviet reply 21 April), showing party line has not been ineffective. The persistence with which Soviets name our plane “B–29 (Flying Fortress)” appears significant probably basically stemming from fact Politburo rarely retreats from position once taken, but also possibly for conscious purpose confusing some into supposing there were two American planes involved (see Warsaw 557 to Department April 202). It is likewise possible this error is being restated in order refute any contention our part that B–24 had insufficient speed to reach scene of alleged territorial violation (Libau) at hour so explicitly fixed by Vishinsky as 1730 Moscow time on 8 April.

After consideration of note of 21 April, it is suggested we have several courses of action to choose from, among others the following:

1.
Reply in surrebuttal, countering point by point the Soviet claims and challenging their “verified data”. Suggest conclusion should be firm without, however, taking position which we are not prepared to enforce.
2.
Reply stating irreconcilable positions can only be resolved by impartial tribunal and offering to place the matter before International [Page 1163] Court of Justice, provided we have collected our own “verified data” and realize there may be two aspects on such procedure, (a) one in which we are plaintiff—i.e. shooting down our B–24 plane over international waters, and (b) other in which we could be defendant—i.e. Soviet claim our B–29 violated Soviet-controlled territory near Libau.
3.
Make no reply to this note of 21 April, thus letting matter drop.

Department is, of course, in best position to judge desirability any of above possibilities from standpoint of all factors involved, but it may be noted that the second alternative would seem to have the added attraction of emphasizing our good faith in being prepared to submit dispute to established impartial peaceful adjudication, even if, as anticipated, the Soviets should decline to agree to such a proposal. Perhaps alternative number (1) is preferable at this stage, with alternative (2) in reserve. In either case, we would thus be committed to further exchanges of notes, a feature not altogether desirable.

Kirk
  1. Mr. Reinhardt was notified of the arrival of this telegram at 12:15 p. m. It was also relayed on April 23 to London at 10:10 a. m. and to Paris at 10:30 a. m.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.