Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

661.00/4–2550

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

top secret
No. 514

Moscow, April 25, 1950.

Sir: I have the honor to enclose herewith a Report entitled “Soviet Intentions”, prepared under my direction by the Embassy’s Joint Intelligence Committee, which includes various specialists of the Embassy and the Attachés of the Military Establishment. This Report is the current or 1950 edition of an “Analysis of Soviet Intentions”, submitted last year as Despatch No. 202 of April 6, 1949.¹

In telegram no, 1214 of April 25, 1950,² the conclusions of the Joint Intelligence Committee were summarized substantially as follows:

“Moscow is waging total war against the Free World, a ruthless and unrelenting struggle within which “Cold War” and “Shooting War” are merely tactical phases. They are currently endeavoring to make the most of the tidal wave of social change generated by World War II with the minimum objective of capturing half the world before the wave subsides and perhaps with the hope that they may be able to achieve sufficient gains to prepare the Free World for a final push without the latter having been able to attain post war stabilization. They have passed through the first phase of exploiting the World War II tidal wave which consisted of effecting revolutionary conquests under the cover of war-engendered good will, meanwhile rehabilitating Soviet heavy industry and their military machine and are now in the second phase, an openly revolutionary offensive in which, relying upon a wave of rebellion against ‘imperialism’ in dependent areas and a Western economic depression, they hope to encompass certain given areas before the free world can recover, perhaps by 1953. To accomplish these objectives Moscow is steering a course as close as possible to full scale war short of actually precipitating it. The danger that war may occur through Soviet miscalculation will, in the circumstances, doubtless grow considerably, but the probability that the Kremlin is still far from considering itself ready for global warfare is supported by most of the available evidence and, while incidents and limited hostilities may be expected, it seems probable that Moscow will try to avoid a showdown until it attains overwhelming superiority of force.”

In reading and weighing the contents of this Report on “Soviet Intentions”, it should be borne in mind that the resources of this Embassy are more restricted and the data available is less comprehensive than will be the case in the Department. It is felt, however, that the views expressed will have the merit of presenting the situation as seen by qualified observers on the spot. The scene shifts, and is shifting rapidly, so that we here in Moscow are perhaps more conscious of the alterations than those who are further removed. On the other hand, the Department with its specialists may enjoy a more favorable position in weighting trends and interpreting events because of the advantages due to perspective. In any case, it would be appreciated if comments and suggestions might be forwarded at an early date, especially in areas or on topics where the points of view may not coincide.

In forwarding this year’s analysis, I desire to draw particular attention to the Section “Fundamental Considerations”, which presents an especially penetrating exposition of what we consider to be basic motivations of the Politburo. Another important Section entitled “Military” should also be closely studied, and if the Department of Defense has better information on Soviet Military strength, its prompt transmission is requested.

In order to carry comment perhaps a step further than the limitations of each Section permit, there follow some general remarks representing my own views on certain broader topics. Some of these views were expressed at the Rome Conference of Western Ambassadors, 22–24 March 1950,³ and may therefore already be available in other documents. However, there may be some advantage in adding them to these studies, as observations affecting actions and reactions in a somewhat larger sphere.

(a) It seems to me the Soviet Government is fully habituated to accepting a state of world affairs which has been succinctly expressed as “No War—No Peace”. For the Politburo, the struggle for world supremacy clothes itself in all the paraphernalia of war, even to a little shooting now and then. Their language is that of the revolutionary, and their nerves are steeled to expressions which may cause the more civilized to shudder. Their objectives are usually defined in military terms, and they act often as if conducting great campaigns in vast theatres—which, in fact, is exactly what they are doing. Similarly, for the Politburo the word “Peace” simply means acquiescence in their concepts and on their terms. Until they rule the world there is no real peace possible for them, because as world revolutionaries they must succeed or perish—which has been the history of all revolutions, including our own. Either a revolution succeeds, or its instigators perish, and usually by the sword.

Conversely, it is difficult for the American people to realize that, in spite of the “cease fire” in 1945, there really is no peace. The effort needed to persuade our people that such is the sad truth, is prodigious, but none the less impelling in its necessity if we are to survive. The manner in which such an educational campaign should be conducted is for decision by our Government, and I am pleased indeed to see the progress already underway. But it is a hard task because it is one not easy to dramatise. Who does not want “peace”?

(b) That another facet of this same dilemma is the question of settling by negotiation the questions at issue between the Soviet Russia and the United States with her associated nations, it may be hard for the Western World to understand (and especially so in the United States), but it seems to me the Soviets are in a different frame of mind about negotiations than the Western World. Within the Communist Party here, there has developed a consciousness of strength which, coupled to an ingrained racial trait of self-sufficiency, makes the rulers of this Slavic Empire less receptive, less willing, less amenable to suggestion regarding any negotiation whatsoever, unless they clearly perceive definite advantages to be gained therefrom. Historically, this people has acquired in such matters an unenviable reputation for guile, deceit, procrastination and for very hard bargaining, and I see no reason to think its present ruling clique are less intractable than their predecessors. In fact, I suspect that in the present state of affairs, they have no real desire to compose differences by meeting together with their opponents; but rather would expect them to display some contempt for solutions by consultation, which involve what to them are representatives of minor interests.

If this delineation of the Soviet point of view be correct, or even partially so, how difficult will it be to explain to the American people? We as a nation prefer to adjust our public differences by consultations and conferences, more or less in the same way we settle our personal differences in business and private life, and we assume the other party likewise willing and ready to do the same. It is one of our traits to expect that with good will and good faith, we can iron out international difficulties in a good-humored way. We suppose the other party will understand that we approach all such matters with an open mind, prepared in all fairness to conclude an agreement, and then to shake hands and all be friends.

Unhappily, I do not conceive such to be possible at present with the Soviet Government, and I feel we need to disabuse our people of the idea that such kind of negotiation is currently possible. The Soviets will meet when we have something to give that they want, or when, as has already been explained publicly to the American people, we are so strong in our position as to make the Soviets understand that negotiation is the only way out. But to suppose the Politburo can be cajoled by soft words or lured by nebulous propositions, does not coincide with the hard-bodied realism of these supremely realistic personalities.

(c) As regards the intransigeance of the Politburo, an example has arisen since this whole Report was prepared, namely, the affair of the airplane loss on April 8, 1950. Since the issue remains unresolved as of the date of this despatch, it is not a proper subject for discussion in this paper. There is, however, one aspect of the situation which might be called to mind, namely that an “incident” of this sort may not be viewed as seriously by the Politburo as one might expect. The Kremlin is accustomed to clashes, or accidents, and has often elected to treat such affairs as incidental and not as monumental. There was a long series of such clashes with the Japanese military forces in 1936–39, along the Manchurian frontier. These skirmishes sometimes even evolved into small-scale engagements, but the Soviet Government did not go to war with Japan because of them. The Kremlin has a manner of relegating such matters to the background, when it suits their policy of the moment. There is a probability such is the present attitude, and if their propaganda can thus be well-served, such may continue to be their reaction. We should be aware of this ability to ignore larger implications, but not lulled into a false sense of security thereby, because any single case might become the crucial one if it suited the Kremlin to make an issue of it.

(d) I fully concur that the areas of imminent danger for us, as set forth in this report, are:

South East Asia

Germany

Persia

Of these, South East Asia is the most important because its loss would be disastrous to the economy of the Free World, although the more immediate threat may lie in Germany.

(e) Not to make some mention of the probable difficulties of the Politburo, would be to present an unbalanced picture. Even if we lack specific data or good evidence upon which to base an estimate of Soviet handicaps, nevertheless it is important that we remind ourselves the Kremlin has troubles of its own. The Politburo may be composed of competent, workmanlike personalities, whose efforts are untiring and whose zeal is unflagging, whose idealism may match their zest for power, whose cunning and guile may seem boundless; but after all they are but men, human beings, with all the liability to error that mankind possesses, and they are not supermen. Just what their troubles may be, we may not know, since they keep their woes to themselves, but that troubles plague them, day and night, is, in all human probability, the fact.

(f) We, therefore, in order to defeat these enemies of our Free World, might well reflect upon how our affairs in the war were conducted, since we did indeed defeat our enemies of that period. In those days we created a unified organization which controlled all our energies and all our resources so that victory was gained. The need now for similar unity is daily being recognized, and its early realization is much to be hoped for. As emphasized in the report, the Kremlin is engaged in a total war against the Free World, in which “cold war” and “shooting war” are merely tactical phases of the same continuing struggle. Though the danger of an actual shooting war should not be neglected, it is important for the Free World not to lose sight of the equally important task of winning the cold war. To do so we must have unity of effort.

United States policy aimed at defeating the Soviet offensive and, ultimately, at winning the total war, should obviously be based on estimates not only of Soviet intentions but also of Soviet and Free World capabilities. The enclosed study of Soviet Intentions therefore yields only certain ingredients for consideration in basic decisions about United States policy. Subject to this qualification, the report mentions certain factors which appear of especial importance in this connection as will be evident from its study.

It is requested that copies of this report be transmitted to the Departments of Defense, the Army, Navy and Air Force, and to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Respectfully yours,

Alan G. Kirk

[Enclosure]

Report on “Soviet Intentions” Prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, American Embassy, U.S.S.R., April 25, 1950

Conclusions, Analytical Summary, Implications for U.S. Policy

(a) conclusions as to soviet intentions

A study of the information available leads the Embassy’s Joint Intelligence Committee to the following conclusions about the intentions of the Soviet leaders:

1. These men are waging total war against the Free World, a ruthless and unrelenting struggle within which “cold war” and “shooting war” are merely tactical phases. Under strict unity of command, using the USSR as base and world communism as fifth column, over decades they are marshalling every force to achieve their end.

2. Holding that the chief communist gains are obtainable during or in the aftermath of world wars, they are presently engaged in making the most of the tidal wave of social change generated by World War II, spurred by the minimum objective of capturing half the world before the wave subsides in order to be in position for World War III and perhaps stimulated by the hope that if their gains are sufficiently great this will set up a kind of chain reaction leading to new gains and so on until the Free World is ripe for a final push, without its having achieved real postwar stabilization at all.

3. The first phase of exploiting the World War II tidal wave consisted of relying primarily on guile to effect revolutionary conquests under cover of good-will acquired during the war, meanwhile rapidly rehabilitating the Soviet heavy industry and military machine, at least partially overcoming an important handicap in atomic technology, and, as the good-will abroad was exhausted, gradually preparing and organizing the masses for the second phase—an openly revolutionary offensive—by developing a mammoth “peace movement” against the “war mongers.”

4. The second phase, already begun, is marked by transition of the peace movement from organization, to “action,” and by belief in the approximate coincidence of two major forms of crisis: a wave of rebellion against “imperialism” in dependent areas set in motion by the Chinese Revolution, and a Western economic depression said to be now in its second year. To take advantage of these real or fancied tides of change, the Kremlin has launched a revolutionary offensive with the probable objective of encompassing certain key areas before the Free World could otherwise begin to recover, perhaps by 1953. Those areas are probably Southeast Asia, the oil lands of the Near East, and Germany.

5. In order to accomplish these objectives in limited time and under conditions which require increasingly frank dependence on violence, the Kremlin is steering a course as close as possible to full-scale war short of actually precipitating it. During this period, therefore, the danger of war nevertheless occurring through Soviet miscalculation will doubtless grow considerably; yet the probability that the Kremlin is still far from considering itself ready for global warfare is supported by most of the available evidence. Incidents and limited hostilities are to be expected, but the Kremlin will probably try to avoid a show-down until it attains overwhelming superiority of force by other means. The probable minimum objective of the present offensive is to capture the basic natural, human and productive resources out of which such a superiority might be built in a decade or more.

6. The most likely possible cause of Soviet miscalculation is loss of touch with reality on the part of the Kremlin. The abnormal isolation of its rulers has long been a subject of comment. Some of their recent statements and actions suggest that they may be moonstruck by recent conquests. Also Stalin’s possible impatience to see victory in his lifetime may conceivably get the better of his prudence, and megalomania fostered by his systematic deification may in the end corrupt the judgment of even this ruthless realist, as well as his associates. History offers interesting parallels for such a development, but Stalin’s reputation for shrewd common sense argues against it.

(b) analytical summary

The factors which have led to these conclusions are analysed in separate sections below. They may be summarized:

Political

It seems clear that the Kremlin’s world outlook is considerably more optimistic than a year ago. Flushed with the victory in China, which is probably regarded as the greatest for world communism since the 1917 Revolution, and evidently deluded by their Marxist analysis of the “western economic crisis”, the Soviet planners apparently believe they are on the rising crest of another wave in the ebb and flow characterizing the final stages of world imperialism. Their “cold” war strategy is therefore likely, and in fact already shows every sign, of becoming considerably more active and aggressive, particularly if the economic crisis continues to develop in accordance with expectations. At the same time, unless their over-estimation of prospects should lead them to provoke a situation on which prestige or other considerations might prevent a tactical withdrawal by either side, it is not believed they will resort to an actual shooting war.

Despite the existence of certain factors which might work for the eventual emergence of Titoism in China, the Soviets evidently expect; to consolidate their hold over this great area, at the same time using it as a strategic base and pattern for the spread of communism in other parts of Asia. Present prospects in the rich lands of southeast Asia are undoubtedly bright, and Moscow’s recognition of Ho Chi-minh⁴ is a sign of high hopes in this direction.

At the same time, there are many indications that the Kremlin also anticipates favorable opportunities in Europe, as the economic crisis deepens and Marshall aid draws to an end. Germany is still regarded as the key to Europe, and Soviet policy there has entered a new, dynamic phase, based on the promotion of a “national liberation movement,” in the form of the National Front, directed against the western occupation powers. The German Democratic Republic constitutes the strategic base for the conquest of the rest of Germany, and the Soviets look forward hopefully to the liquidation of the West’s remaining outpost behind the Iron Curtain—Berlin. France and Italy are secondary arenas, in which “revolutionary defeatism” and sabotage of the economy will be pushed through the media of the Peace Movement and strikes. Control of the satellite states is being steadily consolidated. Though it is still clear that Moscow is out to destroy Tito,⁵ he has been ideologically sealed off from the rest of eastern Europe, and revenge can probably wait.

The Near East and South Asia continues to warrant Soviet optimism, particularly in view of the deteriorating situation in Iran and continuing differences between Israel and the Arab world, India and Pakistan, and Pakistan; and Afganistan, as well as the difficult basic economic and social problems facing both India and Pakistan. Though the promotion of national liberation movements in Africa and Latin America are still relatively long-range undertakings, and the Soviets presumably do not expect the current “economic crisis” will be decisive in the United States, the latter’s present position as mainstay and leader of the world imperialist camp may be considerably shaken.

In the field of international organisations, the Kremlin has showed a completely cynical attitude towards the United Nations through its walk-out over China,⁶ and at the same time has developed the peace movement into its broadest and biggest international “front” organisation to date. A new action phase has begun for the latter and it is now clear that the struggle for peace means the struggle for communism. Though it is believed the UN walk-out represented a tactical maneuver and the Soviets would still prefer to remain in the UN for reasons of prestige, propaganda and obstructionism, it is clear that the longer this situation continues, the greater the possibility it may result in a permanent break-up of the United Nations in its present form.

Thus, on balance, the political factors point toward a further intensification of the cold war, based on the Kremlin’s somewhat “rosy” estimate of its global prospects during the next few years.

Military

Net relative military capabilities of the Soviet-satellite and free western worlds have changed but slightly during the last year. The Chinese communist victory and Soviet progress in atomic weapons have been counter-balanced by the ratification of the North Atlantic Pact and its preliminary implementation through the MDAP. Considering these and other factors, it is believed there has been a slight net gain for the West.

The Soviets are still believed capable of overrunning continental Europe and occupying strategic areas in the Near East, and operations in the Far East in case of hostilities could now include attacks on both the bridgehead of southern Korea and the rich lands of southeast Asia. However, the Soviet-satellite forces would everywhere have weak and overextended supply lines. Western defense pacts and military strength, despite their present imperfect stage of development, still act as a major deterrent. Though a considerable advantage might accrue to the side which first launched all-out atomic bomb attacks, the long, drawn-out world conflict which would almost certainly ensue should give the West an opportunity to mobilize and bring to bear its tremendous and in the long run decisive industrial and scientific potential.

The Soviets are applying many of the combat principles of actual hostilities in their present “cold” war against the West, and still consider eventual hostilities inevitable unless they can win the former. However, they have been devoting much attention to improving their defensive capabilities, are perhaps now even more optimistic than before regarding their prospects of winning the cold war, and would not be expected, on the basis of military considerations, to deliberately resort to a shooting war until their offensive weapons have been further developed.

Thus, from a military point of view, the Soviets are not prepared to launch hostilities and carry on actual war against the West to a successful conclusion in the immediate future.

Economic

While the Soviet economy has evidently become stronger over the past year, and the present cold war can be supported at an increasing tempo, a large-scale shooting war could only be supported in the immediate future with great difficulty and for a limited period of time. Short-term economic considerations thus favor the avoidance of actual hostilities while the Soviets build up their economy and await the further development of the western economic crisis, at the same time doing everything they can to promote the latter. Unless their rosiest hopes are fulfilled along these lines, however, it seems unlikely that they expect to be economically prepared for a long drawn-out, global conflict before one or more decades.

Agriculture

Similarly, though current agricultural production could probably support a war economy for a short period of time, it is not believed that Soviet agriculture would support a protracted international conflict. Recent Soviet actions suggest a realization that the agricultural situation has not improved markedly over the past year and that further control over the peasantry is an immediate political necessity. Similarly, the drive for the establishment of the “kolkhoz”⁷ system, both in the western areas added to the Soviet Union by World War II and the eastern European satellite states, suggests the acceptance of temporary weaknesses in anticipation of greater future strength, thus reinforcing the probability that the Kremlin’s agricultural policy is based on an expectation of no actual hostilities in the near future.

Morale and Propaganda

Despite some evidence of continuing dissatisfaction in certain outlying areas, the Kremlin probably considers its relative position in the field of morale and propaganda better than a year ago, and likely to improve. While it is doubtful that the status of morale and the efficacy of propaganda at a given moment would decide the question of war or peace for the Soviet Union, consideration of this problem again leads to the conclusion, as it did a year ago, that actual war for the Soviet planners would be preferable some years hence rather than now.

(c) implications for united states policy

United States policy aimed at defeating the Soviet offensive and, ultimately, at winning the “total war”, should obviously be based on estimates not only of Soviet intentions but also of Soviet and Free World capabilities. The present study of Soviet intentions therefore yields only certain ingredients for consideration in basic decisions about policy. Special attention is invited to the following:

1. The character and sweep of Soviet intentions, given the magnitude of Soviet and communist resources, constitute an enduring state of emergency comparable to that of wartime. This calls for firm coordination of effort, delegation of power, and unity of command, on both a national and a Free World scale, embracing not merely military but political, informational, economic and other fields of action. Within this framework, an integrated western Europe, including both Britain and Germany, is of particular importance.

2. The free peoples will rise to the occasion only if they realize its vivid and lasting urgency, yet believe they have a fighting chance to win. Against the dangers of complacency and despair, the total war must be made as dramatically intelligible to them as were World Wars I and II.

3. This can be done if the war is both fought and publicly presented as an enterprise of grandiose scope and strategic and tactical action. “Containment” is too defensive and static concept for winning either the public or the war itself. Repeated demands for sacrifice produce diminishing returns in the long run if merely made seriatim; they can rouse cumulative effort of each new demand is a logical part of the total enterprise. Only the prospect of real victory creates the mood in which sacrifices are welcomed and losses call forth new determination.

4. The emotional tone and imaginative range of the wartime spirit give the best hope of achieving the economic integration of not only key areas, such as Western Europe, but of the Free World as a whole, and the patterns of world trade should be re-studied and re-directed to this end. As the Kremlin’s position, in practice as well as in theory, ultimately depends on its claim to out-produce the Free, World, the central long-range clue to victory is to demonstrate the opposite; both stabilizing the Free World economy adequately and developing it dynamically in a way which leaves the lumbering, self-benighted Soviet economy further and further behind. This process should be accelerated by systematically perfecting the restrictions which prevent Soviet access to advanced products and data of Western technology.

5. To the extent that sound economic progress is made in the short run, upsetting Soviet calculations based on belief in a deepening depression, a major blow will have been struck against the present revolutionary offensive. A primary target must clearly be present unemployment in such critical areas as Germany and Italy, to say nothing of the United States. And as far as the promotion of a healthy, prosperous American economy is concerned, a balance must be struck between the demands of the internal economy, economic assistance abroad and the requirements of unified defense. However, recent indications that the western world’s previous condition of serious underproduction is gradually giving way to one of perhaps even excess capacity and production in certain fields suggests that this problem should be capable of solution.

6. The strategic problem, though centrally economic, is by no means exclusively so. By economic health and growth all the sinews of war will be nourished—political, psychological, military, subversive—and all should be put to work in accordance with plans devised to seek out and destroy the foe at his weakest points. For example, Titoism or other splits in the enemy’s ranks should be aided, and ample means devised for penetrating the Iron Curtain with the truth and other means of subversion.

7. If the analysis of Soviet intentions is correct in arguing that the Kremlin wishes to avoid war for some time, then a judicious use of military power can have a salutary effect in stopping certain forms of Soviet aggression in the near future, as it has in the past, with the effect of diminishing rather than increasing the danger of global war. Such action should be taken without hesitation or apology, being justified by the fact that in a deeper sense a state of war has already been in existence for years. This is clearly recommended where areas are threatened by Soviet capture before longer-range forces, such as economic improvement, can take effect—today in Southeast Asia, tomorrow perhaps in Persia. There is also much to be said for a far more extensive deployment of American forces in Europe, to counterbalance the increasingly prominent influence of Soviet or puppet armed forces in fostering revolution, especially until Germany can be permitted to play a full role in European defense. Otherwise the peoples of Western Europe will continue to be a prey to moods of despair at the thought of being overrun in case of war.

8. The noise of the “peace front,” reflecting a probably vastly exaggerated belief of the Kremlin in the power of its propaganda, should not embarass us in making vigorous use of our military power-probably one of the chief purposes of the “peace” campaign—nor tempt us to resort to spurious imitations. The craving of the world for peace is genuine, and if ways to enlist it sincerely on the side of the Free World can be found, that would be excellent strategy. But it will be unlikely to succeed if not sincere, and it cannot be sincere if it utters mealy platitudes or veils the realities of the total war which is actually going on. The one real road to peace is to win the war.

9. Every occasion should be sought not only for checking Soviet aggression but for forcing a retreat—for instance in the coming battle for Berlin. If the whole Soviet revolutionary offensive is frustrated over the next two or three years, the communists may well have expended so many assets, especially human and spiritual ones, that they would be in a peculiarly weakened condition. A properly designed counteroffensive launched at that point would therefore have some chances of rolling them back as the Russians rolled the Germans after Stalingrad. If, for example, the Kremlin has already seriously overextended itself in China and will try to go much further, the opportunity may arise for inflicting dramatic reverses there.

10. Peace is unlikely to be won, however, as long as the present Soviet regime survives, since its very existence is interwoven with and depends upon waging the total war.

Fundamental Considerations

The actions of the Soviet Government and of the Moscow-directed communist parties since the war have corresponded to the views expressed in Stalin’s basic writings to such an extent that these and similar Politburo pronouncements may be taken to give a general outline of Soviet intentions which is substantially true, if shrewdly interpreted. The picture which results is one of extraordinary focus and tenacity of will, operating within a framework of belief about the operation of long-range forces in history which encourages persistence of effort in the same direction for decades, despite odds which would probably long since have moderated or defeated a gang of merely opportunist power-seekers. The aim of that will is to drive from the face of the earth a social system which it conceives to be moribund but unwilling to depart of its own accord, and to establish instead an all-embracing social order of which the USSR is the expanding embryo. Thus its goal is equally world revolution and world empire. Bolshevization of humanity is the form of Stalin’s will to power.

The road by which this goal is sought is total war, a war which has never ceased since it was declared by the young Lenin. It transcends the legal distinction between war and peace, but is properly called war because it tries to destroy its opponent without any scruple whatever as to means. It is total because it seeks to mobilize every physical and spiritual energy in its service.

The grand strategy which Stalin has described and evidently practiced follows the strict logic of war. The Soviet Union is the main base which, once won, is to be defended at all costs and expanded whenever the general course of battle makes it appropriate. Communist and other movements elsewhere are exploited for what they are thought to be worth under given world conditions, but always in subordination to the requirements of the base and under the strict discipline necessary for maintaining unity of command. No challenge to that unity is tolerated. Insubordination is dealt with by the most severe methods available, even if this entails temporary losses of men or territory.

To ask in greater detail for an appraisal of Soviet intentions at any given time is accordingly to inquire about current plans of campaign. Since the Kremlin gives every sign of operating seriously within the framework of a Leninist-Stalinist philosophy of history, it may be inferred that current plans are shaped to some extent by that philosophy, all the more because it emphasizes factors which would in any case recommend themselves as useful in the struggle for power: the theory was developed by professional revolutionaries; hence it is not surprising if revolutionary thought matches revolutionary will. The features of this conception of history most relevant to the present discussion are:

1. The period which began during World War I is the General Crisis of Capitalism. It is an age of wars and revolutions, beginning with the first breach in the old social system and the initiation of the one destined to replace it, marked by a tragic struggle between the two as country after country falls away from the old camp and joins the new until victory is complete. This implies that a principal aim of strategy will be to facilitate this process, picking off one or more countries at a time, whenever conditions are ripe.

2. The underlying forces at work during this period are: (a) the basic conflicts within the old system which grow worse as it becomes more and more inadequate to the demands of this stage of history, and (b) the increasing strength—moral, economic and military—of the new system as it demonstrates its fitness to solve the problems of the age, notably those of production and employment. This suggests a strategy geared to the rhythm of the underlying forces, designed to magnify their effect and capitalize on it at favorable times.

3. The tensions generated by the underlying forces alternately mount and subside, and strategy is intended to develop aggressively as the tide rises, aiming at maximum gains when a crisis is at its crest; when the tide ebbs, the recommended strategy consists in minimizing losses, avoiding decisive encounters, and re-grouping and re-training forces in preparation for the next rise. There are several different, though somewhat inter-dependent, forms of crisis which mark the General Crisis of Capitalism. Economic crises of industrial and agricultural overproduction occur periodically and tend to issue in fascism, war and revolution. The conflicts between imperialist countries and the areas which they exploit come to a head in colonial wars and rebellions. The rivalries between leading imperialist powers lead to world wars, as does the bitter antagonism between the old social system which (according to Kremlin thinking) is on the way down and the new one which is determined to hasten its demise. Of these forms of crisis, world wars are those which generate by far the biggest tides of change, aggravating and bringing to a focus all the destructive conflicts inherent in the old system. Accordingly it has long been not only a clear implication of Stalin’s theory but his explicit prediction that the next additions to the “socialist camp” would be made during or in the aftermath of World War II, and the prediction has been fulfilled so successfully that Politburo spokesmen are beginning to boast that World War III would bring them world victory.

Thus the context within which the Kremlin’s present plans of campaign have presumably been thought out is that of making the most of the World War II tidal wave. This has been complicated by the long period of pseudo-friendship with the democracies which was dictated by the threat emanating from Germany and Japan and began coming to an end, quite logically, when the threat did. At the present time Soviet policy seems to have completed the 90-degree turn of direction which this tactic involved; the former Ally Number One is now Enemy Number One, and the world is frankly polarized between “socialist” and “capitalist” camps. Henceforth the Kremlin is free to drive as directly at its basic goal as it thinks the balance of forces will allow. Thus the crucial problem in estimating Soviet intentions at the present time is to gauge its estimate of those forces. That is the central theme of later sections of this report. The present section will develop only certain broad lines of approach.

Stalin in analyzing the factors which made possible the success of the October Revolution has attributed considerable efficacy to the craving of the masses for peace after several years of World War I. The Soviet “peace” campaign after World War II, which began early in 1946 if not before, looks like an effort to play on similar popular moods today, creating and prolonging semi-artificially what occurred spontaneously in Russia in 1917. Since the “shooting” war is over, the threat of a new one has to be conjured up instead. After a lengthy propaganda preparation, the campaign has passed through its overt organizational phase and now claims to be entering the phase of “action,” using language which clearly implies revolutionary intent. The length of the preceding phases suggests that the action phase in turn may be expected to run through several years. The point at which it is brought to its climax need not be the same for all countries; in each case it will presumably be synchronized with other moves in the light of the Kremlin’s estimate of the total situation. The implication of revolutionary intent does not necessarily mean direct revolutionary action by the “Peace Front”; in many or possibly even in all cases the role assigned to it may be one of blocking or delaying aid to a revolutionary area from the “capitalist” camp. For example: if, as will be argued below, Stalin wishes to avoid global hostilities for some time, a real show of adequate force in the West would bring him to a halt or even cause him to retreat temporarily. In this respect the “peace movement” may be intended to prevent just such measures on our part.

In addition to the fund of war-weariness which the peace front tries to exploit, two other factors stand out as of probably much greater importance in the Kremlin’s charting of the World War II tidal wave: wars of “liberation” in dependent areas, and economic crisis in leading industrial countries. For present purposes it is unnecessary to discuss the extent to which, in Soviet theory, such events are direct consequences of World War II or represent independent chains of causation. It is evident in any case that amid the general dislocation and unrest of the war’s aftermath they have occupied a central place in the Kremlin’s calculations. At the present time the outstanding fact is that just as a major victory was being consummated in China and public attention was being directed toward further fields for “liberation,” notably Southeast Asia, word went out from the Kremlin that the long-hoped-for economic crisis had already begun in the West late in 1948. Though the public statements about the “crisis” may be assumed to exaggerate for propaganda effect, both the nature and source of the statements and the tempo of accompanying Soviet actions make it probable that the development of a depression in the West, considered already fairly serious and expected to reach drastic proportions perhaps two or three years hence, has become a sober Kremlin belief which plays a prominent role in shaping Soviet intentions. Thus in the Kremlin’s view the position of the “capitalist camp” is impaired by the approximate coincidence of two major forms of crisis: wars of “liberation” in the East and depression in the West. This means that the Kremlin probably plans to accelerate its efforts to exploit the World War II tidal wave between now and about 1953. It is evidently no accident that the “action phase” of the “peace campaign” has been initiated at the same time, and it is also relevant to note that Soviet internal postwar rehabilitation is now claimed to be completed.

“Accelerated effort” does not mean that caution will be thrown to the winds, but it does mean rapid expenditure of accumulated assets, throwing into action forces which have been recruited and trained for the purpose, cashing in on alliances, taking greater than ordinary risks for the sake of anticipated gains. Following the analogy of a military campaign, which seems peculiarly appropriate for Soviet activities, the big offensive should not be thought of as an indiscriminate splurge of energy in all directions, but as conducted under carefully thought-out operational plans which are flexibly applied in day-to-day tactics and revised as the campaign develops and unexpected successes or reverses are encountered or new opportunities perceived. Such plans can be expected to make use of the standard rules of the art of warfare—mass, surprise, maneuver, etc.—and an understanding of these rules should prove useful in anticipating Soviet moves.

In trying to estimate the main outlines of the present Soviet plan of campaign, the decisive questions are: How far does the Kremlin intend to go, in various directions? How fast? At what risks? And underlying these questions lies the perennial problem for all estimates of Soviet intentions; How far does the Kremlin’s view of facts and trends, of its capabilities and of ours, differ from our own?

In view of the Kremlin’s ultimate objective, it might seem that in general it intends to go just as far as it can, in every direction, during the present offensive, while Stalin is still alive. However, overextension is a serious danger which prudent commanders seek to avoid. Eighteen months ago it was still the prevailing opinion, according to an estimate received from the State Department, that the Communists would stop half-way in China and not press on to win the whole country. Mr. Kennan’s article in the Readers Digest for March, 1950,⁸ remarks that Soviet imperialism “bit off more than it could comfortably chew” in Eastern Europe. Other eminent students of Soviet affairs have suggested that analogous considerations probably lead the Kremlin to prefer winning a nationalist Germany as a dependent ally to a fully communized Germany, which might threaten Moscow’s monopoly of power. Nevertheless there are considerations which point to a more expansive estimate of the Kremlin’s belief in its own digestive powers: the daemonic drive which has characterized the Bolshevik movement from its beginnings; the fact that they did take all of China and evidently have no intention of stopping there; the enormous self-confidence of an organization which won power against great odds, held and developed it for decades, came victorious out of World War II, and since then has added half a billion population to its empire.

Indeed, given the Kremlin’s basic aims and philosophy, there are reasons which would seem to make it imperative for it to make further major additions to its empire during the present offensive. Holding that violence is required to achieve the new social order, and that this inevitably leads to destructive clashes between the old order and the new, it cannot bide its time and trust that the old will disintegrate merely by reason of its own inner conflicts. Until the old is finally destroyed, there is always a danger that it will crush the budding new order, and the whole painful process of revolution have to begin over again. Hence the problem is to avoid a head-on conflict but continue gaining at the expense of the foe until decisive superiority of force is attained. During the inter-war period, the Kremlin could bank on division between the other great powers to make this possible. Since World War II there remains only one other comparable power, and Politburo statements described the world as evolving into precisely that polarization around two centers which Stalin long ago predicted as the stage which would lead to a final struggle for the world. Thus the prewar strategy is no longer possible. It is true that much is still made of “Anglo-American contradictions,” but the Kremlin, however badly it misunderstands US–UK relations can hardly count on Britain becoming strong enough to disrupt the basic polarity of the two super-powers. The belief that major communist gains are won chiefly in connection with world wars implies that the tidal wave of World War II may offer the last chance of really substantial additions to the Orbit before World War III. Hence in order eventually not to meet World War III under a disadvantage that might prove fatal, the Kremlin very likely feels that it must make drastic efforts to gain something close to half of the world’s basic resources—natural, human and productive—during the present offensive. If it won most of the vital parts of Southeast Asia, a good share of Near-Eastern oil, plus all of Germany, this goal would be substantially attained. These are in fact the areas which recent Politburo statements imply greatest interest in. Despite the danger of over-extension, it seems on balance that they probably are the objectives of the Kremlin’s new offensive.

How fast the Kremlin actually moves toward these objectives will of course depend on developments during the campaign. As far as present intentions are concerned, the fact that the crisis in the East has already reached a high point with the revolution in China, whereas the alleged economic crisis in the West is described in terms which suggest that it is only gradually getting under way, points to the probability that the Kremlin expects to move most rapidly in Southeast Asia during the coming year, saving its main thrusts in Europe and the Near East for later—though of course engaging in preparatory, supporting or diversionary actions there. However, the Kremlin undoubtedly believes that its recent gains in the East have weakened Western countries themselves as well as their “colonial” positions, thereby making immediately possible more extensive gains in the West than the economic “crisis,” if acting alone, would indicate. Hence it is conceivable that it has advanced its timetable somewhat in the West, and may be planning quite dramatic moves there too during 1950. The desire to press forward before MDAP has significantly enlarged West European military stamina would also favor acceleration in that area.

The most decisive question concerns the risks which the Kremlin intends to take, and these in turn depend in large measure on how it estimates the capabilities of each side and the elasticity of our intentions. Considerations advanced in the preceding pages support the view that the Kremlin, because of the urgency of its objectives and the expected limitations on time at its disposal, is prepared to take very serious risks, but not to the extent of starting a war to the finish. The latter point is also reinforced by the apparently controlling objective of Soviet domestic policy, which is projecting long-range industrial and agricultural programs in order to achieve full “communism” in one or more decades. The defensive character of Soviet military installations recently observed in Central and Eastern Europe further suggests a desire to avoid war at present, and may correspond to a Soviet belief that the only way in which the West could really stop Soviet cold war aggressive efforts would be by a shooting war. Indeed it is self-evident that only reckless romanticists, which the Bolsheviks are not, deliberately start wars unless victory seems assured at moderate cost. Assuming, as seems most probable, that the Kremlin does not expect to obtain such a favorable superiority of forces in the next few years, the question narrows to one of estimating how close to war the Kremlin will dare to go, while yet intending to avoid it? It is at this point that the most serious danger of war appears to lie during the next few years. It is entirely possible that the USSR, exalted by its present mood of confidence and impelled by the fancied necessity of grabbing while it thinks it can, may underestimate our capabilities and consequently our intentions, hence precipitate a situation in which we feel compelled to fight. The “peace campaign” in one of its aspects looks very like an effort to insure against the chances of our going to war over the losses which the Kremlin intends to inflict on us during the present revolutionary offensive.

This does not at all mean that the Kremlin will seek to avoid “incidents”. It is already producing these at a very serious rate which is likely to intensify. It might conceivably engage, directly or through satellites, even in rather protracted hostilities as it did with Japan in 1938, provided it calculates that they can be localized. Of course it realizes that our position today is not analogous to Japan’s in that we face no second threat which would compel us to keep such hostilities local. Nevertheless we have amply advertized our unwillingness to begin a war; the “peace campaign” is intended to brand us in advance as aggressors if we should; and it is even plausible to suggest that one purpose of the current propaganda against using atomic bombs is to make public opinion deter us from using the one weapon which would almost automatically turn limited hostilities into global war.

Even if the Kremlin thoroughly intends, however, to keep the situation under control, it does not follow that it will succeed. In addition to the risk, above mentioned, of underestimating us, there is also a risk of overestimation: in daring to steer very close to war, the Kremlin is creating a state of tension in which a false belief that we were about to attack might actually prompt it to attack first. This is a subtler and probably a remoter risk than the other, but it should not be discounted altogether. The desirability of securing initial advantage in atomic war, the relatively favorable position of the Soviet Army for overrunning Europe and the Near East, and the neurotic hypersensitivity of Soviet suspicions, fostered by isolation from normal contacts and by corresponding dependence on the apparently sometimes fantastic mental world of the MGB, all lend some substance to this possibility. Nor is it wise to consider Stalinist dogma a likely preventive. Though the Bolsheviks have in general developed their strategy and tactics under the pretext of righteous reaction against “capitalist” oppression and aggression, there is nothing in Stalin’s teachings which excludes initiating a war as a matter of principle. On the contrary, the basic doctrine is the aggressive use of violence to destroy our social order. The Bolsheviks have never shown any reluctance to resort to violence except where their position was too weak to make it prudent. Stalin’s writings make it very obvious that his strategy of avoiding war and letting the “capitalists” attack first—preferably each other—was adapted to the phase of relative weakness, and that as the Soviet base of world revolution grew in power it would rely on its own force to attain its ends with increasing frankness. The repeated failure of the Comintern⁹ to achieve much in promoting revolution abroad must have encouraged this trend.

So far the discussion has been based on what seems the most probable Soviet outlook. Since, however, what is probable can always turn out to be false, it may be worth while to indicate some alternative possibilities in order to set perspectives in better balance. It is possible, though it seems distinctly less probable, that the evidence from which the Kremlin’s beliefs and intentions have been inferred is consistently over-theorized and over-colored, that the Politburo are really much more sensible than their propaganda line seems to indicate. In that case, their actions will prove in the end to be less risky and less aggressive than above predicted, and the whole structure of evidence as it appears today will then seem to have been partly bluff, designed to protect a position which was in fact believed to be somewhat weaker and to secure goals which were in fact more modest than those above described. On the other hand it is also possible that the above reading of the evidence lags behind reality, that the more extreme among recent Soviet statements approximate literal sincerity, and that the Kremlin’s head has been so turned by its recent successes, and so cut off from reality by its own paranoid security measures and propaganda, that it really does expect to be in position to give the Free World the coup de grâce within the next few years. Though, as argued above, this still seems improbable, it is a possibility which, considering the tone of current Soviet speech and action, definitely should not be excluded. It would of course become more serious if, despite our efforts, the Kremlin moved conspicuously closer to a position which might seem to put it within striking distance of world victory—for example by winning control of Persia and the Ruhr, though the more probable course of action would still seem to be avoiding global hostilities until Soviet power were overwhelmingly predominant: the Kremlin might well consider that really big gains, if made during the next few years, would so weaken and disorganize the remainder of the “capitalist” camp as to delay its postwar stabilization and thus prolong the World War II tidal wave indefinitely, thereby making possible continued acquisition of country after country until an easy final shove would suffice to do the rest, perhaps 5 or 10 years hence. A third alternative possibility might be that the rulers of the USSR are in a sense dual personalities, embodying to a considerable degree the trait, often noted among Russians, of maintaining quite contradictory beliefs and attitudes at the same time, and of shifting from one to another without serious difficulty in a way which baffles prediction. If so, this merely adds one more dimension of uncertainty to the picture.

To resume the main thread of the discussion, however, it should be re-stated that the balance of probability still seems to support the view that the Kremlin does not intend full scale war in the next few years. In this connection, it is relevant to recall one of Stalin’s remarks during the early years of World War II: he said that victory must go in the end to the side which produced the greater number of motors (for tanks, trucks and planes), and stated that Allied motor production was three times that of the Axis. This is in keeping with the tone of sober calculation which has characterized much of Stalin’s public discussion of the world situation throughout the years, and also fits the accounts of acquaintances who recall the realist’s scorn with which he often rejected the proposals of more impractical colleagues.

If what seems probable is really true, then the danger of war, though definitely present because of possible miscalculation, is not the main threat which confronts the Free World during the current Soviet offensive. For this reason it seems important that neither governments nor public opinion should become so overly obsessed with the dramatic but secondary danger of “shooting” war, that they neglect to form that unity of command and scale of effort required to meet the primary danger, which arises from the never-ending “total” war against our social order. The present discussion of Soviet intentions is only one of several necessary approaches to a comprehensive understanding of the danger that confronts us in this total war. As far as this study goes, the tentative conclusion is: so much of Eurasia may be lost by means short of full-scale war, that the existence of freedom in the world will be jeopardized some 20 years hence.

[Here follow the remaining 43 pages of the report. The fundamental considerations are treated in separate sections under these main headings: Political (Far East, Europe, Near East and South Asia, Western Hemisphere, UN and Other International Organizations); Military; Economic; Agriculture; and Morale and Propaganda.]

1. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 603.
2. The telegram is not separately printed. The significant information is quoted immediately following.
3. For documentation on this meeting, see vol. iii, pp. 795 ff.
4. Ho Chi Minh was the “President of the Provisional Government of the Vietnam Democratic Republic.”
5. Marshal Josip Broz Tito was President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of National Defense of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia.
6. For documentation on this topic, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.
7. The system of collective farms, the prevalent agricultural organization in the Soviet Union.
8. See the editorial note, p. 1107.
9. The Third (Communist) International was founded by the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919.