Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

761.5/12–1750: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State ¹

[Extracts] top secret

Moscow, December 17, 1950—2 p. m.

1198. Embassy concurs in Department view that any Soviet decision regarding overt military action in West would probably not rest on mere announcement of agreement to utilize West German forces.² Soviets undoubtedly watching entire rearmament picture closely, US mobilization as well as German defense steps. To date Soviet people have been told that western powers have aggressive intentions which pose ultimate threat to USSR if not frustrated. So far Soviet propaganda has been assuring people that peace will conquer war although there are some intimations that fight for peace might have to be conducted with more than words. Role of Soviet Army still portrayed as defence of homeland and state interests of USSR. Latter presumably embraces existence of friendly governments on periphery in present period but nothing has been noticed which would tend to justify in peoples mind outward movement to complete ring for this purpose alone. Iran case reflected contrary disposition. Hence large scale Soviet move on western Europe would clearly be preventive at fairly early stage of malady and although dictatorship can give orders at any time such move would find quite different reaction from people who defended homeland in 1941. Basic Soviet Marxism would call for the Soviet Army to come out in exploitation of revolutionary situation abroad at point where revolutionary force showed promise of enough success to enable the combination of forces to attain victory. If this thinking applies here, a decision as to whether to take overt military action or not would probably depend heavily upon progress on Chinese front and in peace movement.

Failure of Chinese to show promise of breaking out of containment in Asia could serve as brake on decision to use Soviet Army in Europe. On other hand moderate Chinese successes could hold out expectation that joint Chinese and Soviet efforts would be victorious. Indications of prospect of sweeping Chinese successes might eliminate need for Soviet extention of hostilities to West as being unnecessary in long run. On other hand appears likely that peace movement must demonstrate more success spreading confusion and defeatism and slowing practical defense moves in West than it has so far before it makes the required contribution. Announcement on German rearmament and on national emergency in US as well as UN reaction to Korean developments are signs that peace movement has not been too effective along this line.

Consideration of Soviet military strategy in FE so far leaves impression that large scale sudden offensive as assault on western Europe would not be likely if Soviets could push eastern Germans supported substantially by satellite troops as “volunteers” into conflict with West Germany and Allied troops there thus creating situation where Soviet leaders could assist covertly and watch progress of events for time when decision could be made either to throw in full weight of military strength or act as peacemaker. USSR treaty obligations to satellites for immediate assistance in event they are subjected to attack by Germany and Allies, which might be complicating factor in this strategy, could be obviated or delayed by insistence on “volunteer” nature of participation satellite troops.

Soviets have endeavored through the peace movement to inundate world public with thought that first country using atomic bomb is barbaric perhaps with idea in mind that US reaction to above strategy would be to indict USSR immediately and launch atomic attack on it which they would expect to result in crystallization of world support around Soviet Union as victim of this established concept.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

We also agree with Paris comment (paragraph 3 Paris telegram 3471, December 16³) on additional probable Soviet reaction, which would be consistent Soviet policy to date of endeavoring to buy time and sow confusion by speciously conciliatory pronouncements with threatening overtones. With Paris, we feel that importance of three powers standing together in face of Soviet reaction is overriding and, despite the urgency of present situation, would even be prepared accept somewhat less than maximum desirable decisions, if in doing so we could be sure of achieving wholehearted French and British support in meeting further Soviet moves.

Barbour

1. This telegram was relayed to London, Paris, Brussels, and Frankfort at 11:05 a. m. on December 17.
2. The present telegram was in reference to telegram 3026 sent by the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on December 13, not printed, which was concerned with the possible reaction of the Soviet Union to German participation in European defense. (740.5/12–950)
3. Not printed. The telegram was in relation to having tripartite conversations on a possible reply to a Soviet note proposing four-power talks. (396.1/12–1650)