768.5/12–2950: Telegram
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State
803. We doubt British FonOff had seen, when it reached conclusions, reported in Deptel 599, December 27 (sent Paris 3443, repeated information London 3175),1 report of farewell conversation on December [Page 1515] 20 between Tito and Colonel Dewhurst, retiring British MilAtt. Dewhurst’s report of conversation re military supplies was shown to me in confidence by British Ambassador. Tito is reported to have replied to Dewhurst’s question whether Yugoslavia has sufficient equipment: “I am satisfied that my standing army is well equipped, or will be in the nearest future. I cannot ask for arms from west even if I wanted to. My object is Yugoslavia should remain neutral—until, at any rate, third world war breaks out: in the latter circumstance I realize I shall be drawn in. But to remain neutral, I must act neutrally. I cannot have people saying, ‘That is an American tank. Those are British guns. Yugoslavia is an Anglo-American base.’ I will give no provocation to other side (Moscow).” In response to Dewhurst’s further question “Do you then require nothing, and are you able to fight alone?”, Tito replied: “Not if Russia invades us. Then we will need help from the West”.
In view of this recent and clearly expressed attitude by Tito, it seems to me highly unlikely that he would concur in any arrangement involving sending in of a team of Allied service experts.2 If any conversations on military needs were desirable, it seems to me service attaches already here could do whatever may be necessary, at least at start. I continue question however desirability of our initiating subject. I would prefer await Tito’s approach to us. I might even suggest we make him ask us twice before we answer, to make certain he wants our help and to avoid any possible impression we are pressing it on him.
There is one way to strengthen Yugoslav militarily with minimum effort on our part and practically no risk of provocation on part Yugoslav Government, namely, to loosen up US and WE export controls which seem to me to be about as tight now as they were before new tripartite policy was developed. It seems anomalous to me to continue deny export licenses for small amounts of things of military or potential military significance after joint decision has been reached that our best interests will be served by strengthening Yugoslavia’s ability resist aggression. A recent British example was FonOff proposal remove armor plating from half-tracks of lend lease origin before shipping them to Yugoslavia. Department in position find current US examples. I therefore strongly recommend that export controls be brought quickly into line with developing tripartite policy.
Sent Department 803 repeated information London 46 Paris 116.
- Supra.↩
- Telegram 3675, December 28, from Paris, not printed, commenting briefly upon telegram 3443 to Paris (supra), also expressed doubt as to the desirability of a direct tripartite approach to Yugoslavia. The Embassy also believed that the use of the French agreement to supply Yugoslavia with war materials in order to attempt to secure Yugoslav acceptance of a team of Allied service experts was no longer possible in view of the advanced stage of negotiations (768.56/12–2850).↩