884A.00/2–1550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare)
Subject: Situation in Palestine; Arms Shipments to Near East Countries.
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Henry Morgenthau | |
| NEA: Mr. Hare |
Mr. Morgenthau came in at his request to pass on to the Secretary certain impressions of his recent visit to Israel. Mr. Morgenthau first spoke briefly of the extremely difficult economic position in which Israel finds itself owing particularly to the large number of immigrants which is being brought in despite restricted facilities for their assimilation. He also mentioned additional difficulty caused by war damage, particularly to the orange groves, as well as recent hardship resulting from severe weather conditions. Without pursuing this general subject in detail he reached the conclusion that Israel is now faced by “just about as difficult an economic problem as could be imagined”.
Mr. Morgenthau then turned to the question of the security of Israel which he said he had discussed at length with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and found to be his most serious preoccupation. Mr. Morgenthau [Page 743] said that, as a result of his talks with Mr. Ben-Gurion and other Israeli officials, he was convinced that there is no question that the present Government of Israel is definitely on our side in the present East-West conflict. Thus far, Israel had refrained from taking such a public position but Mr. Morgenthau said he had been given clear indication that Israeli leaders were thinking in terms of taking such a political plunge and that Mr. Ben-Gurion had even intimated that he might be prepared to take this step even though it might mean irretrievably prejudicing the prospects for Jewish immigration from behind the “Iron Curtain”. The fact that Mr. Ben-Gurion was thinking in such terms is very significant since Israeli leaders are imbued by what amounts to a religious fervor as concerns the fate of their coreligionists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Mr. Morgenthau said that he had also received the impression that the Israeli Government might be receptive to the idea of extending base rights to the United States in the Negev. Additional evidence of the anti-Communist bias of the Israeli Government was seen in the strong statements made by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in the Knesset in refuting charges directed at Mr. Morgenthau by several communist deputies.
In the face of this reassuring attitude of the Israeli Government, Mr. Morgenthau said that he was greatly disturbed by the situation being created by arms shipments to the Arab States, particularly to Egypt. He was convinced that Israel sincerely wanted peace and that peace in the Near Eastern area was very much in the interest of the United States. The arms currently being shipped to the Arab States, however, constituted a menace to Israeli security and, by arousing fear of a renewal of hostilities, resulted in an emphasis being placed upon arms procurement which would better be placed on more constructive effort. But if arms were to be furnished the Arab States the least that could be done was to give Israel the facility of commensurate armament by raising the present United States “embargo” on the licensing of arms shipments to Israel. The matter was pressing because it was the conviction of those with whom he had talked in Israel that, as matters were progressing, the Egyptians were planning the renewal of hostilities this Spring.
Mr. Morgenthau seemed to entertain certain misgivings regarding the attitude of the British in this matter. He referred to a flight which he had made over the Gulf of Aqaba and to his having seen a British cruiser and several destroyers in the area. He felt that such a display of force was hardly conducive to the creation of a proper atmosphere for peaceful negotiation.
The Secretary said that he was in entire agreement with Mr. Morgenthau regarding the necessity of preserving the peace in the Near East. Our efforts were constantly directed to that end and he had [Page 744] also discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Bevin. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Hare might have certain specific observations to make regarding the status of arms shipments to Israel, and intelligence available to us regarding the likelihood of the renewal of conflict.
Mr. Hare referred to Ambassador Austin’s statement of last August setting forth American policy regarding the avoidance of an arms race in the Middle East1 and said that this was the guide of our actions in this matter. Regarding the specific question of arms shipments from the United States, a considerable quantity of material had been shipped to Israel, in fact a relatively much greater amount than had been shipped to the Arab States. No applications by the Israeli Government had as yet been refused but decision on certain items was still pending in order that appropriate consideration could be given in the light of established policy. This matter had been under active discussion with the Israeli Embassy here and the Israeli Ambassador had discussed it recently with the Secretary. Pursuant thereto a new and comprehensive Israeli list of arms requirements had been submitted by the Israeli Embassy just the day before and would be actively examined. In the circumstances it was hardly consonant with the facts of the case to refer to an “embargo”. In replying to a question by Mr. Morgenthau whether in fact there was any hope that pending requests would be favorably considered, Mr. Hare replied that the first question of course would be whether the items mentioned were actually available; as far as licensing went, there was no question of any obstacle to fair and reasonable consideration but it was of course impossible to predict action which might be taken on specific items.
Mr. Hare then observed that there was another angle to this question which had to be borne in mind; this was the general strategic situation in the Near East disassociated from the question of Arab-Israeli difficulty. If one could for the moment leave the question of Israel aside, it was obvious that the strengthening of the Near East could play an important role in maintaining desired general security requirements. It was also only natural that there should be a certain emphasis on the historically important Suez Canal area. What was difficult was a satisfactory evaluation of Arab-Israeli difficulty as related to the general strategic pattern of the area. On the one side, it was perfectly understandable that the Israelis should be perturbed by Egyptian rearmament. On the other hand, it was possible to misjudge the situation seriously if arms furnished Egypt were regarded entirely in terms of their potential threat to Israel. The question would seem to be resolved into one of basic intent and in this connection all [Page 745] of the reports which we had been getting from Egypt indicated that those in authority in that country did not have the intention of renewing hostilities with Israel. This information had been furnished by our Ambassador in Cairo, who had been in constant touch with the Egyptian Government on the subject. The Egyptian Ambassador had recently visited the Department for the specific purpose of conveying a similar assurance. General Riley, United Nations Observer in the area, recently expressed the opinion that a renewal of hostilities was not only improbable but in his opinion impossible. Furthermore, relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including Egypt, are covered by Armistice agreements and the Egyptian Government had recently taken pains to make it clear that these agreements should remain in force until such time as peace settlements were reached. A mistaken appraisal was always possible but information available to the Department did not lead to the conclusion that Egypt intended an early renewal of hostilities. The Secretary intervened at this point to emphasize the importance which we attach to this matter and said that he would give instruction that our intelligence efforts thereon be diligently pursued.
[Here follows the last paragraph on the recent call of prominent American labor officials on President Truman in connection with arms shipments to the Near East.]
- Regarding Ambassador Austin’s statement of August 4, 1949, on this subject, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vi, p. 1283.↩